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Introduction
This Handbook of Secular Bioethics is the result of many years of teaching and 
research. Thanks to this accumulated experience we are now able to summarize 
in this book the key issues of this new discipline. Bioethics, although initially 
questioned as a specific area of knowledge, has now consolidated its place in the 
study plans of most universities, in faculties of philosophy, law, biology, medi-
cine and nursing, and in schools of engineering and other technical subjects.
The aim of this book is to provide the information that students on degree 
and post-graduate courses in the subject need, and our intention is to do so in 
a critical way, allowing readers to come to their own conclusions. We under-
stand that university teaching must be addressed to providing a framework of 
knowledge and arguments to enable students to develop their own ideas and 
take part in the informed social debate, as well as to pass the subjects. This is 
precisely what would produce a high-quality democracy such as the one we 
would like to have. Obviously, what we have just said with reference to stu-
dents also goes for anyone interested in bioethical issues, which by their very 
nature affect us and challenge us as citizens.
We the authors of this handbook are part of a powerful group with a strong 
identity. Our work is a continuation of the line that Doctor Casado began 
nearly 30 years ago in the Bioethics and Law Observatory (OBD, UNESCO 
Chair in Bioethics),1 a research centre at the University of Barcelona that works 
in an interdisciplinary way and from secular points of view. Its presence can be 
felt both symbolically and practically, and nationally and internationally. 
Working online has made it possible to share knowledge with different inter-
national groups. Particularly, the creation of links to Latin America has en-
 1 The OBD was created in 1995, and since 2007 it has been the home of the Chair of Bioethics that 
was awarded to Doctor Casado by UNESCO. It is part of UNESCO’s UNITWIN Network for 
higher education, and of the eleven currently in existence in the world it is the only one in Spain. 
Our team was consolidated around the master’s degree in Bioethics and Law, which was inaugurated 
in 1995 and has since then been taught uninterruptedly. More information at www.bioeticayderecho.
ub.edu.
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riched and reinforced discussion, something reflected in the group’s networks, 
research projects and publications, especially Revista Bioética y Derecho, where 
the studies and analyses of many researchers from both sides of the Atlantic 
Ocean have converged.
For us, bioethics is an area of knowledge that requires plural approaches 
and solid scientific backup in order to analyse the ethical, legal and social con-
sequences of biotechnology and biomedicine. By combining the words “law” 
and “bioethics” our goal is to allude not just to the legal system — which is 
used as a connecting thread when analysing problems — but to the idea that 
the human rights recognized in international texts constitute the lowest com-
mon denominator from a secular perspective. Our objective is to supply infor-
mation, arguments and ideas to encourage autonomy and responsibility, so 
that bioethical decisions may result in the construction of a more transparent 
and democratic society.
The current development of bioethics as a framework of interdisciplinary 
thinking in order to face the challenges inherent in biomedicine and biotech-
nology has emerged in response to a set of ideas established over the years: 
from a religious angle, certain limits must not be transgressed, and human 
dignity is the last link of our civilization. From a secular, progressive point of 
view, progress must have repercussions for humanity as a whole, thus avoiding 
the profits being privatized and the risks being socialized; the emergence of 
new technology-based sources of power, each one more predatory, must be 
prevented; the market cannot resolve moral dilemmas, but at the same time 
progress must not be held back by dogmas and irrational beliefs; the figure of 
the entrepreneurial scientist differs from the idealized and naïve view that is 
transmitted about research activity; ethics is politics; law is ideology, and we 
have no external or past source to guide us or enlighten us in this unexpected 
and exponential technological progress that has taken place in recent decades.
The context of uncertainty about the future of science and technology ex-
plains why the problems of bioethics must be debated by society as a whole, 
the ultimate objective being to achieve the broadest possible consensus, an 
essential requirement for coexistence based on respect for democratic plural-
ism. The search for rules of the game that are acceptable to the majority of 
citizens, regardless of their ideological preferences, is not just the basis of the 
rule of law, but a precondition for the resolution of the countless problems 
that technological progress generates. Globalization has brought with it a dif-
ferent context for bioethics; today the main problems are no longer focused so 
much on patient autonomy as on justice, and disputes have as much to do 
with the impact of science and technology as with that of money. Neoliberal 
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ideology has resulted in growing inequality in access to healthcare and to the 
benefits of research. The mechanisms of social protection have been mini-
mized and the welfare state is being privatized.
The shift from patients to citizens that we were calling for has resulted in 
citizens being turned into consumers and, for that same reason, people, groups 
and populations are now more vulnerable than before.2 In this time of run-
away neoliberalism that promotes false freedom — because when individuals 
lack financial resources they are not free to choose — it is ever more necessary 
to appeal to solidarity and to the construction of values that can be shared.
In this respect, the law establishes minimums for coexistence and, pre-
cisely, the point of departure is respect for recognized human rights. However, 
do we have enough guarantees?
In our subject, the Council of Europe, as the body responsible for ensuring 
the acknowledgment and the effective protection of these rights, has attempt-
ed to offer a “common law” and to harmonize international laws in matters of 
bioethics, and it has also had an ad hoc committee to carry out this task. With 
its special dedication to the protection of human rights, it has drafted numer-
ous resolutions on the rights of the sick, of the dying, on euthanasia, organ 
donation, transplants, AIDS, research with humans, assisted reproduction, 
genetic engineering and databanks, and it was responsible for drafting the 
European Convention on Human Rights in Medicine and Biotechnology, 
very important as a benchmark for both the continent and for non-European 
countries.
Along these same harmonizing lines, on 19 October 2005, in Paris, the 
UNESCO General Conference adopted the Universal Declaration on Bioeth-
ics and Human Rights, with the objective of guiding the international intro-
duction of common principles for the whole of humanity with regard to ethi-
cal issues associated with medicine, life sciences and related technologies, 
taking into account their social, legal and environmental dimensions. It is the 
third regulatory text drafted and adopted by UNESCO on the subject of bio-
ethics. The first was the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights, which the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 1997, 
 2 Recently, we have paid special attention to this subject in Casado (coord.) et al. (2015). Bioética, 
derecho y sociedad. Madrid: Trotta (first edition 1998); in Casado (coord.) (2009). Casado, M. (co-
ord.). “Sobre la dignidad y los principios. Análisis de la Declaración Universal sobre Bioética y 
Derechos Humanos de la Unesco”, Civitas; and in Casado, M. (coord.) (2016). De la solidaridad al 
mercado. El cuerpo humano y el comercio biotecnológico. Mexico City: Fontamara (new edition Edi-
cions de la Universitat de Barcelona, 2017).
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coinciding with the 50th anniversary, the following year, of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights; and the second was the International Declaration 
on Human Genetic Data, adopted in 2003 to establish the ethical principles 
that must prevail in the use of genetic data obtained from biological samples. 
As far as Spain is concerned, there are a good number of laws addressed to 
contemporary bioethical issues, such as human assisted reproduction tech-
niques, transplants, biomedical research and, above all, patient autonomy, 
which establishes a model for doctor/patient relationships based on the prin-
ciple of informed consent and respect for the latter’s autonomy. 
Part of this legislation was inspired by the Documents drafted in the Bio-
ethics and Law Observatory during the last 20 years, an inspiration that is in 
keeping with our idea that bioethics is not just an academic or clinical disci-
pline, but that it must work to improve the society in which we live. We be-
lieve that bringing about changes in the law is one of the most effective means 
of influence, and this explains our public vocation and the Observatory’s in-
sistence on publishing rulings and reports openly with recommendations. It 
also explains the importance we attach to the legal and argumentational aspect 
of our teaching, aimed at preparing the students to change the reality in which 
they live.
With all this experience, persuaded that education is a basic cornerstone 
for having a truly democratic — free and responsible — citizenry, we have 
focused our efforts on teaching bioethics in different academic and profes-
sional areas. We are now taking things a step further by publishing this hand-
book. With it, we hope to provide knowledge of bioethics and its debates to 
everyone who is interested in the subject from a secular point of view.
From this perspective, we have produced this Handbook of Secular Bioeth-
ics, whose first volume includes the core and by now classic subjects of bioeth-
ics as an area of knowledge: its characteristics and specificities, its themes, its 
origins, the values, principles and rights in which it is framed, and the most 
important issues that the discipline deals with, from the beginning to the end 
of life, including sexual and reproductive health, voluntary termination of 
pregnancy, assisted reproduction, euthanasia, organ transplants and the envi-
ronment. The issues raised by research, the new genetic technologies, biotech-
nologies, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence and big data, as well as citi-
zens’ rights in healthcare, the scope of conscientious objection and the role of 
ethics committees, will form the content, in the future, of a second volume. 
The book can be used as a basis for teaching in universities, but it also 
makes autonomous learning possible given that it touches on the basic themes 
of the subject and after a careful reading of it readers will be equipped with the 
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basic elements of information and debate. Combining brevity with thorough-
ness is a difficulty that we have faced in every subject dealt with in this hand-
book. While it is obvious that, due to the limited space available in a book 
such as this one, all aspects of every problem cannot be dealt with, our goal has 
been to systematically supply the most relevant information and arguments to 
enable each reader to consider them and to form opinions of their own. It is 
up to the readers to judge whether or not we have succeeded in this aim. 
María Casado
Manuel Jesús López Baroni
Barcelona and Seville, summer 2018

1	 the object of Bioethics
1. Introduction1
The term bioethics, although apparently consolidated, is problematic not just 
because of the scope conferred upon the name, but also because the problems 
with it are political and legal rather than ethical. The key issue focuses on 
whether or not it is necessary to regulate the possibilities that bio technologies 
offer us, and if so, in what sense. As they do not have a clear unambiguous so-
cial response, these problems result in a demand for legislation, and this be-
comes an issue that falls within the sphere of legal axiology: what are the values 
that we must protect and how should it be done? With regard to the possibility 
of intervening in biological processes, there is disagreement within society that 
generates conflict and this requires the law to play its part to establish the lim-
its of the freedom of individual action.
Laws are evidently related to morals, although they do not depend on eth-
ics for their configuration, and over the centuries the analysis of these relation-
ships has been a crucial aspect of philosophical and legal thinking. Our ap-
proach starts from the confirmation of the moral pluralism of society, and that 
this pluralism is not just a fact but a constitutionally protected value. At the 
same time, however, we are opposed to scepticism in values, in the sense that 
we consider rational argument to be possible in ethics and that good reasons 
can be put forward in favour of the options that are chosen. Faced with the 
 1 This chapter revisits issues dealt with in Casado, M. (coord.) (1996). “La bioética”, in Materiales de 
bioética y derecho. Barcelona: Cedecs Editorial; Casado, M. (coord.) (1998). Nuevo derecho para la 
nueva genética. Bioética, derecho y sociedad. Madrid: Trotta. The second edition was published in 
2015; Casado, M. (comp.) (2007). Nuevos materiales de bioética y derecho. Mexico City: Fontamara; 
Casado, M. (coord.) (2000). Hacia una concepción flexible de la bioética. Estudios de bioética y dere-
cho. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanc; and in López Baroni, M. J. (2011). “Los principios no originarios de 
la Bioética”, in Revista Argumentos de Razón Técnica, no. 13, pp. 113-149; López Baroni, M. J. (2013): 
“Las Bioéticas Laicas”, in Argumentos de Razón Técnica, no. 16, pp. 121-161; López Baroni, M. J. 
(2013): “Ética y Moral en la Bioética”, in Cuadernos Electrónicos de Filosofía del Derecho, no. 27, 
pp. 96-120.
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attitudes of extreme relativism, our initial standpoint here implies the possibil-
ity of rationally elucidating whether or not the moral judgments that we up-
hold are correct. In contrast to attitudes that preach the existence of absolute 
and incontrovertible truths, we propose that any moral judgment be subject to 
rational discussion and criticism.
Individual and social considerations can, moreover, be based on trust and 
faith in beneficent progress or radical mistrust of dehumanized science. The 
issues are often presented as conflicts of global attitudes. This is easy to see 
when dealing with euthanasia, abortion or the consideration of the limits of 
science. But these radical conflicts also arise in other fields — in political 
choices, for example, and we have learned to reconcile them, perhaps after 
centuries! These views of conflicts of absolutes, held by important philoso-
phers and certain sectors of opinion, are not a good point of departure for 
analysing issues and learning to reconcile them, something we necessarily have 
to do. It is perhaps in this kind of situation where the tolerance of people and 
societies is best put to the test: tolerance as a tactic is not the same as tolerance 
as an attitude.
Many of the differences in the various meanings that are given to key terms, 
for instance “person”, “dignity” and “life”, besides placing us in an awkward 
position, could be a problem for starting the bioethical debate. Therefore, the 
first thing would be to discern their meaning and transmit these concerns to 
the citizens, since bioethical issues are also political issues. 
This poses the problem of moral agreement, of consensus in ethics and its 
value. Is there disagreement in moral principles? In any case, can different 
views coexist? The discussion between universalist positions and those that 
stress diversity and pluralism is an absolutely topical issue. In our opinion, the 
main problem lies in the fact that ethics and the civil, or secular, moral dis-
course have not yet come up with solutions to the problems of bioethics. On 
the contrary, theology has dogmatic answers that are backed by centuries of 
unbroken usage. This leads us to the suitability of turning to the guidelines 
provided by human rights to frame these issues, while knowing how difficult 
it is to agree on them at the theoretical level of acknowledgment and of their 
basis (without going into the question of infringing them or observing them).
Indeed, one of the chief characteristics of the last 20 years is the prolifera-
tion of bioethics committees and analogous bodies in universities, research 
centres, countries and international bodies, in response to the unstoppable 
advance of biomedicine and biotechnology, to the need to tackle the chal-
lenges in a multidisciplinary way, and to the diversity of moral choices to deal 
with them. They include, for example, the Bioethics Committees of Spain, 
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France, Portugal and Catalonia; the National Commission of Bioethics in 
Mexico; the National Commission of Biomedical Ethics in Argentina; the 
European Union’s European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technolo-
gies (EGE); UNESCO’s International Bioethics Committee, and the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics in Great Britain. There have even been ad hoc meetings 
in Academies of Sciences to deal exclusively with bioethical issues, like the one 
held jointly by the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy 
of Medicine in the USA, the Royal Society of London and the Chinese Acad-
emy of Sciences, in December 2015, to analyse the ethical implications of 
CRISPR genome editing technology. These committees and meetings are a 
direct consequence of what we were talking about, the plurality of moral 
standpoints and the need to agree on minimal universal rules.
Moreover, if we have to decide together what kind of human race we want 
to be and we do not come up with a common model, it may be positive and 
practical to start with the critique of what we do not want to be. In this respect, 
Lucien Sève proposes, as the object of bioethics, the Kantian opposite: “Critique 
of Impure Reason”, continually being transformed into experience. For this em-
inent member of the French National Ethics Committee (in which different 
moral families have coexisted for decades and have managed to reach agree-
ments), the object of bioethics is to ensure respect, through technological inno-
vations, for people. What do we mean by people and respect? What solution do 
we adopt with regard to the controversy over progress? Faced with the constant 
appearance of possible new developments we must think about the world we 
want. And so, after ethics we necessarily turn to politics.
2. The disciplinary specificity of bioethics
Based on the lines followed in recent decades, we consider that the specific 
characteristics that can be ascribed to bioethics, coinciding or not with other 
paradigms, are the following:
2.1. Interdisciplinarity
The majority of the problems analysed in bioethics transcend the traditional 
areas of knowledge and intersect different disciplines.
This characteristic means that no one can really master the innumerable 
ins and outs of our discipline, which moreover are growing continually. For 
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this reason, the always longed-for overlap between the humanities and the sci-
ences is more necessary than ever.
It could be argued that contemporary bioethics is rowing against the tide 
of the traditional system of university teaching. It is virtually unthinkable that 
students doing a Law degree should have to learn genetics, just as it is unheard 
of for a biologist or a doctor to tackle philosophical or legal questions. In bio-
ethics just the opposite is the case. It is impossible to argue with any degree of 
rigour about a problem without taking into account knowledge that tran-
scends what has previously been learned in any given speciality. Therefore, our 
discipline makes it necessary to maintain a respectful dialogue between spe-
cialists from different areas of knowledge, forcing us to listen to points of view 
that we have never previously considered within the narrow framework of our 
small circle of knowledge, always an unsettling exercise. 
To sum up, dialogue, humility, respect and intellectual curiosity are essen-
tial contents of the bioethicist’s bag. Otherwise, it will be difficult for us to 
confront a reality that is always advancing faster than our ability to assimilate 
and comprehend it. 
2.2. Global nature
Although bioethics initially faced problems of a local nature in hospitals, 
which affected specific patients with their personal experiences and character-
istics, the need was soon felt to establish rules that went beyond this frame-
work, with the ultimate aim of achieving a lowest common denominator for 
increasingly larger groups. Thus, from the figure of the sick person with his or 
her particular case history we passed to that of groups affected by the same 
disease, and from there, to that of the citizens of a particular country. Now we 
aspire to place the rights and responsibilities of humanity on an equal footing 
with regard to biomedicine and biotechnology.
These pretensions to universality have been reinforced with the disturbing 
issues raised by technological advances, which force us to realize that the chal-
lenges of the present will affect the coming generations and all the other living 
beings that share this planet with us. Therefore, the greatest challenge for con-
temporary bioethics is perhaps to find the way to agree on rules, protocols and 
universal common minimums for all human beings.
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2.3. Secularism
As we shall analyse later on, the neologism “bioethics” began life associated 
with the Catholic and protestant traditions, although for different reasons. For 
our part, we aspire to give bioethics a secular focus, respectful but at the same 
time critical of religions, far removed from faith-based dogmatic approaches as 
the only source of legitimation of values. Secularism in bioethics implies a 
political commitment to democracy, to the rule of law and to human rights as 
the ultimate limit of respect for the cultural plurality of mankind. 
Tolerance, ecumenism, pluralism and intercultural dialogue have always 
been considered achievements from the perspective of religions, ideal situa-
tions that make coexistence between different spiritual worldviews possible. 
One example is the Tres Culturas Foundation in Andalusia, where, harking 
back to the past, Jews, Muslims and Christians come together. We demand 
our own space, a different vantage point, in the hope that we can deal with the 
numerous issues raised by bioethics from the perspective of atheism and mate-
rialism, with their limitations, which also exist, but without the debts gener-
ated by faith, dogma or the imposed hierarchy. This legitimates us to call for a 
debate without preconceived ideas and, therefore, on equal terms.
2.4. Pluralism
Secularism imposes a lowest common denominator for everyone, human 
rights, but at the same time it ensures a plural space, which makes it possible 
to confront the issues that our discipline tackles from different points of view. 
From our perspective as teachers, respect for pluralism entails fostering the 
ability to give our discourses rigour and autonomy; to train people in the cut 
and thrust of argument and logic; to learn to clarify the numerous angles from 
which problems can be tackled, and lastly, to cultivate empathy for other 
points of view. The ultimate objective of the acquisition of these skills is to 
understand both the points in common with other worldviews and the sub-
stantial and unacceptable differences, something that can only be achieved 
through constant and uncompromising criticism, of our own attitudes as well. 
We cannot renounce the comfort of religious dogma to fall into other faith-
based belief systems that could be equally, or even more, disturbing. 
HANDBOOK OF SECULAR BIOETHICS (I)22
2.5. Possibilism
As we shall be discussing, in recent times the spread has been accentuated of hazy 
narratives that lack the necessary rigour when analysing problems in bioethics. 
Thus, on one hand, technophobic lines of argument are encouraged, which 
anathematize technology, science, and even reasoning itself. Pseudo-therapies 
and alternative thinking flourish everywhere and an idealization of a past as idyl-
lic as it is imaginary is promoted in which human beings and nature coexisted in 
complete harmony. Esotericism would be the lower limit of bioethics.
At the other extreme we have techno-utopias. These narratives spread the 
idea that technology will overcome inequality and injustice, and they compete 
with religion by promising us that we can become immortal through illusory 
mechanisms of the regeneration and/or transfer of our consciousness to sup-
ports as imaginative as they are surrealistic. Naivety would be the upper limit 
of bioethics.
For our part, we aspire to situate the field of action of bioethics between 
the two extremes. We consider that bioethical reflection must accompany sci-
entific progress, without stopping it or slowing it down, but at the same time 
we must be able to prevent or anticipate the scenarios that new forms of con-
trol, power, authority and injustice may represent. And all this without losing 
sight of the fact that some hypothetical future developments may endanger life 
as we know it, whereby it is necessary to realistically and carefully evaluate, 
without unnecessary alarmism but with Promethean naivety, the calls con-
stantly coming from the scientists themselves. 
Possibilism means, in this context, making the advance of science and tech-
nology possible, without in doing so renouncing consideration of the conse-
quences, implications and far-reaching effects of this progress.
2.6. Social nature
We consider that one of the objectives of bioethics must be for progress in 
biomedicine and biotechnology to have repercussions for society as a whole, 
avoiding monopolistic situations or the creation of new powers-that-be that 
exacerbate social inequality. The current preponderant neoliberal paradigm 
aims to privatize the benefits and collectivize the risks and losses. We aspire to 
reverse this approach, trying to minimize the risks and socialize the benefits. 
Not for nothing, what happens in the next decades with new technologies will 
affect the future of our planet. 
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In sum, interdisciplinarity, pluralism, a global and social nature, scientific 
possibilism and secularism will be the signs of identity of bioethics from our 
point of view.
3. The main thematic areas of bioethics
What are the main thematic areas of our discipline? Despite the fact that it 
would be easier for us to list what does not constitute the subject matter of 
bioethics, we shall briefly list the most common thematic areas, without pre-
tending to be exhaustive and even less so dogmatic about what it should or 
should not be. It is the issues and problems inherent in these thematic areas 
that guide our research and, consequently, the writing of this text.
 1)  Clinical ethics. Although this discipline, the preserve of medical personnel, 
appeared many years before bioethics, we consider that due to various vi-
cissitudes that will be explained later on it has been absorbed by the latter, 
which has a broader scope. Moreover, the problems generated in medicine 
and nursing constituted the original core subject matter of bioethics until 
it transcended the clinical field, hence we pay it special attention. Trans-
plants, sterilization, disabilities, drug addiction, sexuality, social stigmati-
zation inherent in diseases like AIDS, patient autonomy, the specificity of 
healthcare legislation, these are all themes of bioethics.2
 2)  The problems pertaining to the beginning and the end of life. Thoughts on 
abortion and euthanasia especially, the bioethical themes that receive the 
most attention in the media, have on quite a few occasions served as the justi-
fication, the driving force or the stimulus for people to begin studying our 
discipline. Others related to them have arisen, such as assisted reproduc-
tion, embryonic stem-cell research, or surrogate motherhood, which rival 
them with regard to the capacity of scientific literature production and the 
glare of public attention.3 
 2 On these issues, we point out the following documents published by the Bioethics and Law Observa-
tory: Document on Oocyte Donation (2001), Document on the Refusal of Jehovah’s Witnesses to Accept 
Blood Transfusions (2005), Document on Transplantation from Living Donor (2011), and Document 
on Bioethics and Disability (2014).
 3 On these issues, we point out the following documents published by the Bioethics and Law Observa-
tory: Declaration on Embryo Research (2001), Document on Sexual and Reproductive Health in Ado-
lescence (2003), Document on the Patient’s Right to End His or Her Life Under Certain Circumstances: 
Declaration on Euthanasia (2007), Document on Conscientious Objection in Healthcare (2008), 
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 3)  The new genetic technologies. Modern biotechnology began at virtually the 
same time as our discipline, in the 1970s. Nevertheless, the unusual ac-
celeration of the progress made in this discipline has widened the range 
of themes, without anything leading us to suspect that it is going to stop. Of 
all of them, genome editing, in both humans and all other living beings, 
is perhaps the research that arouses most expectations and concerns. Thus, 
the sequencing of the human genome (Human Genome Project-Read ), 
finalized in 2003; the project to synthesize this genome, begun in 2016 by 
George Church et al. (Human Genome Project-Write, HGP-Write); the 
uses of genetic information in itself (clinical forensic, etc.); the creation 
of genetically modified products and organisms, and others, are initia-
tives that demand a great capacity for understanding and foresight in our 
discipline.4
 4)  The cognitive sciences. Psychiatry, psychology, philosophy of the mind, and 
neuroethics have gradually been incorporated into bioethics. The require-
ments of these disciplines may even end up creating their own separate 
ethics that autonomously confronts the specificities of its study subject, 
such as the brain, the mind and human behaviour. The techniques, inva-
sive or not, for studying the brain, speculation about human free will, the 
ultimate causes of human behaviour, the malleability of the brain, the dis-
eases that afflict it, such as Alzheimer’s or types of dementia, all generate a 
host of issues that make an interdisciplinary approach necessary. In fact, 
the achievements of the cognitive sciences are being very closely monitored 
by other disciplines, such as, among others, criminal law (how far are peo-
ple accusable?); genetics (which genes explain our behaviour?); anthropology 
(how is the biological related to the cultural?); philosophy (what really is 
Document on the Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy (2016) and Document on Ageing and Vulner-
ability. 
 4 Examining this issue in detail, the recent appearance of the CRISPR gene editing technique has 
profoundly changed our idea of what can and should be done, so we at the Bioethics and Law Ob-
servatory have paid it rapid and close attention. In 2016 we published a document entitled Bioethics 
and Genome Editing in Human Beings, and in July 2017 another collective article in the Revista de 
Derecho y Genoma Humano. In both documents we warned society of the enormous complexity of 
the situation generated by the appearance of this technique, of the need to create embryos specifi-
cally for research, something on the other hand prohibited by the European Convention on Bioeth-
ics; of the legislative disparity between China and the West; of the need to make it possible to use 
this technique for therapeutic purposes, the only limit being, for now, on the modification of the 
human germline; and of the permanent persistence of the atavism of human improvement, whose 
prohibition we ratify. The CRISPR technique also affects all other living species, whereby it is easy 
to infer that in the coming years it will be the subject of special attention.
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human consciousness? To what extent are we free?), and ethology (what is 
the level of awareness, empathy or understanding of non-human living 
beings? Can we extrapolate them to human experience?).
 5)  Nanotechnology, synthetic biology and artificial intelligence are extreme disci-
plines, as their study subject blurs the boundaries between living and inert 
matter.5 Regardless of the nature of these entities, living or not, the undeni-
able fact is that the challenges they pose affect the human race in a way 
hitherto unimaginable. Not for nothing, we could describe them, to para-
phrase Ricoeur, as “disciplines of suspicion”, and so they should also be 
studied.
 6) Big data. The vast amount of information processed by computers, includ-
ing the sequencing of the genome of living beings, raises many questions 
in reference to the level of privacy, data confidentiality, the spurious use of 
it, and so on. Moreover, the predictive capacity (data mining) of these 
databases extends to areas such as economics, health insurance, marketing 
and criminal law, and this compels us to establish protocols to avoid the 
ideological biases of the algorithms that are used in predictions. To give an 
example, a self-driving car will have to carry an ethical algorithm to decide 
whether it saves the life of the driver or a pedestrian crossing unexpectedly. 
Imagine that the car is able to consult a database with biographical infor-
mation about the pedestrian and the driver in order to make a decision 
before impact.
 7)  Environmentalism. As we shall see later on, this subject was the focus of at-
tention of some of the epigones of our discipline (Jahr, Potter), and although 
bioethics focused later on biomedicine it may be said that with the irruption 
of biotechnology, environmentalism has become one of the thematic corner-
stones of bioethics. Moreover, our relationship with other living beings, and 
even more so with the environment, has varied substantially since we have 
been able to modify the genes of living beings. Environmentalism comprises 
a set of very complex issues in which clearly political parameters are mixed 
up with others, in theory less ideologically contaminated, such as those 
referring to health, the environment or the need to specify the moral status 
of non-human living beings. Others include genetically modified organ-
isms and products; food sovereignty; the impact of nanotechnology on the 
environment and health; the monopolies of the multinationals; farmers’ 
 5 On this issue, we point out the Document on Nanotechnology and Global Bioethics. Bioethics and 
Law Observatory (2010).
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reactions to the new technologies; the way in which the signs of identity of 
so many cultures are being blurred by the impact of genetic modification; 
sustainable development; the dichotomy of organic agriculture versus in-
dustrial agriculture; the exponential increase of the human population; the 
finite nature of resources, and the use of animals for experiments.
 8)  The issue of food. Questions related to food have become more and more 
important in bioethics, to the extent that they are currently some of the 
most burning issues.6 Food is on one hand associated with the huge chal-
lenge posed by reconciling limited planetary resources with the need to 
cover the nutritional needs of a constantly growing population, and on the 
other with clinical ethics and the problems that the new technologies gen-
erate when they affect food, and consequently, the health of the popula-
tion. The challenges are therefore enormous.7
 9)  Science and society. In recent years studies have proliferated on the subject 
of the relationship between the scientific community and society, and on 
the social impact of the new technologies.8 Civic participation, the scientific 
education of society, scientific fraud, the problems of authorship, the cultiva-
tion of values such as honesty, independence and impartiality in the scien-
tific community, the social impact of research, accountability, the acqui-
sition of competence in these subjects, the analysis of economic pressures, 
gender equality, open access, governance agreements, are all issues to be 
dealt with from the perspective that we are citing.
Along with these issues, others appear such as analysing the impact of the 
new technologies on society. Thus, for example, at MIT they handle sce-
narios with 80% unemployment due to technological progress, which raises 
doubts as to the feasibility of proposals such as taxing robots as if they were 
humans (surely robots are nothing more than algorithms), whether we 
should head towards a universal basic income in a society where only a mi-
 6 The Document on Food Information: Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues, by the Bioethics and Law Ob-
servatory (2017) and the master’s degree course Food Ethics and Law, directed by María José Plana 
and Itziar de Lecuona, in the context of this Observatory, meet the needs created by this issue.
 7 Plana Casado, María José (2018). E-food control: challenges for the UE in the digital era / El control 
de los @limentos: retos para la UE en la era digital. Doctoral thesis. University of Barcelona.
 8 Along these lines, in 2016 the Bioethics and Law Observatory promoted the Declaration on Research 
Integrity in Responsible Research and Innovation, in accordance with programmes such as Science 
With and For Society by the European Commission, or the RRI (Responsible Research and Innova-
tion) policies, developed internationally by some members of our Observatory. Furthermore, in May 
2018 the Document on the Ethical Aspects of the Dialogue Between Science and Society was presented, 
sponsored by the Bioethics and Law Observatory; and in January of that same year, the Document on 
Ethics and Integrity in University Teaching.
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nority works, and how to share out the wealth generated by technological 
progress. With our minds focused on this perspective, we consider what new 
forms of discrimination will arise as a consequence of genetic engineering; 
for example, when it comes to gaining access to the jobs market, to health 
insurance, or even to finding a partner. We essentially try to assess, predict 
and anticipate what repercussions technologies will have on the social struc-
tures that form the backbone of human civilization, from the family to un-
employment, including aspects such as birth, illness, reproduction, death, 
food, social ties, communication, or our identity as a species. 
4. Definitions of bioethics 
The number of definitions of this discipline greatly exceeds the space we are 
able to devote to them in a study such as this. For this reason, we will cite just 
three, representative of different perspectives:
Warren T. Reich, the compiler of the first bioethics dictionary, defined our 
discipline in the following way:
Bioethics is the systematic study of the moral dimensions — including moral 
vision, decisions, behaviours, and policies — of the life sciences and healthcare, 
employing a variety of ethical methodologies in an interdisciplinary setting.9
The compilation of this dictionary, and the inclusion in 1974 of the entry 
“Bioethics” in the US Library of Congress, was an important step for the con-
solidation of the discipline, aside from other considerations that we shall look 
at in the next chapter. 
María Casado, for her part, defines bioethics as follows:
The analysis of the ethical, legal, social and political aspects of the impact of bio-
medicine and biotechnology, from a framework of respect and the promotion of 
the recognized human rights.10 
As we can see, this definition implicitly advocates a secularist paradigm, 
since it uses, as a benchmark for values, the human rights recognized in the 
different international instruments that have been created in recent decades, 
 9 Reich, W. T. (ed.) (1995). Encyclopedia of Bioethics. New Jersey, 2nd ed.
 10 Casado, M. (1996). La bioética. Materiales de Bioética y Derecho. Barcelona: Cedecs, pp. 31-48.
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and not religious beliefs. The term “impact” alludes to the practical, and not 
merely theoretical or academic, nature of our discipline, insofar as the pro-
posed laws that are passed, after information and consensus inter pares, may 
finally be incorporated in a country’s legislation. This has happened with the 
documents drafted in the last 20 years by the University of Barcelona’s Bioeth-
ics and Law Observatory, which she directs and defines repeatedly as secular 
and multidisciplinary. 
Lastly, Manuel López Baroni defines bioethics as:
The agora in which specialists from different fields of knowledge communicate. 
Its themes are limited at one extreme by political philosophy and at the other by 
science fiction. Its object is the study of how human culture, that is, its symbolic 
nature, interacts with the laws of nature. It aspires to create universal axiological 
norms before it is too late.11
The definition alludes to the connections between bioethics, the tradition-
al themes of political philosophy (justice, equality, freedom and democracy), 
and the hypothetical scenarios, at the limits of our imaginative capacity, which 
can be presented to us with, among others, the genetic modification of living 
beings, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology and synthetic biology. These fu-
ture possibilities justify the need to create codes of values common to all man-
kind, despite the inherent difficulty of achieving workable agreements between 
such disparate worldviews, since the overlapping and reinforcement of the said 
disciplines could modify human civilization structurally and irreversibly. 
5. Paradigms in bioethics
The implicitly ideological component of bioethics means that it can be exam-
ined from multiple perspectives. We are going to point out just three pairs of 
paradigms, each of which attempts to answer a question. 
Indeed, if we analyse bioethics from the perspective of values, we have to 
compare the Anglo-American principlist model (Beauchamp and Childress) 
with that of the ethics of values, of Aristotelian/Mediterranean roots. This di-
chotomy attempts to solve the problem of what is the best way to lay the axi-
 11 In López Baroni, M. (2015). Bioética y Multiculturalismo: Políticas Públicas en España (1978-2013). 
El hecho cultural ante la revolución biotecnológica. University of Barcelona, p. 559.
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ological foundations of bioethics. If we focus on the degree of commercializa-
tion of the human body, we can contrast the Anglo-American model with the 
continental European one. And if we make theological and clerical militancy 
explicit — always underlying in certain themes — we have to contrast reli-
gious with secular bioethics, an antagonism that attempts to answer the ques-
tion of how compatible are religious beliefs with atheist, agnostic or simply 
materialistic positions. We comment briefly on the three pairs of paradigms.
5.1. Principlism versus virtue ethics 
Principlism is the name that, in the context of bioethics, is used to refer to the 
compilation of ethical principles (autonomy, justice, beneficence and nonma-
leficence) made by Beauchamp and Childress in 1979. To understand the im-
portance of this paradigm in our discipline one must start from two factors, the 
historical (three of those principles were already listed in the Belmont Report, 
as a result of the experiments carried out in the USA with Afro-Americans), and 
the religious (bioethics was for a long time simply a branch of Catholic theol-
ogy). We comment briefly on these two factors.
Between the early 1930s and the 1970s, the American government carried out 
experiments with Afro-Americans in Tuskegee, Alabama, and it was recently dis-
covered that they had also been carried out in Guatemala. Basically, these people 
were given placebos to cure their syphilis, despite the fact that from the 1940s it 
could be cured with penicillin. The results were published in scientific journals 
and were not questioned from the ethical point of view for four long decades.
In the late 1960s, in the context of Afro-Americans’ fight for civil rights (by 
Dr Martin Luther King, Rosa Parks, and others), society began to question the 
legitimacy of such experiments. As a result of this being published in The New 
York Times (1972), the research was halted and a committee was created to 
specify the basic principles of research with human beings (1975-1978). The 
result was the Belmont Report (1979), in which the following principles were 
listed: respect for people, justice and beneficence.
Shortly afterwards, Beauchamp and Childress published a book in which 
they reiterated these principles,12 with some variations, and extended them to 
 12 Beauchamp and Childress (1979). Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Several later new editions have 
been published which include the critiques that they formulated at the time.
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biomedicine.13 The success of this book is what leads us to the second factor 
mentioned, the religious. Thus:
It cannot be denied that theologians played a prominent part in the early days of 
bioethics. Jonsen speaks of the “trinity of theologians” that “presided over the 
creation of bioethics”: Joseph Fletcher, Richard A. McCormick, and Paul Ram-
sey. Other protagonists in the early years also came from theology, like James 
Gustafson, James Childress, Leroy Walters, George Kenoti, Warren T. Reich, 
William F. May, Robert Veatch and Jonsen himself. In Spain we ought to men-
tion the work of, among others, Javier Gafo, Marciano Vidal, Eduardo López 
Azpitarte, Francisco Javier Elizari, Manuel Cuyás and Francesc Abel.14
The book from which we have taken the quote is subtitled Theoretical 
Paradigms in Contemporary Bioethics. Significantly, in it there is no reference 
to secularism, Marxism, or Latin American bioethics, where the problems, 
objectives and social concerns are very different.15 And as can be seen, nor are 
there any women in this list of early parents of bioethics.
The reason for the disproportionate presence of theologians is simple: in 
bioethics they found an ideal neologism for fighting against their principal 
enemy, abortion. And this had nothing to do with clinical ethics (with centu-
ries of tradition), or with biomedicine (in 1965, quite some time before Beau-
champ and Childress’s book, the World Medical Association formulated the 
Declaration of Helsinki, in which it listed the rules of action when researching 
with human beings).
As they maintain at the Borja Institute of Bioethics, belonging to the Jesu-
its, principlism represents “a notably elaborate effort to avoid relativism in the 
biomedical sphere and in clinical bioethics”.16 This is a euphemistic way of re-
ferring to those of us who are in favour of women being able to choose, of their 
own free will, whether or not to terminate their pregnancy; those of us who 
 13 The Belmont Report’s respect for people was turned into the principle of autonomy; and, based on 
a list of four actions attributed by W. Frankena to the principle of beneficence (do no harm, prevent 
harm, eliminate harm and promote good), Beauchamp and Childress separated the first (do no harm) 
and made it the principle of nonmaleficence.
 14 Ferrer, José; Álvarez, Juan Carlos (2003). Para fundamentar la bioética. Teorías y paradigmas 
teóricos en la bioética contemporánea. Universidad Pontificia Comillas.
 15 There should be discussion about which field utilitarianism belongs to, in theory non-religious, es-
pecially when Beauchamp and Childress were in fact accused of practising “mitigated utilitarianism”, 
which is another way of saying they were not dogmatic enough.
 16 Tubau, J.; Busquets, A. (2011). “Principios de Ética Biomédica”, by Tom L. Beauchamp and James 
F. Childress. Bioética & Debat. Open platform of the Borja Institute of Bioethics.
the oBjeCt of BIoethICs 31
believe that human beings can choose a dignified death with no external im-
positions, that research can be done with embryonic stem cells, with therapeu-
tic cloning, with genome editing, and so on. And that the state and religion 
should be separate. Relativism, in this context, is synonymous with secular-
ism, which includes the majority of feminist currents. Principlism is the para-
digm that is opposed to it. 
The success of Beauchamp and Childress’s proposal is all the more surpris-
ing since, in fact, none of the four principles was formulated by them. The one 
about autonomy (the heart of law and morality, and the basis for responsibil-
ity), was already in the Nuremberg Code (1947), created as a result of the 
Nazis’ experiments, and it links up with ideas about human freedom, thou-
sands of years old. That of beneficence (basically, the obligation of medical 
staff to cure the sick) and that of nonmaleficence (not to cause undue harm) 
were part of the Hippocratic Oath. And the one about justice (the basic philo-
sophical and legal principle) is lost in the mists of time, so much so that we 
cannot even date its origins.
And so, against principlism virtue ethics was proclaimed, based on the 
classic Aristotelian distinction between ethical virtues, alluding to habit 
(strength, self-control and justice) and intellectual ones (art, as knowledge of 
what is necessary; wisdom, as knowledge of necessary and universal things; 
practical wisdom; theoretical wisdom, and intelligence as the intuitive and 
direct reason for the first principles).17
The true importance of this claim does not lie in chauvinistic pan-Europe-
an issues — in the Mediterranean, more than 2,000 years before American 
principlism emerged, people were already thinking about these questions — 
but in the defence of the welfare state (public health and education; the redis-
tribution of wealth through a strong system of taxation, and so on), as op-
posed to the (more) capitalist model of the USA. There, private healthcare 
would be legitimized by the principle of autonomy: the patient is basically a 
customer, and the doctor/patient relationship is contractual. Therefore, the 
recovery of Aristotelian thinking is in fact part of a meta-debate about which 
model is the right one, not in biomedicine, but in politics.
This defence of the welfare state would actually be more appropriate for 
the European Union, or the countries of Scandinavia, than the Mediterranean 
countries proper (it could be said that we are still waiting to achieve this type 
 17 Diccionario, by Ferrater Mora. Entry “dianoético” (intellectual). i, p. 879, and v, pp. 3704-3705. RBA 
2005. As Mora shows us, the distinction between ethical and intellectual virtues is not categorical, since 
caution, for example, “as practical wisdom, is considered by some authors to be an ethical virtue”.
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of state). However, for reasons not always easy to explain, Aristotelian-based 
virtue ethics is held up to be the alternative to the model of American private 
healthcare, represented by principlism.
5.2.  The commercialization of the human body:  
the Anglo-American model versus the continental model
With reference to how acceptable the commercialization of the different parts 
of the human body is, we can distinguish two main models of thinking, the 
(European) continental and the Anglo-American.
Although the first paradigm, the continental, was initially dominant, cen-
tred on prohibiting and/or restricting the commercialization of the human 
body, it could be argued that it has gradually lost ground to the second para-
digm, the Anglo-American.18
Indeed, in 2000, Hottois19 clearly showed the existence of two opposing 
models that he called Euro-French and Anglo-American. Along the lines of 
the studies of the Council of Europe, he supported the priority of the first 
one, very much present then in continental European and Latin American 
bioethics: considering the human body off-limits to trade, based on the no-
tion of human dignity, at the same time denouncing the European Union’s 
mercantilist drift. This approach is opposed to abandoning the human body 
and its parts to their fate in a market dominated by money, technology and 
individual wishes. This would mean renouncing a long and valuable tradition 
based on the prohibition of the exploitation of the other, and on the consid-
eration that the use by a third party of a part of the human body is the result 
of a gift, a voluntary act of solidarity.20 Therefore it is the state — and not 
technology, the market or money — that should mediate in these exchanges, 
ensuring that agreements are transparent and that public order is observed at 
all times.
On the contrary, the Anglo-American approach is based on a certain inter-
pretation of the ideas of Locke, as developed by libertarians who base them-
 18 Casado, M. (2017). “Gratuidad o precio”, in Casado, M. (coord.) (2016). De la solidaridad al mer-
cado. El cuerpo humano y el comercio biotecnológico. Mexico City: Fontamara (new edition by Edi-
cions de la Universitat de Barcelona, 2017).
 19 Hottois, G. H. (2001). “Corps humain”, in Hottois, G. H.; Missa, N. Nouvelle encyclopédie de 
bioéthique. Brussels: De Boek Université, p. 243ff.
 20 Rodotà, S. (2010). La vida y las reglas. Madrid: Trotta, p. 139ff.
the oBjeCt of BIoethICs 33
selves on the idea that individuals have inalienable rights and that private prop-
erty is the most important of them. This axiom would also be valid for one’s 
own body, which, thus appropriated, becomes an asset that can be the subject 
of free market exchange. This Anglo-American individualist tradition, and its 
contractualist idea of the practice of medicine, has eventually found its way into 
the mindset in our part of the world. Furthermore, individual freedom and 
wishes are mixed up and confused — frequently conditioned by the context of 
each — and they are elevated to the category of rights. As Rodotà argues:
[…] the ideology of economic liberalism turns out to be the law of the strongest 
and social Darwinism, which has turned society into a market that — destroying 
social bonds and solidarity — abandons social cohesion to techno-structures 
frequently manipulated by private interests.21
To sum up, the regulation of trade in human body parts depends on how 
the body is perceived, as an object or as a subject, and it has a different meaning 
depending on every society’s idea of the freedom and autonomy of the will, and 
of responsibility. If it is considered that the body is the subject’s property, the 
limit of freedom is the possibility of the regeneration of the product, and in-
formation is required for valid consent. But if one starts from a relationship of 
identity between body and subject, even the separate parts of the human body 
deserve a different consideration that makes it necessary to take the notion of 
free status seriously. Of course, biomedical technologies have turned the hu-
man body and its constituent parts into raw materials for industry, but this 
must not involve a new source of discrimination and exploitation. Although it is 
not reasonable to think of a human body as the sum of its parts, nor is it desir-
able, conversely, to legally turn them into mere things. Perhaps it is right to 
establish specific regimes for products of human origin that, depending on 
their different symbolic natures, would not fit into a single concept either.22 
At the start of this millennium it could still be argued that we had a choice 
of two paths. Now, it is clear that development has brought with it a tendency 
to the reification of the human body through technology and — even more 
 21 The contrast between these two tendencies that affects bio-law and bio-politics, closely related to 
bio-economics, has been outlined intriguingly by Hottois (“Corps humain”..., pp. 212-213), saying 
that an American citizen is the owner of his body, whereas the French citizen is merely the occupant 
of a body that belongs to the State.
 22 Hermitte, M. A. (2001). “Commercialisation du corps et de ses products.” In: Hottois, G. H.; 
Missa, N. Nouvelle encyclopédie de bioéthique. Brussels: De Boek Université, p. 207ff .
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so — the market, a divine entity that now regulates not only the economy but 
also human relationships and society itself.23 A gradual change has been taking 
place in the model due to financial incitements, the education — persuasion — 
of advertising, or to a utilitarian rationalization of research itself and the idea of 
taking advantage of what is not used. An example of this is the reuse of the 
health data in the hands of the government by public/private third parties, and 
the establishment of presumed consent. It can be seen that the mercantilist 
approach to the human body — and to the law itself — is winning the game. It 
is obvious not just because of the proliferation of deplorable events that we 
read about every day, but also because of the philosophical foundations that, 
pragmatically, are shifting from facts to prescriptions. “It is” is turning into “it 
must be”, and making an elementary naturalistic mistake. 
5.3. Religious bioethics versus secular bioethics
Bioethics deals with issues such as the beginning and the end of life, in a con-
text in which advances in biotechnology have gradually been increasing the 
number of living entities that deserve to be the subject of regulation.  These 
include pre-embryos, clones, IPS cells and parthenogenesis.  There are also 
more possibilities, for instance the genetic modification of living beings, in-
cluding the germline, which affects not just the modified individuals, but the 
species to which they belong.
In response to the Catholic Church’s attempt to monopolize the truth in 
these issues, more pluralistic analyses have emerged from secular, feminist and 
multicultural observatories. The irruption of Judaism and Islam in these de-
bates has merely deepened this fracture. This however should be no obstacle to 
notable efforts being made to reach agreement on issues that affect both the 
coming generations and the future of the human race. We shall deal exten-
sively with this clash of paradigms in the next chapter. 
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2	 the origins of Bioethics
1. Introduction1
The discussion about where and when bioethics came into being is not just 
academic or anecdotal. On the contrary, it is a question that must be consid-
ered in order to understand the subsequent development of the discipline and 
the subjects it covers.
The most usual criterion, almost unanimous, consists of associating the 
birth of the discipline with the person who “discovered” the neologism, and so 
the issue of the origins is reduced in practice to the search for the ancestral 
bioethicist, from whom the others are descended. This explains why Van Rens-
selaer Potter II, in 1970, and more recently Fritz Jahr appear in almost every 
handbook.
The limitations on this way of proceeding are obvious, since we are forced 
to ask ourselves what, then, is the status of clinical ethics, which has existed for 
centuries, or how to describe the thoughts on these subjects of non-Western 
peoples, who for obvious reasons were unable to discover the neologism be-
cause their languages are derived from a branch different to Greek and Latin. 
However, the main objection is that the fact that the creation, the discovery or 
the happy invention of the neologism “bio-ethics” was due to the religious 
concerns of those who gave birth to it is exalted.
In order to analyse this problem, where and when bioethics came into be-
ing, we shall use a model with two variables and four possible combinations. 
The two variables are origins of the neologism (the important thing is when 
the word bioethics first appears, regardless of the fact that the term has been 
rediscovered more than once over the years, or that the intentions of the crea-
tor did not coincide with contemporary bioethics); and origins of bioethics 
(the important thing is the group of subjects that are currently studied in the 
 1 This chapter is a partial summary of the book by López Baroni, M. J. (2016). El origen de la bioé-
tica como problema. Barcelona: Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona.
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discipline, essentially clinical ethics and the implications of biotechnology, 
irrespective of the term, word or neologism used). The interaction of these 
two variables generates four possible combinations, which we shall look at 
below.
2. Models for the origins of bioethics2
2.1.  “Origins of bioethics (1)” – “origins of the neologism (1)”
This is the official, most widely acknowledged criterion. Bioethics was born 
when Potter, an American protestant theologian, discovered the neologism 
bioethics in 1970, and it was reused shortly afterwards by the Jesuits in George-
town when they created the Kennedy Institute. However, in the late 1990s it 
was announced that Fritz Jahr, a German Lutheran theologian, had beaten the 
Americans to it by publishing two articles with the word bioethics in almost 
half a century before Potter. This made it necessary to redefine this criterion, 
the attribution of the paternity of the discipline to the person who first in-
vented the neologism. 
To understand the haze surrounding the appearance of the term we shall 
use a strictly chronological order.
2.1.1. The resurrection of Fritz Jahr
A classic debate in our discipline has been the discussion about who actually 
created bioethics in the American cultural sphere, Potter or the Jesuits of 
Georgetown. In 1977, the German Rolf Löther publicly presented a compa-
triot of his, Fritz Jahr, as the true creator of the term bioethics (bio-ethik).3 Jahr 
did indeed publish two articles in the magazine Kosmos, in 1927 and 1934, in 
which he used the neologism bioethics for the first time. In light of this crite-
rion, this made him the first bioethicist.
 2 We use a model with two variables and four combinations, similar to the one used by Gustavo 
Bueno in ¿Qué es la ciencia? (Ediciones Pentalfa, 1995) and by Castilla del Pino in his Teoría de los 
sentimientos (Tusquets, 2000).
 3 Iva y Muzur, A. (2011). “Fritz Jahr: The Invention of Bioethics and Beyond.” Perspectives in Biology 
and Medicine, vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 550-556.
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This unexpected reappearance has generated discomfort in the USA, where 
they have more or less pretended not to notice, and jubilation in Europe, 
where Jahr has become an icon with whom to oppose American principlism. 
Nevertheless, we find it difficult to identity with the German’s ideas. 
Fritz Jahr was a Lutheran pastor who apparently never left his hometown, 
Halle, in the middle of Germany. The two articles that interest us are Bioethics: 
Review of the Ethical Relationships of Humans to Animals and Plants (1927) and 
Three Studies of the Fifth Commandment (1934). His work is essentially a rein-
terpretation of the Bible to adapt it to environmentalist thinking, using Kant 
and Luther as hermeneutists in order to do so. For Jahr, the first bioethicist was 
not really him but Saint Francis of Assisi, because of his love of animals.
Essentially, as we glean from his ideas, bioethics was a manifestation of 
pantheist mysticism, reminiscent of Romanticism (Herder, Wagner) and Prot-
estant theology (Schleiermacher, Krause and Hartmann). The puritanism with 
regard to life and sex that imbues the two articles contrasts with his ideas about 
education, quite liberal for the time.
It should be pointed out that this manifestation of bioethics had nothing 
at all to do with human rights. As far as we know, Fritz Jahr was not a Nazi, 
but the fact is that he wrote absolutely nothing about the barbarity that char-
acterized that period, not even after the Second World War (he died in 1953). 
The article in which he really detailed the content of his bioethics was pub-
lished in 1934, one year after Hitler came to power. And the neologism bioeth-
ics corresponds to a context in which other authors were using similar expres-
sions, such as biopsychisch.4
I believe that the chief result of the resurrection of Fritz Jahr is that it shows 
how sterile the debate about primacy in bioethics is. His concerns were purely 
religious, and it would be no surprise if one day we were to discover that the 
Nazis, who also had environmentalist concerns, as Luc Ferry denounced,5 used 
the term for their propaganda. Hence it is not such a good idea to use Fritz 
Jahr to claim the European origins of bioethics as opposed to the American 
origins.
 4 To be precise, Theodor Fechner and Rudolf Eiler. Salomé Lima, N. (2009). “Fritz Jahr y el Zeitgeist 
de la bioética”, Aesthethika, International Journal on Subjectivity, Politics and the Arts, vol. 5 (1), 
pp. 4-11; Martin Sass, H. (2011). “El pensamiento bioético de Fritz Jahr, 1927-1934”, Aesthethika, 
Revista Internacional de Estudio e Investigación Interdisciplinaria sobre Subjetividad, Política y Arte, 
vol. 6, no. 2, April, pp. 20-33.
 5 Ferry, L. (1994). El Nuevo orden ecológico. El árbol, el animal y el hombre, translation by Thomas 
Kauf. Barcelona: Tusquets, April edition.
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2.1.2. Potter’s environmentalism 
Potter has been thought of as the father of bioethics for many years because in 
1970 he published an article in which he used the neologism bioethics, which 
led everyone to mistakenly think that it was the first time this term had been 
used in the West.6 The article was entitled Bioethics: The Science of Survival.7 
Although the appearance of Fritz Jahr has diminished his importance, Potter 
remains the first person to have published a book, Bioethics, Bridge to the Fu-
ture (1971),8 using this word.
There are several reasons why, over time, the Jesuits of Georgetown Uni-
versity eclipsed him: a) Potter attributed an environmentalist aspect to the 
term bioethics (just as, by the way, Fritz Jahr had done half a century earlier in 
Europe); b) the Jesuits of Georgetown developed bioethics around clinical eth-
ics, a subject that had nothing to do with Potter’s objectives and which, ini-
tially at least, had the support of the medical profession; c) Potter’s book on 
bioethics is actually a series of 13 rambling articles that are totally unconnected,9 
whereby it could hardly constitute an exportable programme; d) the Jesuits 
had far more financial support.
The result of this unequal contest is that Potter on numerous occasions ex-
pressed his resentment over the Jesuits’ conceptual theft, while on the George-
town website Potter is not even acknowledged as the creator of the neologism. 
It could be said that the first American bioethicists unashamedly ignored one 
another.
Like Fritz Jahr, Potter was a Lutheran pastor, and therefore his idea of bio-
ethics was also purely religious. Using Luther as his guide, he considered that 
the objective of our discipline had to be combatting the increase in the world’s 
population. In his second book, he outlined an eight-point programme on 
bioethics in which he mixed ideas typical of religious puritanism (for example, 
encouraging marriage between virgins to avoid AIDS), with concerns typical 
only of the industrialized world.10
  6 Potter, V. R. (1970). “Bioethics: The Science of Survival”, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine. 
  7 Ibid.
  8 Potter, V. R. (1971). Bioethics: Bridge to the Future, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
  9 Henk cites Reich’s explanations about the scattered, digressive and inconclusive nature of Potter’s 
work, especially his books in 1971 and 1988. Henk, A. M. J. (2012). “Potter’s Notion of Bioethics”, 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 59-82.
 10 Potter, V. R. (1988). Global Bioethics, Building on the Leopold Legacy. East Lansing: Michigan State 
University Press.
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The path Potter took is rather disconcerting. For reasons difficult to ex-
plain and perhaps too influenced by his follower Whitehouse,11 he ended up 
embracing the ecology of the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess. Thus, the 
deep bioethics of the last years of Potter’s life is an imitation of Naess’s deep 
ecology. Although Potter probably never seriously read the philosopher, the 
truth is that the Norwegian provided cover for an inflammatory form of envi-
ronmentalism, which considers that there are millions of people too many in 
the world but does not explain what to do with the “surplus”.12 It is no surprise 
that the followers of Naess, to his regret, proposed to spread diseases in Africa 
to get rid of the excess millions. It was this kind of thinking that contaminated 
bioethics unnecessarily.
In sum, Potter is important because for almost 20 years the coining of the 
term was mistakenly attributed to him, which explains why he still appears in 
numerous handbooks, articles and studies as the father of bioethics.
2.1.3. The Jesuits’ crusade against abortion
If the Jahr/Potter duo created the neologism, it was the Jesuits of Georgetown 
who really developed the discipline. Whether or not their objectives had any-
thing to do with what we now call bioethics is another matter.
The intellectual father of this expansion was André Hellegers, flanked by 
Sargent Shriver and his wife Eunice Kennedy. Together, in 1971 they founded, 
at the Jesuit University of Georgetown, the Joseph and Rose Kennedy Center 
for the Study of Human Reproduction and Bioethics, funded by Eunice Ken-
nedy, the late President John F. Kennedy’s sister. To understand the true nature 
of this institute we have to go back to the 1960s, in the context of the Second 
Vatican Council.
In those years, with John XXIII as pope, a commission was created to 
study population, family and childbirth. This commission came at the same 
time as the Kennedy family’s support for the studies of, among others, André 
Hellegers, on natural methods for controlling human fertility.13 Hellegers was 
 11 Whitehouse, Peter J. (2003). “The Rebirth of Bioethics: Extending the Original Formulations of 
Van Rensselaer Potter”. The American Journal of Bioethics, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 26-31.
 12 Naess, A. (1973). “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A Summary”. In-
quiry, 16, 1, 1973, pp. 95-100.
 13 Collins Harvey, J. (2004). “Andre Hellegers and Carroll House: Architect and Blueprint for the 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics”. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 14, 2, June, pp. 199-206.
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a member of the papal commission from 1963 to 1966, and he became its lead-
ing scientific figure. 
In 1968, Pope Paul VI issued the encyclical Humana Vitae, a document of 
great importance for life and the struggle, in his words, against the two great 
evils of the time: divorce and abortion.14 In 1969, André Hellegers, worried 
about the world’s overpopulation, published an article in which he recom-
mended non-westerners to use the withdrawal birth control method, which, 
as he said, the founding fathers of the American nation had practised so effi-
ciently.15 In March 1970, Hellegers published an article entitled “Fetal Devel-
opment” in the Jesuits’ magazine Theological Studies. The titles of all the other 
contributions make the editorial line crystal clear: fighting abortion.16 Hellegers 
proposed that dilation and curettage should not be carried out on women, not 
even in cases of rape, because it might cause a miscarriage at a time when there 
was no way of knowing if a woman was pregnant in the first days of conception. 
According to some authors, Hellegers was partly responsible for spreading the 
Nazi myth that women who had been raped could not get pregnant.17 In those 
years, Hellegers was a pro-life activist, and so he was often asked to appear in 
court as an expert, where he established woman/foˆetus, slaver/slave analogies 
to position himself against the termination of pregnancy.18
In 1969, the other bioethicist who is usually mentioned as the joint father 
of bioethics, Daniel Callahan, published a book with an introduction by An-
dré Hellegers entitled The Catholic Case for Contraception,19 with texts by dif-
ferent theologians about natural contraceptive methods, written before and 
after the encyclical Humana Vitae. The only woman writing in it, Sidney Cal-
lahan, was the mother of the publisher Daniel Callahan’s six children (“my 
pro-life wife”)20 and her chapter was entitled Beyond Birth Control: The Chris-
tian Experience of Sex, in which she analyses married life trying to make the 
 14 McCormick, R. A. (1979). “Theological Studies”. Moral Theology, Mar 1, 1979, pp. 59-112.
 15 Hellegers, A. (1969). “Factors and Correctives in Population Expansion”. SAIS Review, 13, 3, 
Spring, pp. 21-29.
 16 Various authors. Theological Studies (1970). Theological Faculties of the Society of Jesus in the 
United States, March, Volume 31, no. 1.
 17 Hildebrandt, S.; Seidelman, W.; Caplan, A. “Rape and Abortion: Negating a Myth”. Harvard 
Law, Bill of Health. Examining the Intersection of Law and Health Care, Biotech & Bioethics. A Blog 
by the Petrie-Flom Center and Friends. At: http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ billofhealth/2013/07/26/
rape-and-abortion-negating-a-myth/. Last visit, May 2014.
 18 Hellegers, A. (1975). “Abortion: Another Form of Birth Control”. Vita Humana, no. 4, pp. 82-86.
 19 Callahan, D. (1969). The Catholic Case for Contraception. MacMillan Publishing Company, March.
 20 Callahan, D. (2012). In Search of the Good: A Life in Bioethics. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
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problem of contraceptive methods compatible with Christianity.21 Daniel Cal-
lahan wrote the famous article “Bioethics as a Discipline”,22 which made it 
possible for the American Library of Congress to start using the neologism.23
In 1974, Hellegers published what might be the first bioethics handbook 
proper, Problems for Bioethics. A Report to the Sacred Congregation on the Doc-
trine of the Faith, his intellectual legacy.24 The Congregation for the Doctrine 
of the Faith is the Catholic Church’s modern name for the Inquisition.
In 1992, during the Democratic Party Convention, a joint letter was pub-
lished in The New York Times defending Hellegers’ legacy in his fight against 
abortion and publicly showing that there were anti-abortionists in the Demo-
cratic Party too. The letter was signed by Eunice Kennedy, her husband Sar-
gent Shriver, the bioethicist Edmund D. Pellegrino, Sidney Callahan, the wife 
of the joint father of bioethics Daniel Callahan, Leon R. Kass, the future pres-
ident of the neo-conservative American Bioethics Committee during the Bush 
era, and bodies and organizations such as Feminists for Life Law Project, 
Women Exploited By Abortion, National Women’s Coalition for Life, and 
Evangelicals for Social Action. Two years earlier, Eunice Kennedy had publicly 
denounced the attempts to manipulate her brother’s discourse in order to sup-
port abortion (J. F. K. Would Have Defended Bishops’ Right to Fight Abortion).25
This is the context that explains the Joseph and Rose Kennedy Center for 
the Study of Human Reproduction and Bioethics, in Georgetown. Eunice 
Kennedy supplied the money needed to create an institute at a Jesuit univer-
sity to study human procreation from the Catholic point of view. Ten days 
before the institute opened, the word bioethics was not in its name.26 Several 
months before the institute began its activities, ethics as an area of reflection 
was not among its objectives.27,28
 21 Guttmacher Institute (1970). “Catholics Speak Out”. Family Planning Perspectives, vol. 2, no. 1, 
January.
 22 Reich, W. T. (1993). “How Bioethics Got Its Name”. Hastings Center Report, November-December.
 23 Reich, T. (1994). “The Word ‘Bioethics’: Its Birth and the Legacies of those Who Shaped It”. Ken-
nedy Institute of Ethics Journal, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 319-335.
 24 Beller, Fritz K. (1983). “Andre E. Hellegers as a Philosopher Portrayed by his Thinking. In Memo-
riam of an Admired Friend”. Europ. J. Obstet. Gynec. reprod. Biol, no. 14, pp. 289-297.
 25 Kennedy Shriver, E. “J. F. K. Would Have Defended Bishops’ Right to Fight Abortion”. The New 
York Times. Available at: www.nytimes.com/1990/05/13/opinion/l-jfk-would-have-defended-bishops- 
right-to-fight-abortion-884290.html (last visit, May 2014).
 26 Friedman Ross, L. (2010). “Forty Years Later: The Scope of Bioethics Revisited”. Perspectives in 
Biology and Medicine, vol. 53, no. 3, summer, pp. 452-457.
 27 Reich, T., op. cit.
 28 Ibid.
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At some time before it began its activities, Time magazine cited the book 
that Potter had published with the neologism bioethics, and Shriver, Hellegers 
or people in their circles probably saw it. They considered that the word was 
appropriate for their objectives and they decided to incorporate it in the name 
of the Kennedy Institute that they were creating. The discussion about how it 
reached them has generated a huge amount of literature, but in reality the 
word bioethics was added to the institute’s name purely by chance and because 
it was particularly euphonic.
What they were doing had nothing to do with what is now known as bio-
ethics. The objective of those who founded the Kennedy Institute arose from 
the pro-life movements that in the 1970s positioned themselves against abor-
tion. The ultimate aim of the people who created this institute was to indoc-
trinate healthcare staff so that they would not perform abortions, and to spread 
the word about the goodness of natural contraceptive methods. The contribu-
tions of women were in this case limited to those of the upper class, donating 
money and enlightening the working class and the ethnic minorities in the 
USA about what to do with their sexuality and their married life.
The clearly religious nature of early bioethics, militant, doctrinaire and evan-
gelical, whether protestant, with Jahr and Potter, or Catholic, with the Jesuits, 
who turned it into a crusade, explains why the incorporation of new schools of 
thought in the discipline was not peaceable, let alone an invitation, but rather 
the consequence of a reaction against the attempts of pastors, priests and theolo-
gians to monopolize areas as sensitive as sexuality, reproduction and death.
2.2.  “Origins of bioethics (1)” – “origins of the neologism (0)”
This model highlights the fact that our field of knowledge goes back thousands 
of years, as questions related to clinical ethics have been asked in all periods 
and cultures. The key lies in the fact that the term used for these reflections 
was not bioethics, but a different name that logically varied according to the 
place or the period.
This is why the model is expressed with the formula 1-0; our discipline has 
always existed, and it could even be said that it is inherent to human civiliza-
tion, and the neologism bioethics is simply a name for something that existed 
before Potter and the Jesuits of Georgetown.
This explains why the debates, regarded as sterile, about who was the first 
to create the neologism, and the inherent process of beatification, are rejected 
in this model, considering it an exercise in naivety to place the birth of bioeth-
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ics between 1970 and 1971. Having established this, the energies are focused on 
studying the different manifestations of the discipline that, with different 
names, have appeared throughout the history of humanity. 
In our cultural context, this way of thinking has served to make a case for 
the existence of European bioethics, predating the American version; Mediter-
ranean bioethics, enriched by the civilizations on the shores of that sea;29 Latin 
American bioethics, focusing on its specific socioeconomic problems,30 very 
different to those of the United States, and virtue ethics, originally Greek, as 
opposed to American principlism.31,32
In short, this model shuns the irredentism inherent in the supposed found-
ing fathers of bioethics and, conversely, it understands our discipline as a pro-
cess inherent to human civilization, which, with different names, concerns 
and solutions, has been with us ever since Homo sapiens appeared on the Earth.
2.3.  “Origins of bioethics (0)” – “origins of the neologism (1)”
This model concedes that the neologism did indeed emerge in the American 
context (Potter, Georgetown, etc.), but it considers that the birth of bioethics 
proper came later, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when schools of thought 
that had nothing to do with Christianity were incorporated in the discipline.
The core argument for justifying this standpoint is that it is considered 
that the 1970s bioethics of Potter, but especially that of Georgetown, had a 
strong religious, missionary bias, incompatible with the cultural and ideologi-
cal plurality and diversity in the world. 
There were two alternatives to the early concept of bioethics as a branch of 
theology: either giving ground — the neologism in this case — to the theolo-
gians, or on the contrary playing on the same field. This second option is what 
led numerous schools of thought to gradually enter bioethics, bringing new 
agendas, objectives and projects, but above all standing up to the purely reli-
 29 Mallia, P. (2012). “Is there a Mediterranean bioethics?” Med Health Care and Philos, 15, pp. 419-429.
 30 Various authors. (2008). Diccionario Latinoamericano de Bioética. Organización de las Naciones 
Unidas para la Educación, la Ciencia y la Cultura (Unesco) and Universidad Nacional de Colombia; 
Casado, M.; Luna, F. (coords.) (2012). Cuestiones de Bioética en y desde Latinoamérica. Navarra: 
Civitas.
 31 Leone, S. (2012). “The features of a ‘Mediterranean’ Bioethics”. Med Health Care and Philos, 15, 
pp. 431-436.
 32 Rodríguez del Pozo, P.; Fins, J. (2016). “Iberian Influences on Pan-American Bioethics: Bringing 
Don Quixote to Our Shores”. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 15, pp. 225-238.
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gious ideas of its early days. We can distinguish three major paradigms of 
thinking that have gradually drawn nearer to our discipline: feminist and secu-
larist schools of thought and multiculturalism.
2.3.1. Feminism in bioethics
Theories about feminism predated the creation of the neologism bioethics and 
their objectives have run parallel to those of clinical ethics in the last two or 
three centuries, intertwining as their respective themes rubbed up against one 
another.
As we have seen, the founding fathers of bioethics tried to establish obliga-
tory rules of behaviour in areas such as sexuality, reproduction, abortion and 
the family, so it was just a matter of time before they came up against the 
feminist paradigm. And this is indeed what happened.
Nevertheless, we should not talk of feminism in the singular, but of femi-
nist schools of thought, plural, diverse, and still at odds with one another. 
Essentially, the axioms of feminism — Marxist, liberal, spiritual, both Western 
and Eastern, postmodern, psychoanalytical, and so on — provide a cluster of 
very diverse observatories on the themes of bioethics that have broken the 
monolithic mould of the early days. Another matter altogether, which I shall 
simply mention, is whether this same plurality of positions hinders the crea-
tion of universal and transcultural rules, something essential in the face of the 
progress made in biotechnology and biomedicine.
Despite the blurred conceptual boundaries between the different feminist 
schools of thought, we consider that their incorporation in bioethics has made 
it possible to synchronize the gradual process of women’s equality with men, 
questioning the traditional concepts of marriage, family, sexuality, fatherhood 
and motherhood, based ultimately on the patriarchal order of early bioethics. 
This is how Silvia Tubert sees it:
We should remember, once again, that male and female are not synonymous 
with man and woman. One thing is men and women as empirical entities, in a 
twofold sense: as beings naturally differentiated by their anatomical sexual char-
acteristics, and as socially differentiated groups who are assigned and expected to 
perform certain (gender) roles. And something else altogether are male and fe-
male principles, which do not exist naturally and empirically, but which, as I 
mentioned earlier quoting Freud, are uncertain theoretical constructs. In other 
words, they are cultural creations that are offered to (or imposed on) subjects as 
the orIgIns of BIoethICs 47
ideal models that, in turn, are incorporated in particular individuals in the form 
of an ideal of the self.33
The results of this incorporation can be observed in the normalization of 
one-parent families, which has made it possible for women to be users of assisted 
reproduction techniques without the need for a male. They can also be seen in 
the recognition of the rights of transsexuals, which has questioned the classic 
male/female dichotomy and has made it necessary to acknowledge complex hu-
man plurality; in the legalization of same-sex marriage, with all that it entails as 
regards reproduction and the concept of family; and in the existence of an abor-
tion law based on legal time limits, which has made it possible for women to 
exercise personal autonomy regardless of their cultural or religious affiliations. 
These achievements have also enabled the empowerment of women with fewer 
financial resources, as they have forced the public authorities to provide certain 
services across the board with regard to sexual and reproductive health. 
In conclusion, the main objective of the incorporation of the different 
schools of feminism into bioethics has been the formal and material equality 
of women, lesbians, homosexuals and transsexuals with respect to the tradi-
tional archetype of the European Christian liberal model, the educated white 
middle-class male, the centre, nucleus and object of bioethics in its early days.
2.3.2. Secularism in bioethics
Essentially, secular bioethics shapes up as an alternative to plain bioethics. The 
reason for this distinction is the perception from materialist paradigms that 
since the beginning the discipline has been monopolized by religion, so much 
so that it is not necessary to place an adjective before bioethics to infer that the 
perspective is religious. Therefore, the expression “secular bioethics” implicitly 
denounces that this area of knowledge has been swallowed up by theologians, 
what Mori calls “the invasion of the field by Catholic culture”,34 whereby the 
defence of secularism would carry with it an attempt to decolonize and rebal-
ance forces.
 33 Tubert, S. (1999). “Masculino/femenino; Maternidad/paternidad”. Hombres y mujeres. Subjetivi-
dad, salud y género, compilation by M. A. González de Chávez, Universidad de Las Palmas, pp. 53-
74.
 34 M. Mori’s preface in the book by Scarpelli, U. (1998). Bioetica laica. Baldini & Castoldi.
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If we focus on the sociocultural level, we see that secular bioethics has been 
advocated with greater vehemence in the Latin world, something probably 
motivated by the disproportionate influence of the Catholic Church in those 
countries. This is why the most outstanding texts, like the two Italian manifes-
toes on secular bioethics,35 Uberto Scarpelli’s Secular Bioethics, Javier Sádaba’s 
Principles of Secular Bioethics,36 the book What is Bioethics?, by Gustavo Bueno,37 
or the documents published by the University of Barcelona’s Bioethics and 
Law Observatory, directed by María Casado, have emerged in contexts strong-
ly dominated, and not just in bioethics, by Catholicism. In this way, the com-
mitment to secular bioethics would be part of decades of effort to separate the 
state from the Catholic Church, to mark the boundaries between the public 
and private spheres, and to solve the problem of “crypto-confessionality” 
(Puente Ojea) once and for all.38 This would explain why Latin secular bioeth-
ics still seeks hand-to-hand combat with religion, while in the Anglo-Ameri-
can cultural sphere secular bioethics is full of infighting, as if the battle had 
already been won ages ago.
One of the founding fathers of the European Convention on Bioethics 
(1997), Marcelo Palacios, transferred this secular paradigm to bioethics in the 
following words: “With the previous foundations, in democratic, plural and 
free societies, in my opinion bioethics will be: 1) Civil, secular, without de-
nominational determinants. 4) Humanistic.”39
Thus, the expression secular ethics, although still ambiguous and elastic, 
given that it covers multiple ideological currents, would include the moral 
ideal of this approach. We could condense its characteristics into two aspira-
tions, universalism and neutrality. 
 a) Universalism. This paradigm starts from the recognition of the existence of 
different moralities, one for each human community or group (ethnic 
group, religion, culture, etc.), but the aim is to achieve universal ethics that 
 35 Flamigni Massarenti, A.; Mori, M.; Petroni, A. (1996). Manifesto di bioética laica. Il Sole24Ore, 
9 giugno; Mori, M.; Vattimo, G. et al. (2008). Nuovo manifesto di bioetica laica.
 36 Sádaba, J. (2014). Principios de bioética laica. Barcelona: Gedisa.
 37 Bueno, Gustavo, (1995). ¿Qué es la Bioética? Oviedo: Pentalfa Ediciones.
 38 To understand what this term means in the Spanish context, it is essential to read the article by 
Puente Ojea “La llamada ‘Transición a la Democracia’ en España. Del confesionalismo al criptocon-
fesionalismo, una nueva forma de hegemonía de la Iglesia.” In: Various authors (1994). La influ-
encia de la religión en la sociedad española. Madrid: Libertarias/Prodhufi. 
 39 Palacios, M. (1998). “Hacia el siglo de la Bioética”. Panorama actual de la bioética. Encuentros de 
Filosofía en Gijón. Fundación Gustavo Bueno and Sociedad Internacional de Bioética, Gijón, 3 July, 
pp. 12-13. 
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transcend these particular moralities. The group of statements that repre-
sents these trans-moral values is called ethics, the equivalent of a kind of 
morality of morals.40 
In this way, secular ethics would be a lowest common denominator for 
all human beings.41 Below this LCD, human rights would be violated; 
above it would be the demands of the morals of each specific human group 
(religion, culture, etc.),42 which would only bind the members of their re-
spective particular moral communities.
Essentially, this idea of ethics represents the efforts of contemporary secu-
larism, the heir in turn to the Western / liberal / enlightened / materialist 
tradition, to go beyond the world’s moral multiplicity without in turn falling 
into ethnocentrism, at least in its strong version. Another matter is the ideo-
logical guideline that must be followed, namely, the question of neutrality.
 b) Neutrality. Secular ethics aspires to be aseptic, neutral, non-ideological; in 
other words, it should not represent the values of any religion, culture, 
paradigm, etc. The degree of civic adhesion is achieved by accepting pre-
cisely that the values do not represent any human group in particular, but 
all of them.
In bioethics, this neutrality results in the defence of the rules that ensure the 
greatest number of options; for example, an abortion law based on legal time 
limits that does not oblige a woman to justify, publically or socially, her reasons 
for terminating her pregnancy, active euthanasia, artificial reproduction for sin-
gle mothers, same-sex marriage, divorce, contraceptives, and so on. Secular eth-
ics would offer a range of possibilities so that citizens may freely choose the 
option that is most in keeping with their religious and/or cultural convictions. 
The function of the state would not be to impose a single line for living life, but 
to allow the different alternatives to compete without being mutually exclusive. 
This would be the meaning of bioethics as “civil ethics” (Feito).43
 40 López Baroni, M. J. (2013). “Ética y moral en la bioética”. Cuadernos Electrónicos de Filosofía del 
Derecho, no. 27, pp. 96-120.
 41 Gómez Heras, J. M.ª (2005). “Repensar la bioética. Una disciplina joven ante nuevos retos y tareas.” 
In: Gómez-Heras J.; Velayos Castelo, C. (eds.). Bioética. Perspectivas emergentes y nuevos proble-
mas. Madrid: Tecnos, pp. 21-48. 
 42 Peces-Barba Martínez, G. (2003). “Ética pública y ética privada.” In: Tamayo, J. Aportación de las 
religiones a una ética universal. Cátedra de Teología y Ciencias de las Religiones Ignacio Ellacuría. 
Madrid: Dykinson SL, pp. 15-31.
 43 Feito Grande, L. (1997). “Panorama histórico de la bioética”. Moralia, no. 20.
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However, although secular ethics is neutral in the sense of not granting 
pre-eminence to any ideological or religious worldview, this does not imply 
that it is neutral in the sense of indifference. Therefore, on numerous occa-
sions, and just as happens with feminism, this ethical paradigm collides head-
on with multiculturalism. Its LCD is obligatory for all, regardless of the group 
they are in, which a priori makes it possible to judge the contents of the dif-
ferent groups’ morals, or their laws, in accordance with this canon. Thus, 
from this premise it can be inferred that when the individual’s interests clash 
with the signs of identity of their group, the individual’s interests must prevail 
over those of the group (Kymlicka),44 including the right of separation or re-
instatement, which is not the same as banishment.
This explains why this participative neutrality (that is, ideological, as it is 
the heir to enlightened liberal tradition) takes as its canon of “ethicity” human 
rights as they are conceived in the West, headed by their paradigmatic text, the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Casado).45 This in practice 
makes it possible to compare, and where appropriate to condemn, the moral 
practices or the laws of different peoples, cultures or religions, even at the risk 
of committing ethnocentrism. It would in this case be a weak form of ethno-
centrism, because any other option would turn the world into moral ghettoes, 
where each moral tribe would do as it pleased. In bioethics, the European 
Convention on Bioethics (1997) and UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights (2005) would include this spirit of non-indifferent 
neutrality with pretensions to universality. 
The paradigm that inspires the University of Barcelona’s Bioethics and Law 
Observatory is precisely the one I have just analysed, as can be read in its presen-
tation:
 44 Thus, Kymlicka, a classic of liberalism, upon analysing these questions, concludes that: “a) the rights 
of minorities should not allow one group to dominate other groups; b) nor should they allow a group 
to oppress its own members. In other words, liberals should try to ensure that there is equality among 
groups, as well as freedom and equality within groups.” Kymlicka, W. (1996). Ciudadanía multicul-
tural. Paidós Ibérica, p. 266.
 45 “Human rights constitute the legal foundations and, in turn, the inalienable ethical minimum, on 
which Western societies should be based. The previous statement is essential for establishing patterns 
of behaviour acceptable to everyone, regardless of the foundations on which it is based. [...] the 
point of reference of moral and legal attitudes is established on respect for human rights — as an 
ethical minimum and as a basis for the legal system — they seem the most appropriate nexus be-
tween different standpoints.” Casado, M. (1998). “Nuevo derecho para la nueva bioética”. Bioética, 
derecho y sociedad. Madrid: Trotta, p. 70. The second edition was published in 2015.
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The Bioethics and Law Observatory (OBD) is a University of Barcelona research 
centre that carries out its activity in an interdisciplinary way from secular points 
of view. Its members understand bioethics to be a field of knowledge that requires 
plural approaches and solid scientific backup in order to analyse the ethical, legal 
and social consequences of biotechnology and biomedicine. The objective is to 
supply arguments and proposals that encourage autonomy and responsibility, so 
that bioethical decisions will result in the construction of a more transparent and 
democratic society.46
The Observatory was created in 1994 with the intention of offering a non-
denominational approach to our discipline. The following year the master’s de-
gree in Bioethics and Law was inaugurated. The word “Law” in the title alludes 
not only to the study subject, namely the legal system, but also to human 
rights as the ethical lowest common denominator from a secular point of view, 
a paradigm according to which in the last twenty years numerous professionals 
in different fields of knowledge have been trained.47
When the twentieth anniversaries of the Observatory and the Master’s de-
gree were celebrated, the retrospective analysis summarized in a few lines the 
new direction of bioethics:
In those days bioethics was an incipient field of knowledge, which started from 
crypto-confessional approaches, advocated a principlist system close to indoctrina-
tion and was conducive to an aggiornada form of traditional medical ethics. When 
the Council of Europe (with its Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, 
of 1997) and UNESCO (with its three declarations on bioethical themes that 
culmi nated in the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, of 2005) 
endorsed our approach, it was easy for our ideas, which had previously been dis-
cussed acerbically, to be accepted by even their fiercest detractors.48
 46 Presentation of the Bioethics and Law Observatory, at www.bioeticayderecho.ub.edu/es/presenta 
ción, last visit, December 2016.
 47 This perspective can be observed in the presentation of the master’s degree: “The Master’s degree is 
addressed to the training and qualification in bioethics of healthcare professionals, members of na-
tional ethics committees, research and healthcare committees, legal operators, judges, journalists, etc. 
and, in general, anyone interested in obtaining an overall, flexible and comprehensive view of bioeth-
ics, framed in the respect for internationally recognized Human Rights, and in obtaining an interdis-
ciplinary education that allows for rational decision-making with regard to bioethical problems and 
issues”, at www.bioeticayderecho.ub.edu/es/master, last visit, January 2016.
 48 Bioethics and Law Observatory, “XX Aniversario del Máster y del Observatorio de Bioética y Dere-
cho de la Universitat de Barcelona. Barcelona”, at www.bioeticayderecho.ub.edu/es/xx-aniversa 
rio#sthash.VskNF2Rk.dpuf, last visit, February 2016.
HANDBOOK OF SECULAR BIOETHICS (I)52
The importance of the Bioethics and Law Observatory is both symbolic and 
practical. On the one hand, its director, María Casado, obtained the UNESCO 
Chair in Bioethics in 2007, one of just nine in the world and the only one in 
Spain in this speciality, and on the other, the documents and reports drafted 
by the Observatory have been reflected in Spanish legislation, so much so that 
many of the laws passed in recent years have copied its proposals.49 Moreover, 
the creation of links with Latin America has made it possible to enrich and 
reinforce the debates,50 something reflected in the body’s most emblematic 
publication, the Bioethics and Law Journal, where studies and analyses by nu-
merous researchers from both sides of the Atlantic have appeared.
To sum up, the incorporation of secularism in bioethics has been the con-
sequence of the militant, evangelical, colonizing ideas of early bioethics, mo-
nopolized by theologians. The basic axiom of secularism could be expressed by 
etsi Deus non daretur (as if there were no God),51 which implies trying to lay the 
foundations of ethics and action without spiritual, religious or metaphysical 
elements.
2.3.3. Multiculturalism in bioethics
Lastly, multicultural trends were incorporated in bioethics in the 1990s. Be-
tween 1989 and 1991 Communism collapsed, whereby the logic of the Cold 
 49 Casado, M.; Lamm, E. (coords.) (2011). Reedición y análisis del impacto normativo de los documentos 
del Observatorio de Bioética y Derecho sobre salud reproductiva en la adolescencia y sobre la interrup-
ción voluntaria del embarazo. Bioethics and Law Observatory, Barcelona; Casado, M.; Royes, A. 
(2010). Repercusión e impacto normativo de los documentos del Observatorio de Bioética y Derecho 
sobre las voluntades anticipadas y sobre la eutanasia. Bioethics and Law Observatory, Barcelona; 
Casado, M. (coord.) (2008). Reedición y análisis del impacto normativo de los documentos del Obser-
vatorio de Bioética y Derecho sobre reproducción asistida, Bioethics and Law Observatory, Barcelona.
 50 The networks created by the Observatory have also made it possible to contact professionals in dif-
ferent countries: “In some cases, the networks are coordinated by the OBD, as occurs with the 
Network on Bioethics and Human Rights (backed by the Generalitat de Catalunya), with the Bio-
ethics Teaching Network (which was formed based on a European Union Alpha Project), of the 
Spanish Universities’ Ethics Committees Network and other public research bodies, or coordinated 
jointly, as occurs in the Ibero-American Network — International Association of Bioethics (IAB). In 
other cases, the OBD is a member of other prestigious national and international networks, as is the 
case of the UNITWIN/UNESCO Chairs network, the Unesco.cat network, the network of the In-
ternational Institute of Research in Ethics and Biomedicine (IIREB), and the European Association 
of Global Bioethics”, at www.bioeticayderecho.ub.edu/es/redes, last visit, January 2016.
 51 Preface by Maurizio Mori in the book by Scarpelli, Uberto (1998). Bioetica laica. Baldini & Cas-
toldi, p. 14.
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War, with its dichotomy of capitalism versus Marxism, gave way to globaliza-
tion, with its melancholy heteronym, post-modernity, and the dichotomy be-
tween the Clash of Civilizations and the Alliance of Civilizations. The ideas 
that anthropologists had been working on for 200 years burst in on our disci-
pline, filling it with concepts such as culture, civilization, ethnocentrism and 
relativism. The presence of multiculturalism in bioethics fractured along two 
lines of discourse.
In its first line, multiculturalism served to uphold the value of moral plu-
ralism in a complex and diverse world. The Western principlism of early bio-
ethics was questioned, as was, above all, the pre-eminence of the principle of 
autonomy, the badge of the paradigm of the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant 
and ultimately of the Western world. This questioning led to the defence of 
particularisms. Each people, tribe, culture, religion or civilization explained 
what its values were with regard to biomedicine, with the dialogical enrich-
ment this entails, but with the handicap of redirecting the discipline towards 
a series of monologues with no possibility whatsoever of reaching across-the-
board agreements.
In its second line of discourse, multiculturalism confronted the dangers of 
biotechnology, since, accompanying the cultural discourse, the scientific pos-
sibilities appeared in the 1990s. The collusion between computing, the Inter-
net and biotechnology generated countless new concepts or expressions such 
as “embryonic stem cells”, “genetically modified products”, “therapeutic clon-
ing”, “synthetic life”, “extinct species revival”, and others, which with great 
difficulty reflected the question marks hanging over the new reality. Ultimate-
ly, biotechnology aims to intervene, alter, control or dominate the genetic 
makeup of living beings, beginning with our species, or even to create new 
forms of life, artificial included. Hypothetical scenarios ceased to be the mo-
nopoly of science fiction and were here to stay. Multiculturalism had just been 
incorporated in our discipline when all of a sudden we had to consider how to 
regulate these scenarios with moral observatories as diverse as those existing on 
our planet.
Two alternatives thus emerged when it came to confronting the dangers of 
contemporary science. The first one attempts to mould the non-Western world 
according to the canon of human rights, which ultimately takes us back to the 
problem of Western / liberal / Euro-Christian / secular ethnocentrism (the rules 
that should govern biotechnology on a worldwide scale are ours). The second 
alternative consists in creating shared, transcultural, agreed values, without 
doubt a very aesthetic idea in theory, but actually rather impractical. It could 
be said that this is where we are now.
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2.4.  “Origins of bioethics (0)” – “origins of the neologism (0)”
The fourth model, a minority one but which does exist, considers that bioethics 
is not a serious field of knowledge, worthy of being taken into account, and that 
the neologism was a lucky invention useful for intentions that have nothing to 
do with thinking about or defending human rights in the sphere of biomedicine. 
The 0-0 formulation thus highlights the scant or zero importance of the two 
variables, “origins of the discipline” (which does not actually exist) and “origins 
of the neologism” (which has nothing to do with ethics).
Essentially, this view is put forward by those who question the legitimacy 
of bioethics as a discipline. For its defenders bioethics represents one or all of 
these axioms: a) the defence of American capitalist neoliberalism; b) the de-
fence of a new form of colonialism, genetic and biotechnological; c) the re-
placement of the model of clinical ethics typical of doctors, based on benefi-
cence, with an economistic model upheld by theologians, philosophers and 
intellectuals without full knowledge of it or representativeness; d) the legiti-
mation of the abuses that continue to be perpetrated through an apparently 
benign discourse. 
Although there are not many formal attacks against the discipline, we could 
mention, speaking for all of them, the book by Tom Koch and its intriguing 
title, Thieves of Virtue: When Bioethics Stole Medicine.52
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3	 Principles, Values and Citizens’ rights with 
respect to Biomedicine and Biotechnology
1. Introduction1
When analysing the population’s rights with respect to biomedicine and bio-
technology, we must first bear some issues in mind.
On one hand, the rights, values and principles that we shall analyse suc-
cinctly belong to human beings in their capacity as citizens, and not just as 
patients. Indeed, the wide range of actions that may be generated as a conse-
quence of biomedicine and biotechnology affect not just the people who need 
medical treatment, but, in general, any and all citizens, even when they do not 
have any direct connections to these disciplines. The protection of the envi-
ronment, the genetic modification of living beings, uncontrolled experi-
ments, attacks on generic rights such as privacy or collective health, among 
others, constrain humanity as a whole, the reason why the European Conven-
tion on Biomedicine is entitled “Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and the Dignity of the Human Being with Respect to the Applications 
of Biology and Medicine”.2 The same occurs with the Universal Declaration 
on Bioethics and Human Rights, adopted by UNESCO’s General Conference 
in Paris on 19 December 2005. They are not texts designed solely and exclu-
sively for patients, but for all human beings, regardless of how close their con-
nections are to biology and medicine.
 1 This chapter is part of the materials for the Bioethics and Law Observatory’s master’s degree in Bio-
ethics and Law, and it was written by María Casado and Manuel Jesús López Baroni. 
 2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Respect to 
the Application of Biology and Medicine, Oviedo, 4 April 1997. Ratified by Spain through an instru-
ment of ratification, 23 July 1999. RCL 1999\2638. It came into force on 1 January 2000. From 
hereon, the European Convention on Bioethics. It was developed by the Council of Europe.
The European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights was passed in Nice in 2000, symboli-
cally and not legally binding for the countries of the European Union. Nevertheless, the European 
constitution included this charter in its articles, whereby, if it had been approved, its content would 
have had the same regulatory scope as the rest of the constitution. Since the constitution was not 
passed, the Treaty of Lisbon, of 2007, referred expressly to the charter, making it binding. For that 
reason, it is now a legal document of huge importance for all the countries of the European Union.
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On the other hand, the sources of these rights are very diverse. Thus, we 
can find principles typical of bioethics (such as those listed in principlism, al-
ready mentioned): principles that came about in other contexts but which 
have been reused for our field of knowledge, like the principle of precaution or 
that of food sovereignty;3 abstract values, such as dignity, at the limits of ius-
naturalism or metaphysics; rights expressly acknowledged in some legal sys-
tems, such as active euthanasia; rights established in international documents, 
like UNESCO’s European Convention on Bioethics and Human Rights, or 
article 3 of the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights;4 rights only 
understandable in the light of the new technologies, like the right to be forgot-
ten; pre-existing rights that gathered new momentum through the develop-
ments of big data and bio-computing, as in the case of the right to privacy and 
information that contains the genetic makeup of human beings, and so on.
Lastly, we must point out that responsibilities have also been created with 
regard to subjects or bodies that are unable to exercise the reciprocity inherent 
in any obligation, as is the case of future generations in issues referring to the 
protection of the environment, or of some animals, over which there are strict 
regulations when marketing products derived from their use by industry.
Upon analysing these rights and responsibilities, we are going to focus on 
a few values, rules and issues related to our subject, wholly irrespective of 
where they come from, citing the main national and international laws.
2. Dignity
Dignity has become unusually important with respect to progress in biotech-
nology and biomedicine. In the face of the importance attached to civil and 
political rights in liberalism, and to social, economic and cultural rights in 
socialism, the transverse nature of dignity could be upheld, since it cannot be 
exclusively attributed to either first- or second-generation rights. A good start-
ing point for understanding what it means is Kant:
 3 López Baroni, M. J. (2011). “Los principios no originarios de la Bioética.” Revista Argumentos de 
Razón Técnica, no. 13, pp. 113-149.
 4 Thus, Directive 2003/15/EC of 27 February 2003, prohibiting the commercialization of cosmetics 
whose manufacturing entails experimentation with animals, came into effect in 2013. Regulation 
(EC) 1007/2009, of 16 September, prohibited the importation of products derived from seals. And 
Regulation (EC) no. 1523/2007, of the European Parliament and the Council, of 11 December, pro-
hibited the importation and exportation of dog and cat fur and of products that contain it. 
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In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What has 
a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other 
hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity. 
[…] What is related to general human inclinations and needs has a market 
price; that which, even without presupposing such a need, conforms with a cer-
tain taste, that is, with a delight in the mere purposeless play of our mental pow-
ers [an aesthetic object, for example, or an object that has great sentimental value 
for us], has a fancy price; but that which constitutes the condition under which 
alone something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative value, that is, a 
price, but an inner value, that is, dignity.5
The huge possibilities that contemporary technology offers have obliged us 
to consider what type of actions, experiments or investigations are compatible 
with human dignity. As Valls argues, “All humans have dignity, because we are 
all primarily and actively free, sovereign”,6 hence the need to reinforce human 
moral integrity. This may well be the reason, highlighting this value, which 
justifies the name of the European Convention on Bioethics: “Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Human Dignity with Respect to the Ap-
plications of Biology and Medicine” (our italics).
Indeed, as we see, for the first time in an international document of this 
kind the title separates human rights from dignity, not because the latter 
does not pertain to them, but with the intention of stressing that the idea of 
dignity must come before all other values (such as sacrosanct “autonomy”). 
UNESCO’s Declaration of Bioethics also uses this distinction, although in 
article 3, under the heading Human Dignity and Human Rights, where it estab-
lishes that: “Human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms must be 
fully respected.”7 In the case of the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, instead of the term “dignity” it uses another with a similar meaning, 
 5 Kant. Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres. (KW IV, pp. 434-435). Madrid: Santillana, 
1996, p. 56, in Valls, op. cit. Worthy of mention is Valls’ interpretation of the paragraphs by Kant 
referring to dignity in the article from which we have taken this citation: Valls, R. (2005). “El con-
cepto de dignidad Humana”. Revista de Bioética y Derecho, no. 5, December.
 6 Ibid.
 7 In this respect, the first part of the book Sobre la dignidad y los principios. Análisis de la Declaración 
Universal sobre Bioética y Derechos Humanos de la Unesco, by María Casado (2009), published by 
Civitas, at www. bioeticayderecho.ub.edu/es/solicitud/libro-sobre-la-dignidad-y-los-principios, deals 
with the concept of dignity from the different points of view upheld by the most important philoso-
phers, jurists and bioethicists in our context.
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“integrity”, the heading for article 3 dedicated to the rights of Europeans with 
regard to medicine and biology.
In any case, the meaning in both documents, Convention and Charter, is 
the same. It is considered that certain actions are an attack on human dignity 
itself, regardless of the consent that those affected may give. In the case of the 
European Union, financial gain from the human body, eugenic practices and 
reproductive cloning are expressly prohibited, presupposing that these acts in-
jure “human integrity”, not in the physical but in the moral sense; in the Eu-
ropean Convention on Bioethics (which pertains to the Council of Europe 
and not the European Union), we find similar proposals, although of greater 
significance, with the implicit intention that “human dignity” be respected.
To assess what this value represents in the recent history of bioethics, we 
must bear in mind that the famous experiments carried out on Afro-Ameri-
cans in the USA (Tuskegee, Alabama) for almost 40 years, the basis of the 
Belmont Report, did not affect just the lack of consent (they were not in-
formed that the treatments for syphilis they were being given were placebos 
and therefore useless), but their dignity as human beings, since these people 
were used as guinea pigs. The publication in scientific journals of the results of 
these medical actions, which were also performed in Guatemala, violated these 
people’s right to not be objectified, that is, their right to not be treated as mere 
tools (as a means and not an end, as Kant would have it).
A second example took place in Pakistan, where the CIA put a certain doc-
tor in charge of a false vaccination campaign. The ultimate aim was to fraudu-
lently obtain the DNA of thousands of Pakistani children in the secret hope of 
locating the children of the famous terrorist Bin Laden, who, as we know, was 
eventually killed in Islamabad (although we do not know if he was found due 
to this campaign). The important thing about this practice is not that the con-
sent of the children and their families was lacking; nor that they were deceived; 
nor that their DNA was sequenced massively; nor that it took advantage of the 
good faith of a population living in conditions of social and economic poverty; 
nor that, because of it, all kinds of vaccinations in that country were suspend-
ed, with the added risk of it being an area where polio is endemic and if mass 
vaccinations are not carried out this disease will never be eradicated from the 
face of the Earth:8 no, the important thing is that the dignity of these people 
was violated, as they were used — Kant once again — as a means and not an 
end. This is the significance of this value here. 
 8 López Baroni, M. J. (2018). Bioderecho y bioética durante la era Obama. Aconcagua.
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A third example has to do with human cloning. It is not prohibited be-
cause of a hypothetical evolutionary problem for the species (lack of genetic 
variability), or its potential use by totalitarian states (the cloning en masse of 
human beings), or at least this is not what concerns us here: reproductive (not 
therapeutic) cloning is prohibited because it is considered that it affects hu-
man dignity, a person’s unique and unrepeatable nature. Although the indi-
vidual is not just his or her genetic makeup but a group of subjective and irre-
placeable experiences, it is considered that cloning a person, living or dead, 
harms their moral integrity. For this reason, article 11 of the Universal Declara-
tion on the Human Genome and Human Rights, drafted by UNESCO in 
1997, is formulated in these terms: “Practices that are contrary to human dig-
nity, such as cloning for the purpose of reproducing human beings, must not 
be permitted.”
The Protocol to the European Convention on Bioethics, of 1998, which 
also prohibits cloning, is even more specific: “For the purposes of this article, 
a human being that is ‘genetically identical’ to another human being is under-
stood to be a human being who shares the same series of nuclear genes with 
another one.”9
To sum up, two people are not identical because they share their genetic 
makeup (we only have to think of twins), but it is considered that cloning a 
person in a laboratory affects human specificity, namely, a person’s singularity, 
even though the experiments cannot be duplicated in a test tube. 
Lastly, the prohibition of the creation of interspecific hybrids, that is, the 
fertilization of an animal egg by a human sperm, or vice versa, or the creation 
of similar living entities, regardless of the fact that the resulting embryo may 
not be viable beyond a few days, is based precisely on this concept of human 
dignity. Although the transfer of animal organs, tissues or cells to a person is 
accepted, in the context of transplants, the creation of human chimeras is con-
sidered unacceptable.
This is the reason why the sentence by the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union, of 18 October 2011, excluded from the patenting system “the 
procedures to create hybrids of living beings on a basis of germ or totipotent 
 9 Protocol of 12 January 1998, ratified by Instrument of 7 January 2000, RCL 2001\540, ratifying the 
additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Hu-
man Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (RCL 1999/2638, 2822), prohib-
iting the cloning of human beings, drafted in Paris on 12 January 1998. BOE 1 March 2001, no. 52, 
p. 7671.
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cells of people and animals,”10 not because they could give rise to science-fic-
tion scenarios — therefore uncontrollable — but because it is considered that 
this kind of mixing violates the dignity of our species.
However, despite the fact that this could be considered the general rule, 
Spanish legislation allows these hybrids in certain cases. Article 14.4 of the first 
Law of Assisted Reproduction in this country authorized the hamster test to 
evaluate the fertilization capacity of human sperms (fertilization of a hamster 
egg with a human sperm up to the two-cell division phase [mitosis]). This 
same article allowed “other combinations” if they had the relevant administra-
tive permission.11
Article 26.c.7 of the Law of Assisted Reproduction of 2006, currently in 
force, punishes as very serious conduct the creation of interspecific hybrids, 
but it allows them indirectly, by establishing the exception “in the cases of cur-
rently permitted trials”. What is more, appendix B of the said law allows the 
creation of these hybrids not just with hamsters, but with “animal oocytes”,12 
which massively increases the possibilities.
What we have just said shows that, although dignity is a fundamental 
value, its content is a long way from being sufficiently agreed upon. Some 
authors defend human reproductive cloning, stating that what makes human 
beings unique and unrepeatable are their experiences, not their genetic make-
up; human chimeras are legal in Spain provided a certain period of develop-
ment is not exceeded.
Moreover, we have to bear in mind that the word “dignity” is very often 
used spuriously, as a tool at the service of religious dogma. The Catholic 
Church, for example, holds up human dignity to oppose in vitro fertiliza-
tion, therapeutic cloning, embryonic stem cell research, contraceptives, and, 
in general, any scientific progress in biomedicine that goes against its postu-
lates. Across the Atlantic, the American Bioethics Committee during the 
Bush presidency, directed at that time by the Catholic theologian Edmund 
 10 Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber). Sentence of 18 October 2011. CJEU\ 
2011\316.
 11 The actual wording is as follows: “The hamster test is authorized to evaluate the fertilization capacity 
of human sperms, until the stage when the hamster’s fertilized egg divides into two cells, the moment 
when the test will be terminated. Other fertilizations between human and animal gametes are forbid-
den, except those with the permission of the relevant public authority, or where appropriate of the 
multidisciplinary National Commission if it has delegated powers”, article 14.4 of Law 35/1988, of 24 
November, of Assisted Reproduction Techniques. 
 12 Specifically, the wording is as follows: B) Diagnostic procedures. Procedures aimed at evaluating the 
fertilization capacity of human sperms consisting in the fertilization of animal oocytes until the stage 
when the fertilized animal egg divides into two cells, the moment when the test must be terminated.
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Pellegrino, published a document entitled Human Dignity and Bioethics to 
oppose en bloc any sort of scientific progress in biomedicine and biotech-
nology.13 
Essentially, the American report was a reaction against the opinion of the 
philosopher Ruth Macklin, who dared to question the usefulness of the con-
cept of “dignity” in contemporary bioethics.14 Three-quarters of the authors of 
this report came, according to Pinker,15 from the religious right, led by Leon 
Kass, the former president of the American Bioethics Committee and a well-
known ultra-conservative thinker.
Dignity is therefore used as a euphemism to advocate the moral conserva-
tism typical of the monotheist religions, with the paradoxical effect of defend-
ing, as in the case of the American neocons (“theocons”), neoliberalism and 
social Darwinism as options in keeping with human dignity.16
However, even if we sidestepped the religious discourses, the debate about 
the importance of dignity in bioethics would be no clearer. What is more, one 
could even speak of a dichotomy, dignity versus autonomy, among authors 
who take positions in secular, materialist or atheist observatories:
[…] dignity cannot be reduced to autonomy. This is, precisely, one of the core 
themes that can be found in several articles about dignity appearing in the book 
that María Casado coordinated some years ago: Concerning Dignity and Princi-
ples: an Analysis of UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human 
Rights. In contrast to the ideas of authors such as Macklin, Pinker or Mosterín, 
who had suggested dispensing with the “intractable” concept of dignity and re-
placing it with that of autonomy (taking this to mean, approximately, the duty 
 13 Various authors, Human Dignity and Bioethics. Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on 
Bioethics. Washington, March 2008.
 14 Macklin, R. (2003). “Dignity is a Useless Concept.” BMJ 327, pp. 1419-1420.
 15 To understand the content of the report, it is essential to read the article by Steven Pinker entitled 
“The Stupidity of Dignity: Conservative Bioethics’ Latest, Most Dangerous Ploy”. The New Republic, 
28 May 2008.
 16 In any case, the defence of dignity in bioethics is recent, as Hottois’ study showed: “Dignity has no 
place in principlism, the classic systematization of American bioethics. The first edition of the Ency-
clopedia of Bioethics, coordinated by W. T. Reich, has no entry for it and only indexes about ten 
frequencies. In 1995, the new edition of the Encyclopedia (in five volumes!) has no entry for it and it 
does not even appear in the index!” Another equally significant fact: the classic work of principlism 
— Beauchamp T. L.; Childress J. F. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Oxford University Press, 1979 
(1983, 2nd ed. enlarged) — mentions the term dignity twice, once to stress its vague nature, the 
second time within a citation: the index refers to “sanctity of life” (four mentions), and to “respect 
for persons” (seven mentions) (2nd edition). Hottois, G. (2009). “Dignidad humana y bioética. Un 
enfoque filosófico crítico”. Translation by Chantal Aristizábal Tobler. Revista Colombiana de Bioéti-
ca, vol. 4, no. 2, June-December, pp. 53-83.
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to respect the decisions of individuals, as long as they do not harm anyone else, 
at least), almost everybody writing this book on the subject of dignity argues that 
this view is a mistake, although they acknowledge that dignity is not exactly an 
easy concept to define and that, in some ways, dignity and autonomy are con-
cepts necessarily linked to one another (Atienza).17
Thus, at one extreme we could cite the authors who consider dignity to be 
a metaphysical concept, hence they believe that this value must be replaced by 
the principle of autonomy, more quantifiable, understandable or verifiable 
from the point of view of legal positivism. From this perspective, iusnatural-
ism would be a myth, although a useful myth (Mosterín),18 as one can only 
talk about rights from an anthropocentric perspective (there are no natural 
rights, but rights granted by one human being to another, without divine me-
diation).
At the other extreme, we could place the majority of those who collabo-
rated in the abovementioned book, Concerning Dignity and Principles: an 
Analysis of UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights.19 
Even though iusnaturalists and positivists may be mixed up in this book to a 
different degree, these authors uphold the idea of dignity as a value in itself, 
separate from, although coordinated or at least compatible with, the principle 
of autonomy.
In conclusion, as a result of the exponential growth of biomedicine and 
biotechnology, the issue of human dignity has ceased to be a merely theoreti-
cal or abstract question and has gone straight to the forefront of the values to 
be upheld. It is, on one hand, a dam against not only cultural or religious 
practices — which no matter how ancestral or historical they may be do not 
have to be accepted — but also democracy itself,20 under whose protection, 
 17 Atienza, M. (2016). “El derecho sobre el propio cuerpo y sus consecuencias.” In: Casado, M. 
(coord.). De la solidaridad al mercado. El cuerpo humano y el comercio biotecnológico. Mexico City: 
Fontamara, pp. 33-61.
 18 Mosterín, J. (2014). El triunfo de la compasión. Nuestra relación con los otros animales. Alianza Edi-
torial. p. 91.
 19 Casado, M. (2009).
 20 In line with, the predominance of dignity over autonomy, we would for example place the inter-
pretation made by Ricardo García Manrique of article 12 of UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights, “human dignity must not be infringed through the invocation of 
considerations relative to cultural diversity and pluralism, whose importance is acknowledged by 
the Declaration (2009: 55-56,60)”, which implies that dignity is a limit not just for individual but 
for collective autonomy, too: “In other words, dignity is a limit for democracy itself ” (Atienza, op. 
cit., 46).
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in the form of populism, certain achievements may be threatened; on the 
other hand, it represents a danger when it is brandished by ultra-religious 
groups for the purpose of halting scientific investigation; lastly, it is an ab-
stract concept that is hard to define, whose ultimate content must be speci-
fied case by case. 
3. Autonomy
The principle of autonomy must be associated with the idea of individual hu-
man freedom and the Kantian maxim that every person is a moral subject, 
capable of universalizing their actions. It presupposes the ability of any human 
being to control their actions without outside interference. This principle is 
part of Beauchamp and Childress’s principlism, and it may even be considered 
the most emblematic one, although, as we have already said, its existence can-
not be explained by the ideas of these authors. 
The first legal formulation of this principle can be found in the Nuremberg 
Code of 1947, drafted after the Second World War as a consequence of the 
Nazis’ experiments in biomedicine. The second time it was included in an in-
ternational text was in 1964, in the World Medical Association’s Declaration of 
Helsinki (article 25).
The third occasion was in the Belmont Report, of 1979, the result of the 
commission that was created in the USA (1975-1978) to investigate the experi-
ments carried out with Afro-Americans in Tuskegee, Alabama, for almost 40 
years, although expressed as “respect for people”. The fourth time we find a 
precise formulation of this principle is in the European Convention on Bio-
ethics, in 1997.
Since 2000, the year this convention came into force in Spain, this prin-
ciple has become an essential part of our legal system. What is more, we 
could argue that the application of this principle made it possible to replace 
a paternalistic model — the heir to the clerical view of Francoism in which 
decisions were taken not only by healthcare personnel but also by the powers-
that-be or the Catholic Church, instead of by those directly affected — with 
another model based on autonomy, in which the patient becomes a fully 
entitled subject and makes decisions according to their convictions and be-
liefs.
Thus, different laws in the Spanish legal system, at both state and autono-
mous community level, have included this principle, especially Law 41/2002, 
of 14 November, regulating patient autonomy and rights and responsibilities 
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in matters of information and clinical documentation, and Law 14/2007, of 3 
July, of Biomedical Research.
The fifth occasion was in the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Hu-
man Rights, of 2005, under the auspices of UNESCO (article 5).
Due to the large number of laws that include this subject, we shall just 
mention the most usual consequences of the principle of autonomy.
3.1. Informed consent
It is a person’s right not to be subjected to any biomedical treatment, experi-
mentation or research without their consent. We can compare how it is formu-
lated by looking at different laws:
Art. 5 of the European Convention on Bioethics
An intervention in the field of healthcare may only be made after the person has 
given their free and informed consent.
Art. 3.a. of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
In the context of medicine and biology the following will be respected, in par-
ticular:
A) The free and informed consent of the person being treated, in accordance 
with the types established by law.
Art. 5 of UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics
The person’s autonomy must be respected with regard to the power to take deci-
sions, taking responsibility for them and respecting the autonomy of others.
Art. 2 of the Law of Patient Autonomy
2. Any and all action in the field of healthcare generally requires the prior con-
sent of the patients or users. This consent, which must be obtained after the pa-
tient is adequately informed, will be given in writing in the cases envisaged in the 
Law.
3. The patient or user is entitled to decide freely, after being suitably informed, 
between the available clinical options.
Art. 4 of the Law of Biomedical Research
1. The free autonomy of people who may participate in biomedical research or 
who may contribute their biological samples to it will be respected, for which 
they will necessarily have previously given their express consent in writing after 
being suitably informed.
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 The information will be given to people with disabilities in accessible condi-
tions and formats appropriate to their needs.
 If the subject of the research is unable to write, consent can be given by any 
means offered by the law to allow them to state their wishes. 
The requirement for express consent generates a huge amount of case law 
when people’s autonomy is limited or non-existent. Nevertheless, the Euro-
pean Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights establishes no specific rules for 
these situations; and the clause established in article 5 of the Universal Decla-
ration on Bioethics and Human Rights is too generic, as it simply says that 
“special measures will have to be taken to protect their rights and interests”.
In this respect, only article 6 of the European Convention on Bioethics has 
specified this case law, although based on the general rule that it will only be 
possible to intervene in people lacking the ability to express consent when it is 
for their direct personal benefit.
The Convention authorizes certain medical interventions, for example inter 
vivos transplants of regenerative tissue, if specific requirements are met (which 
we shall examine in the corresponding chapter) and the incapable person is not 
openly opposed to it, and even some experiments, if the beneficiary is:
[…] the person affected or other people in the same age range or who suffer from 
the same disease or the same disorder, or who present the same characteristics. 
(Art. 17.2.i).
In this way, the use of people who are incapable of expressing their consent 
is avoided in experiments that benefit society as a whole, but not them or those 
who are in a situation similar to them.
Developing this possibility, the Law of Biomedical Research allows, in ar-
ticle 19, for experimentation with pregnant women, embryos or foetuses, pro-
vided that, besides meeting certain requirements, the research benefits them 
personally or pregnant women, embryos, foetuses or newborn babies as a 
whole; and in article 21, experimentation with people whose “emergency clin-
ical situation” does not allow them to express consent. In these cases, the ben-
eficiary of the research must be the person affected or others in the same situ-
ation. Moreover, among other requirements, the law demands that the Public 
Prosecutor be informed and that the consent of the person affected or their 
relatives be obtained whenever possible.
In the case of minors, the European Convention on Bioethics, in article 
6.2, requires that the minor’s degree of maturity, age and comprehension be 
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properly assessed depending on the type of treatment, as well as collecting the 
express consent of their parents or representatives.
Respecting the content of the Convention, article 4 of the Spanish Law of 
Biomedical Research establishes that:
2. Consent shall be given by a representative when the person is legally incapaci-
tated or is a minor, provided there are no other alternatives for the research. 
Consent through representation shall be given to the investigation to be carried 
out and shall be made respecting the person’s dignity and for the benefit of their 
health.
 Incapacitated people and minors will participate as far as possible and ac-
cording to their age and capacities in the decision-making throughout the re-
search process.
On this point, we should point out that Spain prohibits inter vivos organ 
donation to minors, even though the parents may agree to it (we shall examine 
this in the corresponding chapter), and abortion used to be permitted for mi-
nors aged 16 or 17, even if the parents were opposed to it or did not know 
about it (the situation has changed, but we shall also analyse that later on).
In the event of a dispute between the parents and the minor the interven-
tion of a third party may be necessary, which in the case of Spain means a 
court, without prejudice to the intervention of the Public Prosecutor to pro-
tect the interests of the minor. In certain situations, even though minors and 
parents agree, it may be necessary to notify the Public Prosecutor so that they 
are at least aware of this and may oppose it if they feel that the minor is being 
unjustifiably harmed. 
A singular case in this subject is presumed consent in the context of trans-
plants, a subject that we shall examine in the corresponding chapter.
Lastly, there are not usually any rules to specifically protect particularly 
vulnerable groups, such as people with very little money, the long-term unem-
ployed, ethnic minorities, sick people (for example, a patient must not be led 
to believe that his or her medical treatment is going to be better or there will 
be more possibilities of survival or a cure if they voluntarily submit to a medi-
cal experiment), and so on. 
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3.2.  The right to be informed of the consequences  
of medical treatment
Article 5 of the European Convention on Bioethics establishes that the person 
who is going to receive treatment in the field of healthcare:
[…] must be suitably informed beforehand of the purpose and the nature of the 
intervention, and of its risks and consequences.
The citizen is entitled to have the information adapted to his or her educa-
tional level or ethnic or linguistic group, with the ultimate aim of the affected 
person being able to fully understand the information. In this respect, articles 
2 and 4 of the Law of Patient Autonomy establish the patient’s right to be 
“suitably informed”, which as a general rule must be done verbally, even 
though a note will made in the clinical record. This information must be of-
fered “comprehensibly and suited to their needs”, with the object of them 
understanding “at least, the purpose and the nature of each intervention, its 
dangers and consequences”, which will allow them to make “decisions accord-
ing to their own free will”.
For its part, article 4 of the Law of Biomedical Research establishes that:
The information will be provided in writing and will include the nature, impor-
tance, implications and risks involved in the research, in the terms laid down by 
this law.
Sometimes, the law demands that the information be especially detailed, 
as is the case with assisted reproduction:
The information and guidance about these techniques, which must be given to 
those who wish to have recourse to them and to those who, where appropriate, 
are going to act as donors, will include their biological, legal and ethical aspects, 
and it must likewise specify the information relative to the financial conditions 
of the treatment. The medical teams performing these techniques in the hospi-
tals and services authorized for their practice will be legally obliged to provide 
the said information in the proper conditions in order to facilitate its compre-
hension. (Art 3.3 of the Law of Human Assisted Reproduction Techniques, Law 
14/2006, of 26 May).
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3.3.  The right to refuse treatment or withdraw consent  
at any time 
The right to receive information, conversely, entails the possibility of refusing 
treatment after receiving it, or even withdrawing consent once it has been 
given, even though the patient may die as a result. Thus, article 6 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Bioethics states that: “The person affected may freely 
withdraw their consent at any time.”
With the aim of providing healthcare personnel with legal certainty, article 
4.2 of the Law of Patient Autonomy requires this refusal to be made in writing. 
And article 4, sections 3 and 4, of the Law of Biomedical Research, develops 
this right even further, in the context of experimentation in biomedicine:
3. The persons taking part in biomedical research may revoke their consent at any 
time, without prejudice to the limitations established by this law. The persons or 
bodies that have received this consent will take the necessary steps for the effec-
tive exercise of this right.
4. The lack of consent or the revocation of consent previously given will not af-
fect the subject’s healthcare attention in any way.
Among other implications, this right entails not only the possibility of ceas-
ing to participate in an ongoing experiment, but also not transferring the em-
bryos generated in a fertility treatment procedure already underway;21 or not 
making an inter vivos organ donation even though consent was initially given.22
It is important to point out that the withdrawal of consent must not sup-
pose a financial, equity or personal cost for the subject, although the law does 
not always expressly acknowledge that the said refusal will not affect the indi-
vidual negatively.
Going into this issue in greater detail, in a document the University of Bar-
celona’s Bioethics and Law Observatory dealt with the problem arising from 
reconciling the principle of autonomy, the right to life and religious freedom in 
 21 Article 3.5 of the Law of Human Assisted Reproduction Techniques, Law 14/2006, of 26 May, estab-
lishes that “the woman in receipt of these techniques may ask for their application to be suspended 
at any time during the process prior to embryonic transfer, and this request must be respected”.
 22 Article 13 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine con-
cerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin, drafted in Strasbourg on 24 Janu-
ary 2002. Instrument of ratification by Spain. BOE no. 25 (Thursday, 29 January 2015).
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reference to Jehovah’s Witnesses, since this group refuses blood transfusions, 
which can have serious consequences for their health. The Observatory’s rec-
ommendations were to respect this group’s freedom to refuse transfusions, even 
though it could cost them their life (except when they are minors, in which 
case their right to life prevails and the courts may even be required to inter-
vene), but that they should be consistent with this decision and should not 
demand alternative treatments that could be costly for the Treasury in a con-
text of budgetary constraints.23
3.4. The right not to be informed (or the right not to know)
This right, which may seem paradoxical, can be explained because in certain 
cases a patient might not want to know what disease they have or how it is 
progressing, handing over the decision-making to the healthcare staff. In other 
cases, it may be that they do not wish to know their genetic information in case 
they are found to have a predisposition to an incurable disease.
The problem is that there may sometimes be third parties involved. Thus, 
if a person suffers from a contagious infectious disease, their health is a matter 
of public order, whereby their right not to know must be overruled by the 
right of the society in which they live to be protected. Moreover, a person’s 
health condition may be shared unwittingly by the members of their family. 
And so, if it is discovered that an individual has a particular mutation that 
predisposes them to an illness, it is reasonable for their close relatives to receive 
that same information, so that they can take preventive steps if possible.
The right not to be informed is succinctly included in article 4 of the Law 
of Patient Autonomy, and, in greater detail, in article 4.5 of the Law of Bio-
medical Research, in the context of genetic information:
Every person has the right to be informed of their genetic data and others of a 
personal nature that are obtained in the course of biomedical research, according 
to the terms in which they expressed their wish. The same right is acknowledged 
for a person who has contributed biological samples for the purpose indicated, 
or when other biological materials have been obtained from them.
 The person’s right to decide not to be notified of the data referred to in the 
previous section, including any unexpected discoveries that may be made, will be 
 23 Martorell, M. V.; Sánchez-Urrutia, A. (coords.) (2005). Declaration on the Refusal of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses to Accept Blood Transfusions. Bioethics and Law Observatory.
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respected. Notwithstanding this, when this information, in the opinion of the 
doctor in charge, is necessary to avoid serious harm to their health or that of their 
biological relatives, a close relative or a representative will be informed, after 
consultation with the medical committee if there is one. In any case, notification 
will be limited exclusively to the data necessary for these purposes.24
3.5. Consent through advance directives
Article 9 of the European Convention on Bioethics establishes that:
Wishes expressed previously with respect to a medical intervention by a patient 
who is not in a position to express them at the time of the intervention will be 
taken into consideration.
Although the living will, or advance directives, will be examined in detail 
in the chapter referring to dignified death, we can say here that the function of 
this kind of document is to make up for the lack of ability to give consent in 
situations that are unlikely (for example, the request for a person not to be 
kept alive artificially), but no less deserving of attention. 
4. Justice
Thoughts about the value “justice” usually pertain to the field of political phi-
losophy, whereby they fall outside the scope of this study. We have selected 
some of the most common meanings of the term adopting it to the subject we 
are looking at. We will examine four of them:
4.1. “To each person, the same”
According to this formulation, everyone should receive the same amount, so 
an action would be just if no one receives more than anyone else.
Despite its apparent innocuousness, it is an axiom that basically corre-
sponds to a liberal model, since it is based on formal equality. If we all receive 
 24 Although referring to confidentiality, it is interesting to point out that article 51.2 establishes that “in 
the event of genetic analyses of several members of a family the results will be filed and each of them 
will be informed individually”.
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the same, the possible differences between different groups are not taken into 
account (for example, ethnic minorities, underprivileged social classes, the dis-
crimination of women as opposed to men, and so on).
Thus, this meaning of justice is useful for avoiding negative discrimination 
(everyone has the right to vote, for example), but it prevents positive discrim-
ination (for example, gender quotas in a bioethics committee to prevent it 
from being made up of men only).
An example of the dreadful consequences of the literal application of this 
principle was the famous “baby cheque” during the term of office of Presi-
dent Zapatero’s socialist government. Every woman who gave birth while 
this subsidy was in effect would receive 2,500 euros per year. On the face of it, 
it seems a just measure (every woman receives the same), but in practice it is 
absurd for a millionaire to receive the same help as someone who may be on 
the threshold of poverty. It was more reasonable to concentrate financial ef-
forts on those who really needed it rather than share out the scant financial 
aid equally. 
4.2. “To each according to his work”
This formula first appeared in the New Testament (“he who does not work, 
neither shall he eat”, Saint Paul) and, by a paradox of history, it ended up in 
the Soviet Constitution of 1936:
In the USSR work is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, 
in accordance with the principle: “he who does not work, neither shall he eat.” 
The principle applied in the USSR is that of socialism: “From each according to 
his ability; to each according to his work” (art. 12).
In the Marxist paradigm, this would be the criterion to follow during the 
existence of the socialist state, as a first step to its disappearance and entry in 
communist society.
Indeed, at this stage the state is still necessary (there are still capitalist states, 
so a socialist state is useful for upholding and spreading the achievements of 
the revolution). For that reason, some bourgeois reminiscences must still be 
maintained, such as everyone receiving according to what they bring to the 
revolution, according to their labour, and not according to their need.
If we transfer this idea to today’s world, we can observe what criterion is 
followed for the pensions systems in economies in countries such as the USA. 
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Indeed, the retirement pension in a capitalization pension system (Spain’s is 
for the moment, and with qualifications, a system based on sharing out the 
funds) implies that everyone receives according to what they contribute, so if 
they do not contribute anything, they receive no pension whatsoever.
The same is the case with private healthcare, which attends only to those 
who pay, regardless of social needs or other criteria of justice.
4.3.  “From each according to his ability, to each according  
to his needs”
This principle was envisaged in the Marxist worldview for when capitalism 
had disappeared and all the countries in the world were socialist. At this stage, 
the socialist state would no longer be necessary and would be dissolved, giving 
rise to a society in which, without private property, police, army, laws, Church 
or bourgeois order, everyone would contribute what he could to the group ac-
cording to his ability, but he would receive, not for what he contributed, but 
for what he really needed. Thus, a person could receive food, healthcare, and 
so on, even though he did not contribute with his strength to society, simply 
because his personal situation made him deserving of such attention.
Despite being an apparently utopian rule, envisaged for anarchist societies, 
it does in practice just about function in countries like Spain. In the Spanish 
public health system a person receives the treatment he needs (criterion of 
need) regardless of what he contributes in the form of social security payments 
or taxes (criterion of contribution).25 A person earning a high income may be 
paying taxes and Social Security contributions for years without being given 
any healthcare attention if he does not need it. Conversely, a long-term unem-
ployed person may receive the maximum possible medical care that the system 
can provide just because it is necessary.
 25 The Spanish health service is funded through taxes, paid only by those who earn a certain amount of 
money. Moreover, the percentage that must be paid varies according to the income obtained (crite-
rion of progressivity, not proportionality). Moreover, those who are paid a salary must pay a certain 
percentage applicable to their salary in Social Security payments, and so the amount also depends on 
the size of their salary. 
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4.4. “To each according to his worth”
The concept of worth in this context means market value. In a wholly neolib-
eral system, people’s value is determined by the correlation between supply 
and demand, regardless of the (real) social value of a commodity or service.
This would explain why a state hospital’s budget can be smaller than a top 
footballer’s signing-on fee. Our society, which votes through the consumption 
of advertising and the election of politicians who satisfy its preferences, gener-
ally chooses (demands, prioritizes, etc.) the latter.
The priorities of biomedical research, for example, are very often estab-
lished by the market, and not social needs. This means that research into rare 
diseases (they are not rare, they just affect a tiny minority), or research that is 
unprofitable, gets no attention whatsoever. The value of the research depends 
in these cases on the possibility of obtaining short-term gains, which condi-
tions the market value of the research.
4.5. Justice as “social justice”26 
The fifth meaning of this value establishes an antagonism between the princi-
ple of autonomy and that of justice, understood as social justice.
Indeed, from this perspective, the principle of autonomy is the key value in 
a market economy context where the patient, and in reality, the citizenry as a 
whole, acts as a customer. For this reason, their interaction with healthcare 
personnel has given rise to a contractual relationship, not too different to what 
is established with a bank when you take out a mortgage, or even to mere con-
sumerism, where healthcare products are just like any other good or service.
According to Daniels’s classic,27 there are three main criteria for allocating 
healthcare resources: the market, rights and needs. For those who defend the first 
one, goods, including medical services, must be distributed according to supply 
and demand, because as individuals are the main actors in this model, they will 
seek the appropriate means to achieve their goals. The second model, which is 
enshrined in the Spanish Constitution, in the European Union and in many 
countries in our cultural ambit, comes up against the problem of cuts, the 
 26 Casado, M. (2016). “¿Gratuidad o precio? Sobre el cuerpo humano como recurso.” In: Casado, 
María (coord.). De la solidaridad al mercado. El cuerpo humano y el comercio biotecnológico. Mexico 
City: Fontamara, pp.15-32.
 27 Daniels, N. (1995). Just Health Care. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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breakdown of economic and social rights in the face of the global crisis. The 
last criterion argues with regard to basic needs, about which there has been 
much debate in the spheres of philosophy, law and economics in recent dec-
ades. It has even been used as a basis for human rights, since if these needs are 
not met it is impossible for people to personally or socially achieve any pur-
pose or goal in life.28
The economic crisis has provided the conditions for a rapid process of 
privatization of public services and an increase in inequality, and so countries, 
instead of protecting the citizens, give in to the private financial systems that 
govern the world’s economy. In countries that had a good health service, like 
Spain for example, the increasing privatization of medicine is an attempt to ap-
propriate public resources by private interests that notably increases inequality 
and erodes values, because commercialization — the market — corrupts cer-
tain values and practices, the core aspect of Sandel’s ideas on this issue.29
The State must meet certain moral standards to enjoy legitimacy and hold 
coercive power; for this it must treat all its citizens with equal consideration 
— not just consideration.30 Therefore, the gap between rich and poor — and 
the existence of extreme poverty — is indefensible and a market society must 
be rejected, as must a “night-watchman” state that simply guarantees transac-
tions, and a state at the service of powerful private interests that dictate its 
rules. All this in a context of the commercialization of life, in which there 
seems to be no remedy for inequality and which is particularly ominous in 
matters of health. 
5.  Prohibition of financial gain  
from human body parts31
The national and international legal framework determines that transactions 
involving the human body and its parts should be free and based on solidarity. 
In principle, it could be said that, invoking human dignity, only things should 
have a price, whereby the human body and its component parts should be off-
 28 Dieterlem. “Bioética y justicia distributiva.” In: Casado, op. cit., De la solidaridad... pp. 365-367.
 29 Sandel (2013). Lo que el dinero no puede comprar. Los límites morales del mercado. Barcelona: 
Debate.
 30 Dworkin, R. (1996). La democracia posible. Principios para un nuevo debate político. Barcelona: 
Paidós.
 31 Casado, M. “¿Gratuidad o precio?...”, op. cit.
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limits to the market. But this point of departure, which is generally accepted, 
collides head-on with the reality of practices that are carried out in the sphere 
of health and research. This is the case in Spain and elsewhere.
In article 2 of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine the primacy of the human being is established, indicating that 
“the human being’s interest and welfare shall prevail over the exclusive interest 
of society or science”, and in article 21 the prohibition of financial gain is un-
equivocally introduced: “the human body and its parts shall not, as such, give 
rise to financial gain.” Furthermore, article 22, which refers to the use of parts 
removed from the human body, envisages that, “when in the course of an in-
tervention any part of a human body has been removed, it may not be stored 
or used for a purpose other than that for which it was removed, unless this is 
done in conformity with appropriate information and consent procedures”. 
The Council of Europe has been reiterating the principle of non-commercial-
ization over the years in different declarations. As an example we can cite the 
Council of Europe’s Convention against Trafficking in Human Organs and 
the Declaration on the prohibition of any form of commercialization of hu-
man organs, of 2014. Different international institutions have ordered countries 
to punish organ trafficking.32 Additionally, it is important to mention that the 
European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Human Rights also establishes, in 
article 3, section C, the prohibition of financial gain in the trafficking of the 
human body and its parts. UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights indicates in article 21.5, when dealing with transnational prac-
tices, that “countries should take appropriate measures, at both national and 
international level, to combat […] the illicit trafficking of organs, tissues, sam-
ples, genetic resources and materials related to genetics”.
In the European Union, community legislation closely relates concern over 
voluntary, non-remunerated donation to the quality of the donations. Direc-
tive 2004/23/EC establishes, in article 12.1, that every three years member states 
must submit reports to the commission on the existing situation in relation to 
this principle; based on them, the Commission must inform the Parliament 
and the Council of any additional measures that it considers necessary in rela-
tion to the said donations. The report submitted on 21 April 2016 reveals in 
section 3.4 that, although countries comply with the adoption of measures to 
ensure voluntary non-remunerated donation, it is difficult to assess their com-
 32 For example, Resolution 63/22, of 21 May 2010, of the World Health Organization (WHO), which 
establishes the guiding principles on human cell, tissue and organ transplantation.
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pliance exhaustively; it also warns that some practices which are regarded as 
compensation in one country may represent payment in another, since due to 
differences in spending power between member states, what is compensation 
in one country is an incentive in another. The report confirms the difficulties 
arising from the uneven monitoring and control of registers, and insists that 
the fact of it being free is a guarantee of safety for protecting human health, 
since if payment to the donor were allowed they might be tempted to conceal 
important health data. It is also interesting to highlight the data of the Euro-
barometer, according to which only 13% of citizens consider it right to receive 
compensation for donation.
In the Spanish legal system, the unpaid donation of human organs and 
tissues is an established ethical principle, and doing business with body parts 
is considered to be contrary to the dignity of the human being. The legislation 
supports the general principles of non-remuneration and altruism for dona-
tions of organs, cells and biological samples; the specific regulation established 
for the different fields — for example, egg donation — is based on the same 
consideration.
What is questionable is that, once this principle has been established, oth-
er possibilities are accepted, and principles that seemed solidly established are 
being watered down in practice and even in the subordinate development 
regulation itself. Hence the confirmation that once again the legal system op-
erates as a screen to hide the reality, or it at least embellishes it. This also hap-
pens in other areas — for example, the theoretical equality between men and 
women — but, in the case we are looking at here, the gradual and almost 
imperceptible legitimization that seems to be taking place leads to very pro-
found cultural consequences.
The practical effects of what we are analysing can be seen in the problems 
posed in practice by subjects such as gestation by substitution; the donation of 
blood, organs, above all inter vivos; or oocytes; and, lastly, research with hu-
man beings, biological samples and healthcare data.
 In all these cases the problem arises of the hazy dividing line between le-
gitimate financial compensation, because of the trouble and the expense in-
volved (for example, in the obtainment of eggs), and concealed payment that 
weakens the wishes of those who agree to donate organs, tissues, and so on. In 
this respect, gestation by substitution is an extreme case. Although many ad-
vocate the individual exercise of freedom by the gestating woman who agrees 
to this practice, in reality the situation of vulnerability of those who make 
these decisions in contexts of extreme poverty is not usually taken into ac-
count. We shall analyse this issue later on.
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6. Rights in genomics
Progress in sequencing people’s DNA, and the possibility of activating or si-
lencing genes, or even transferring genes from some species to others, have led 
to the need for the different treaties and declarations on bioethics to contain 
specific articles on this subject. Thus, for example, chapter IV of the European 
Convention on Bioethics is wholly about the human genome and, in the 
framework of UNESCO, two important documents have been published 
whose specific object is solely and exclusively the question of genetics: the 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, of 1997, 
and the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, of 2003. We shall 
now analyse some of the principal rights acknowledged in these documents.
6.1. Genes as the heritage of humanity
Article 1 of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human 
Rights establishes that:
The human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the hu-
man family, as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In 
a symbolic sense, it is the heritage of humanity.
The idea that the human genome belongs to our species as a whole, and 
not to each individual person, although formulated on a symbolic level, entails 
very important legal and ethical consequences, among other things because its 
commercialization, appropriation or even modification concerns us all.
Although the meaning of the first part of the cited article usually goes un-
noticed, the idea of linking human identity to the genome presupposes the 
right to keep it intact for future generations, preserving our uniqueness as a 
species.33 In fact, in a context in which it is becoming easier, cheaper and more 
accessible to modify the genetic makeup of living beings, the obligation not to 
make alterations that transcend the individual and extend to their descendants 
has gained legal status. Thus, article 13 of the European Convention on Bio-
ethics establishes that:
 33 It is understood that our duty is not to modify the human germline in a laboratory. Obviously, our 
genetic makeup, as occurs with all other living beings, is modified at random and adapted over time.
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An intervention seeking to modify the human genome may only be undertaken 
for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to in-
troduce a modification in the genome of any descendants. [The italics are ours.]
In other words, it is licit to use gene editing techniques on the human ge-
nome for medical purposes, provided that these interventions do not extend 
to the individual on whom they are performed and his or her descendants in-
herit them. The reason is that, if the human germline is modified, this altera-
tion would pass into the genetic heritage of our entire species (the descendants 
of the modified individual would in turn transmit it to their children, whereby 
the said modification would be propagated irremediably in our species, with 
unpredictable effects in the medium term).
6.2.  The right for predictive trials to only have  
a medical or scientific purpose
Can a company require its workers to submit to DNA sequencing tech-
niques to find out how predisposed they are to certain diseases? In reality it 
is a complex subject, since, for certain professions, it may be useful to know 
if someone has a predisposition to certain diseases (for example, some type 
of heart disease that could lead to sudden death). The risks, however, greatly 
outweigh the potential benefits, given that if the private sector could de-
mand these tests from its workers, they could then be discriminated against 
because of diseases that, in the majority of cases, belong purely to the realm 
of hypothesis. 
A predisposition to certain diseases does not in fact mean that they will 
definitely develop, since there are other factors at work: and conversely, the 
absence of a predisposition is no guarantee that some diseases cannot devel-
op. The information supplied by DNA moves in the context of probabilities, 
something easy to handle with algorithms but difficult to reconcile later with 
the actual facts. 
Moreover, in the case of diseases that are not only incurable but which can-
not be prevented either, there is no personal benefit in knowing that one has a 
predisposition to them; on the contrary, this knowledge could be devastating 
from the psychological point of view. 
This context of uncertainty is what justifies article 12 of the European Con-
vention on Bioethics:
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Tests which are predictive of genetic diseases or which serve either to identify the 
subject as a carrier of a gene responsible for a disease or to detect a genetic pre-
disposition or a susceptibility to a disease, may be performed only for health 
purposes or scientific research, and subject to appropriate genetic counselling.
As we see, besides demanding the usual requirements of express consent 
and medical purposes, the Convention makes it obligatory for the person who 
has been the subject of sequencing to be counselled by a specialist in order to 
avoid erroneous, alarmist or media-influenced interpretations.
6.3. The right not to be discriminated against
Article 11 of the European Convention on Bioethics specifies that human be-
ings have the right not to be discriminated against because of their “genetic 
heritage”. Article 7 of the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data 
states something similar:
Every effort should be made to ensure that human genetic data and human pro-
teomic data are not used for purposes that discriminate in a way that is intended 
to infringe, or has the effect of infringing a person’s human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and human dignity.
This type of article attempts to anticipate a scenario that seems to be get-
ting closer and closer, the creation of huge databases with the genetic informa-
tion of a country’s entire population. Even if the purpose of gathering it were, 
in principle, biomedical, we may suppose that it would be tempting to give the 
said information other uses, and it would be done sooner or later (for example, 
selecting workers for a job, looking for a partner or calculating the premium 
of a private insurance policy). 
Moreover, the sequencing of a single individual’s DNA also reveals infor-
mation about their family, and, in certain cases, even about the ethnic group 
to which they belong. Thus, genetic population studies, very important for 
scientific knowledge, may easily give rise to spurious conclusions applicable to 
a human group.
For this reason, article 7 of the International Declaration on Human Ge-
netic Data, under the heading “Non-discrimination and non-stigmatization”, 
establishes that:
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a) Every effort should be made to ensure that human genetic data and human 
proteomic data do not […] lead to the stigmatization of an individual, a family, 
a group or communities.
b) In this respect, the appropriate attention should be paid to the findings of 
population-based genetic studies and behavioural genetic studies and their inter-
pretations.
This idea was included, for example, in article 58.6 of the Spanish Law of 
Biomedical Research, Law 14/2007:
6. In studies on genetic diversity, local and ethnic traditions will always be re-
spected, at all times avoiding practices of stigmatization and discrimination.
Lastly, the recent important regulation adopted by the European Union to 
protect personal data has explicitly stated the risks of bio-computing and big 
data.
Personal data which are, by their nature, particularly sensitive in relation to fun-
damental rights and freedoms merit special protection, as the context of their 
processing could create significant risks for fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Such personal data should include those revealing racial or ethnic origin, where-
by the use of the term “racial origin” in this Regulation does not imply an accept-
ance by the Union of theories which attempt to determine the existence of sepa-
rate human races.34
The objective of these precautions is to prevent the massive treatment of 
genetic data making it possible to draw racist, xenophobic, stigmatizing con-
clusions. The risk, always present in this kind of collective study, is that past or 
contemporary inequalities are justified by virtue of supposed moral or behav-
ioural qualities conditioned in an irremediably deterministic way by human 
genes. The statistical correlations that are sometimes established in different 
pseudoscientific studies, for example, between gene mutations and poverty, or 
between financial success and genetic seniority of the reference population, 
cause incalculable harm to certain groups and discredit social and egalitarian 
policies.
 34 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and the Council, of 27 April 2016, relative 
to the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and the free circu-
lation of these data. Considering 51.
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6.4.  The prohibition of making financial gain  
from genetic heritage
Can human beings’ genes be patented? The general rule is that the genetic 
makeup of our species belongs to humanity as a whole, whereby it cannot be 
the object of individual or commercial appropriation.
The same thing happens with the genes of all other living species, espe-
cially those that have coexisted symbiotically with certain indigenous com-
munities since time immemorial. In fact, article 26.2 of the Cartagena Proto-
col on Biosafety of the Convention on Biological Diversity (Montreal, 2000), 
after citing “the value that biological diversity has for indigenous and local 
communities”, establishes the following:
2. The Parties are encouraged to cooperate in the sphere of information exchange 
and research into the socioeconomic effects of modified living beings, especially 
in indigenous and local communities.
The issue, however, is not that simple. Until the 1980s there was consensus 
that living beings could not be the object of a patent. The pressure of the powerful 
biotechnological, pharmaceutical and biomedical industry soon reverted this ax-
iom. The first to be allowed was the patent for bacteria (Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
SC, USA, 1980),35 followed by mammals (Harvard mouse), then human organs 
(Moore)36 and finally, genes (Myriad).37 Although there are many nuances that we 
cannot explain in this chapter, it may be said that it is currently possible to patent 
not just genes, including those of our species, but any living being, along with its 
offspring, with the sole exception, we imagine for now, of human beings.38 
 35 In Diamond v. Charkrabarty, the American Supreme Court agreed, by five votes to four, to grant a 
patent on a bacterium that, genetically modified, degraded crude oil.
 36 John Moore was an American citizen who suffered a particular kind of leukaemia. They removed his 
spleen and saved his life. The doctors created a cell line from the T-lymphocytes of the spleen they 
had removed and patented it in 1984, all of this without telling the patient anything. When Moore 
went to court alleging that the spleen was his property and that he at least had a right to share in the 
profits generated by this patent, the courts found that the removed organ was discarded material and 
he had no right to it at all.
 37 A company discovered the relationship between some mutations in certain genes and breast cancer. 
When patenting its discovery, women had to pay large sums of money to gain access to a diagnostic 
trial and they also could not get a second opinion. The American Supreme Court eventually ruled 
against the company, but it held this monopoly for years.
 38 López Baroni, M. J. (2018). “El criterio de demarcación en las Biopatentes.” Anales de la Cátedra 
Francisco Suárez, 52, pp. 131-153. See also by Casado, M. the chapter “Patentes...”, in Mayor Zarago-
za, F. and Alonso Bedate, C. (coords.) (2003). Gen-ética. Ariel.
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In fact, the wording of article 4 of the Universal Declaration of the Human 
Genome and Human Rights is ambiguous: “the human genome in its natural 
state shall not give rise to financial gains” [our italics]. This wording indirectly 
legitimates patents for human genes when a “non-natural” intervention has 
been performed. And this is the interpretation made by the Directive on bio-
technological inventions39 and the European Court of Justice, when deciding 
if this law was in keeping with the values that shape the EU.40 
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4	 sexual and reproductive health 
and Voluntary termination of Pregnancy
1. Introduction1
Attitudes to abortion are almost inevitably split in a remarkably visceral con-
frontation between supporters and detractors, who rather than constructing 
possible paths to agreement seem determined to discredit the other side and 
turn the debate into a clash of absolutes. In our opinion several facts and argu-
ments must be taken into consideration for a correct bioethical analysis.
Firstly, any discussion of abortion implicitly carries with it two different 
aspects that ought to be separated: on one hand, the right to lead a healthy sex 
life — freely decided, of course, within the options and contexts that each 
person chooses — and on the other, the right to have children and to plan 
one’s family. Therefore, the first thing to do is to think about good sexual and 
reproductive health (which, as a consequence, would notably reduce unwant-
ed pregnancies). 
It is obvious that sex and reproduction are involved and intertwined and 
that, moreover, they conceal underlying individual and social fears and taboos, 
inculcated for centuries. It must not be forgotten that the control of sexuality 
has been a form of power, exercised by churches and patriarchs, not only over 
women — although this is the key element — but over men too. Fear of “the 
consequences”, both reproductive and those referring to the transmission of 
diseases, or moral condemnation, have anathematized generations, but this 
has obviously never stopped people doing it.
 1 Most of the arguments discussed below are included in the Document on Involuntary Termination of 
Pregnancy, http://hdl.handle.net/2445/11453; the Document on Sexual and Reproductive Health in 
Adolescence, http://hdl.handle.net/2445/11370; and the Document on Conscientious Objection in Health 
Care http://hdl.handle.net/2445/11376. The regulatory impact of these texts in current relevant Span-
ish legislation is included in New edition and analysis of the regulatory impact of the Bioethics and Law 
Observatory’s documents on sexual and reproductive health in adolescence and on voluntary termina-
tion of pregnancy, http://hdl. handle.net/2445/104592.
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Sexuality constitutes an element of pleasure, wellbeing and balance that is 
essential in people’s lives, and it is therefore necessary for information, atten-
tion and advice about it, in all its forms, and about methods of contraception, 
to be available to all and truly accessible. The effective and efficient separation 
of sex from reproduction is a very recent occurrence, as only in the early 1960s, 
with the contraceptive pill, was this dissociation safely achieved. This was one 
of the greatest revolutions of the century — comparable in its scope to women 
being given the vote, for example — although it must be admitted that its 
repercussions are very different in industrialized countries and less developed 
ones, where there has been no widespread adoption of its use, since ensuring 
easy access to the different contraceptive methods is little short of impossible 
in a context of poverty.
2. Consequentialist arguments
Abortion has been prohibited and practised in every society for centuries, but 
its prohibition has merely led to it being performed in secret. This has made 
the circumstances of discrimination between men and women worse, and 
among women too; between those who, with better financial, social and cultu-
ral circumstances, have been able to have a safe abortion — even travelling to 
another country with different laws and healthcare practices — and those who 
have not.
In our opinion, abortion is a problem of public health and legal policy, not 
just a matter of conscience; the existence of proper regulation to delimit the 
legal cases and provide guarantees for its practice is an unavoidable matter of 
legislative policy for countries. Having an abortion or not, in each particular 
case, is a moral question, of individual awareness, that everyone has to resolve. 
All abortion laws must be accompanied by good sexual and reproductive 
health policy to facilitate access to information and contraceptive methods, 
and to encourage responsibility in one’s sex life, so that abortion is not the first 
option; such policies must be part of public policy in a plural, social state un-
der the rule of law. Nevertheless, in Spain the reality shows us that there is no 
place for sex education in school curriculums, but it is taught according to the 
goodwill and the possibilities of parents and teachers in each school. 
It is a fact — although some sectors do not even want to accept it — that 
lessons on the subject of sex and reproduction would notably reduce the num-
ber of cases in which women are forced to make tragic and painful decisions. 
Naturally, not all cases would be resolved, but it is a fact that the number of 
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abortions would be reduced, as would the confrontation between attitudes 
that lead to clashes of absolutes between “warring factions” — they can only 
be described as such, as it seems to be a fight between different sides who do 
not even agree on the concept of dignity or human rights. Good quality sex 
education, not attaching blame, but based on responsibility, helps people to 
take control of their own behaviour, take the relevant steps to reduce risks, and 
avoid unwanted effects. In other words, sex education and access to contracep-
tive methods bring about a considerable reduction in the number of abor-
tions: all those that are performed because of a lack of information and access. 
In this way the voluntary termination of pregnancy would be a solution in 
cases where the measures have not been sufficient and, specifically, it would 
resolve the instances in which the woman’s life and health are at stake, or 
where malformations of the foetus have been detected, or serious unforeseen 
circumstances have arisen that make it necessary to resort to it.
The decision to terminate a pregnancy entails having to choose between 
various “evils” and options that may be placed in order differently, but which 
always represent a fateful decision for the woman, who is the one who has to 
decide, and also for those who intervene in the act. Therefore, with respect 
to abortion, a fundamental question is — as Resolution 1607/2008 of the 
Council of Europe2 points out — to clearly show that abortion is the unwanted 
outcome of a previous problem: unwanted pregnancy. Not wanted because it 
was the result of a forced sexual relationship, because it endangers her health, 
because the foetus presents malformations, because it changes her life, or, quite 
simply, because it was not planned. In the majority of cases, abortion is the con-
sequence of very poor or non-existent sexual and reproductive education and of 
inadequate access to the birth control methods that women have to use and, as 
has been said, it has particular repercussions on those who are in a very under-
privileged social and financial situation. 
In any case, it would be appropriate to delimit the controversy over the 
regulation of abortion. Very often the issue ought not to be focused yet again 
on discussing the morality of abortion, as laws on the voluntary termination 
of pregnancy already exist in more than two-thirds of the countries in the 
 2 Resolution 1607/2008, of 16 April, of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, which urges member 
countries to legalize abortion, establishing reasonable time limits for it, and to guarantee the effec-
tive exercise of women’s right to an abortion free of medical or legal risks, respecting women’s right 
to choose and offering them conditions for a free and informed choice. It also urges its members to 
eliminate real and regulatory restrictions on gaining access to risk-free voluntary termination of 
pregnancy, creating the appropriate healthcare conditions and providing suitable funding. Available 
at: http://assembly.coe.int/main. asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta08/fres1607.htm.
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world,3 and moreover abortion has never been equated with murder in sen-
tences, grief or public sentiment.4 In our opinion, reasons in favour of or against 
the type of regulation or modification proposed need to be put forward.
In comparative law, abortion can be regulated by a law that includes indica-
tions of de facto instances where behaviour is decriminalized; by a law that sets 
legal time limits for abortion; and through a mixed system in which the system 
of time limits is observed during the first weeks of gestation, after which indica-
tions and prohibition come into play. Most countries adhere to the system of 
indications, and the performance of abortions is decriminalized (done with the 
consent of the pregnant woman and meeting certain requirements) in different 
instances, of which the most commonly accepted are: danger to the mother’s 
life or health, when pregnancy is a consequence of — previously reported — 
rape, malformations of the foetus, and so-called social or socioeconomic indica-
tion. Different evaluations of the conflict between the real rights of the woman 
and the potential rights of the embryo or foetus — which the Spanish Consti-
tutional Court does not consider a person but a “legally protected asset”5 — 
underpin the adoption of one or another technique. 
3.  The value of the life of the foetus  
and women’s rights 
The moral status of the foetus is the subject of heated discussion, and about 
which it seems impossible to reach peaceful agreement.6 While there is a high 
degree of consensus with regard to the biological facts and criteria of gradual-
 3 It is interesting to visit the webpage worldabortionlaws.com/map, as one can observe the situation of 
abortion all over the world and note the correlation between the north and south, between countries 
where abortion is prohibited and poverty.
 4 “Throughout our entire legal history the life of the foetus has been protected to a lesser extent than 
independent human life. Therefore, among other things, the punishment is, and has always been, far 
lighter in abortion than in homicide. For the law, the confirmation of the existence of a person with 
rights and responsibilities is diverse from the moment when a life cycle begins that will give rise to a 
person. In other words: the prenatal process does not confer the status of person; this condition is only 
acquired with birth (art. 29 CC) and therefore it is subject to the fundamental right to life envisaged 
in article 15 CE and article 2 CEDH.” Ruling on the scope and limits of the therapeutic and eugenic 
indications of voluntary termination of pregnancy, requested by the Department of Health of the 
Generalitat de Catalunya, issued by Mirentxu Corcoy Bidasolo, Santiago Mir Puig and Joan Josep 
Queralt Jiménez, professors of Criminal Law, University of Barcelona.
 5 See the sentences of the Constitutional Court 53/85, 212/86 and 116/99.
 6 On the need to find a solution, see Singer, P. (1997). Repensar la vida y la muerte. El derrumbe de 
nuestra ética tradicional. Barcelona: Paidós.
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ism are accepted, from the legal point of view as well, since birth is considered 
to be the moment when a person acquires rights, the same is not the case for 
termination of pregnancy.
From a philosophical point of view attempts have been made to find a 
criterion indicating which beings have full moral rights; the problem is that 
the criteria given are not universally accepted and they may also clash with one 
another, or lead to absurd or contradictory consequences in their application. 
Sensitivity, the capacity to feel suffering and pleasure; consciousness, the ca-
pacity to be aware of itself and its surroundings; the capacity to anticipate and 
relate to others; the capacity to have a moral conscience, to distinguish be-
tween good and evil … and so many others that, nevertheless, applied to foe-
tuses lead us to the paradox that it is in practice impossible to grant foetuses 
equal rights without cancelling out those of women.
It is therefore necessary to introduce to the debate two interesting ele-
ments: a) the distinction made about potentiality. Foetuses are potential peo-
ple but they are not fully developed yet (just as although all oak trees have been 
acorns, not all acorns become oak trees, according to the well-known apho-
rism); b) the idea that supra-conformist forms of behaviour — the “good Sa-
maritan” — are not required (and even less so in criminal law); hence it should 
not be considered a woman’s obligation to continue with an unwanted preg-
nancy that may imply taking risks she does not want to.7
Between the clash of absolutes that arises when the foetus is granted pre-
dominant rights over those of the woman, prohibiting abortion under any 
circumstances, or giving the woman absolute rights to decide freely about her 
own body, at any time, the proposed position is gradualist and very reasona-
ble.8 At the beginning of pregnancy, it is understood that the woman’s decision 
over the potentiality of a life at the embryonic stage takes precedence, and,9 
establishing time limits, the decision is left in the hands of the subject with 
rights (the woman), respecting her autonomy without the need for controls by 
 7 See Warren, M. (1995). “El aborto”, in Singer, P. (coord.). Compendio de ética. Madrid: Alianza 
Editorial. Also very interesting is the controversy between Thomson and Finnis, the Spanish version 
of which is included in Debate sobre el aborto. Cinco ensayos de filosofía moral. Madrid: Cátedra, 
colección Teorema, 1992.
 8 The idea of the three trimesters associated with viability comes largely from the famous case Roe V. 
Wade, in 1973. See also Dworkin, R. (1994). El dominio de la vida. Una discusión acerca del aborto, 
la eutanasia y la libertad individual. Barcelona: Ariel, where an idea of the sacred nature of non- 
religious, secular life is defended, hugely interesting.
 9 See Mitjans, E. (2007). “Bioética e igualdad en la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo.” In: Casa-
do, M. (coord.). Nuevos materiales de bioética y derecho. Mexico City: Fontamara, pp. 209-228.
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third parties, doctors or psychologists. From thereon it is considered that as the 
foetus acquires greater viability, greater measures of protection are required; 
therefore, only the indications of serious danger for the life and health of the 
mother and malformations of the foetus are maintained.
The most basic and intuitive idea of rights leads the possibility of making 
one’s own decisions about life options back to terms such as freedom, dignity 
and justice. “The right to decide” is the cry of the Enlightenment, of “dare to 
know and to decide”, which today still arouses so much fear and reticence, and 
which is so often claimed to be contrary to communal co-existence, ignoring 
that deciding freely does not mean harming coexistence, but that it needs to 
be made compatible with the freedoms of others.
4. Regulation in Spain
4.1.  Regulation before the enactment  
of the Law of Legal Time Limits
In Spain, before the current Law of Sexual and Reproductive Health and Vol-
untary Termination of Pregnancy, of 2 March 2010, was passed, which will be 
analysed in the next section, legislation already existed that allowed abortions 
to be performed in certain cases (which will also be analysed later),10 and yet 
the need to change the law and the way in which the pre-existing law had been 
applied had been extensively and repeatedly questioned. The previous law was 
in force in the long period from 1985 to 2010 and not even the total reform of 
the Criminal Code — in 1995 — modified it. Passed at the end of the political 
transition, after the period of the Franco regime it seemed the only one pos-
sible at the time. Through its long period in force, it proved to be so necessary 
that successive governments — despite their overall majorities — neither sup-
pressed it nor restricted it, nor even tried to limit the extensive interpretation 
with which it was being applied. And it is well known that the scope attrib-
uted in practice to the third instance of the current law went much further 
than what its own formulation indicated, since through the gradual extension 
of the concept of mental health, it in fact introduced the social indication.
Although it covered obvious social needs and problems fully deserving of 
support, this generated a situation of legal uncertainty repeatedly pointed out 
 10 Organic Law 9/1985, of 5 July, of The Decriminalization of Abortion in Certain Cases.
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by jurists and the different groups involved. The changes in criminal law poli-
cy are effectively possible and the attorney general could have ordered each of 
the “legally” practised cases of abortion to be thoroughly investigated. In this 
respect, it should also be remembered that many healthcare workers are still 
unaware of the real possibilities of the legal framework and they find it safer to 
pretend not to know about the problem or to refuse to collaborate in acts that 
have legal consequences unknown to them.
Thus, in this context, it may be said that the reform of the abortion law 
with the aim of its conditions being clear and accessible had become a demo-
cratic demand to give women legal certainty, while at the same time respecting 
those who have an abortion and those who do not.
Along with all these facts and precedents, let us remember that women’s 
reproductive autonomy has been an internationally acknowledged right ever 
since the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo 
in 1994 went further than the generally accepted association with the concepts 
of family planning and contraception, and defined sexual and reproductive 
health as the possibility of having a responsible, satisfactory and safe sex life, 
and it understood reproductive rights as the capacity to freely determine 
whether one has children or not.
At this point we ought to add that the University of Barcelona’s Bioethics 
and Law Observatory has been drafting various documents on the subject 
with considerable repercussions in the media and public opinion. The science 
associations involved have echoed its recommendations, and they have even 
had a big impact on the law, since the various regulations — at state and au-
tonomous community level — include many of its proposals. There is the 
Document on the Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy, in which we make a 
proposal to change the law in Spain and in which we include additional meas-
ures that we had published previously, in the Declaration on Sexual and Repro-
ductive Health in Adolescence and the Document on Conscientious Objection in 
Healthcare. These publications, along with other similar initiatives, have had 
an impact on the debate in society and have generated ideas for the creation 
and / or updating of healthcare institutions’ protocols of action referring to 
this subject. These initiatives include the Report on the Termination of Gestation 
drafted in 2008 by the Bioethics Advisory Committee of Catalonia.11 
 11 It can be consulted at www.gencat.cat/salut/depsalut/html/es/dir89/intgestesp.pdf.
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4.2.  The Organic Law of Sexual and Reproductive Health  
and Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy
4.2.1. The history of the drafting of the law
The result of the precedents mentioned so far was that — at the request of the 
Ministry of Equality, something in itself open to interesting interpretations — 
on 14 May 2009 the Council of Ministers passed the draft bill of the Organic 
Law of Sexual and Reproductive Health and Voluntary Termination of Preg-
nancy.12
After that a series of rulings and reports on the draft bill were issued, some 
due to statutory requirement and others — like the one by the recently created 
Spanish Bioethics Committee — at its own request.13 Of them it is interesting 
to mention the Report of the Prosecution Advisory Board, of June 2009, and 
the Ruling of the Council of State, of September that same year.
On 26 September the Council of Ministers passed the bill, which was pub-
lished in the Official Bulletin of Parliament on 2 October 2009. After the cor-
responding parliamentary channels in Congress and the Senate, the new Or-
ganic Law of Sexual and Reproductive Health and Voluntary Termination of 
Pregnancy was finally passed on 2 March 2010, and came into effect on 4 July 
of that year.
In the period from the draft bill to the text eventually passed modifications 
were introduced that, in our opinion, have left the articles of the legal text 
looking more and more like a programme rather than a specific regulation. 
Many of its articles are a declaration of good intentions, so the interpretation 
being given to the precepts — in too many cases, very open — will determine 
its application, and only with the passage of time will we see if the new law has 
provided the longed-for legal certainty that was so badly lacking with the pre-
vious law. Or if it does indeed represent progress for women’s rights, as is 
claimed in the Preamble, postulating that “The first duty of the legislator is to 
adapt the law to the values of the society whose relations it has to regulate, 
always ensuring that new legal regulations generate certainty and security in 
 12 It could be said with satisfaction that the draft bill included many of the conclusions and proposals 
of the aforementioned Documents of the Bioethics and Law Observatory and that it had, moreover, 
an interesting and enlightening exposition of reasons.
 13 Spanish Bioethics Committee, Opinion on the bill for the Organic Law of Sexual and Reproductive 
Health and Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy, 2009. Available for consultation at www.comitede 
bioetica.es/documentacion/docs/consenso_interrupcion pregnancy_comite_bioetica_oct_2009.pdf.
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those to whom they are addressed, as freedom only finds refuge on the firm 
ground of the clarity and precision of the law”.
At the same time, this Preamble makes it clear that “The law comprehen-
sively tackles the protection and guaranteeing of rights relative to sexual and 
reproductive health. It introduces the definitions of the World Health Organiza-
tion in reference to health, sexual health and reproductive health in our legal 
system and provides for the adoption of a series of actions and measures in 
both healthcare and education”. It is also important to mention that, based on 
national and international law, on the sentences of the Spanish Constitutional 
Court and those of the European Court of Human Rights, “This law recog-
nizes the right to freely decided maternity, which among other things implies 
that women can make the initial decision about their pregnancy and that this 
decision, conscious and responsible, must be respected”. The decision adopted 
of establishing a mixed system “of time limits” in the first 14 weeks of gestation 
combined with a later one of indications is justified in this way.
4.2.2. General requirements
The general requirements for terminating pregnancy are (Art. 13):
1)  That termination of pregnancy be performed by a specialist doctor or be car-
ried out under his/her supervision.
2)  That it be carried out in a public or private healthcare centre that has been 
previously authorized.
3)  That it be carried out with the express consent in writing of the pregnant 
woman, or, where appropriate, of her legal representative, in accordance with 
the stipulations of Law 41/2002, Basic Regulator of Patient Autonomy and of 
Rights and Responsibilities in matters of Information and Clinical Documen-
tation. Express consent may be waived in the case envisaged in article 9.2b) of 
the said law.
The question of consent through representation is especially important in 
the case of abortion, as the case law that may be present (minors up to the age 
of 15; minors aged 16 and 17; and persons with disability, who may have very 
different levels of autonomy) generates quite a few problems.
The law of Patient Autonomy, to which the Law of Voluntary Termination 
of Pregnancy refers, stipulates the following (Art. 9):
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3.  Consent through representation will be granted in the following cases:
 a)  When the patient is incapable of making decisions, in the opinion of the 
doctor in charge of their care, or their physical or mental state does not 
allow them to be aware of their situation. If the patient has no legal repre-
sentative, consent will be given by people related to them for family or de 
facto reasons.
 b)  When the patient’s capacity has been legally modified and this is stated in 
the sentence.
 c)  When the patient is a minor, incapable either intellectually or emotionally 
of comprehending the scope of the intervention. In this case, consent will 
be given by the minor’s legal representative, after listening to their opinion, 
in accordance with the provisions of article 9 of Organic Law 1/1996, of 15 
January, of Legal Protection of Minors.
We can thus distinguish four classes of autonomy in reference to the ter-
mination of pregnancy:
 a) Women aged 18 and over. They have full autonomy.
 b) Minors aged 16 and 17. The original wording of the law (2010) allowed 
them to have an abortion not only without their parents’ consent (it was 
enough for one of them to be informed), but also, if there was a conflict of 
interests, without their knowledge. Nevertheless, in 2015 the Partido Popu-
lar reworded this part and, for a girl of that age to be able to have an abor-
tion, the express consent of her parents was obligatory and necessary (we 
shall analyse in detail the ideological context of this reform in a later sec-
tion), as well as that of the minor.
 c) Minors aged 15 and under. Besides the specific consent of their parents, the 
minors’ consent will be necessary. In the event of their age or circumstanc-
es not permitting it, it will be enough to know their opinion, which must 
be taken into account. 
 d) Persons with some degree of disability, who in turn may or may not be 
minors, and who may also be totally or partially legally incapacitated, or 
even not be. Given that there is a huge body of case law in these cases, each 
specific case will have to be considered in order to assess whether their 
consent, their opinion, and possibly the consent of their parents or guard-
ians is necessary.
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4.2.3. System of time limits
The main new aspect of the law is that it makes it possible to terminate preg-
nancy without having to justify the reason (Art. 14). The only substantial re-
quirement is that termination must take place within the first 14 weeks of 
gestation. 
As to the formal requirements, apart from the woman’s consent, it will be 
necessary for her to be informed of her rights, services and help in the event 
that she decides to continue with the pregnancy, and there must be a three-day 
gap between the moment she is offered this information and when the abor-
tion is performed. 
This is the most noteworthy aspect of the law, as it means it is the woman 
who decides freely and voluntarily to continue or not with the pregnancy, 
without having to justify, explain or argue, in the event of termination, why 
she does not wish to continue with it.
Causal (justified) abortion is limited to the cases of danger to the mother’s 
health or anomalies in the foetus. Abortion because of rape, which in the pre-
vious Spanish law had to be reported, and the abortion had to be performed 
within the first 12 weeks, disappears. It has been absorbed by a generic system 
of time limits without specific causes.
4.2.4. Termination for medical reasons
Besides the previous case, the law envisages termination of pregnancy for med-
ical reasons provided the following requirements are met:
4.2.4.1. Risk for the pregnant woman’s life or health 
This is what is known as therapeutic abortion. The only requirement is that it 
be performed up to and including week 22 of pregnancy. A medical ruling 
must be issued prior to termination of pregnancy, unless the woman’s life is in 
danger, in which case it can be omitted (Art. 15).
Moreover, in the event of risk for the woman’s life or health after week 22 
of pregnancy, what is required is not an abortion but an induced birth. As the 
law says, “the woman’s right to life and physical integrity and the interest in 
protecting a life in the process of development are fully harmonized”. It is 
important to stress that this rule does not appear in the articles of the law, but 
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in the preamble, something that is anomalous from a technical point of view, 
as it may generate legal uncertainty in such an important matter. 
In the previous Spanish law these two cases were not distinguished, as they 
are now, as there was no limit whatsoever to performing an abortion in the 
case of risk for the physical or mental health of the mother, and nor was in-
duced birth envisaged, expressly at least.
4.2.4.2. Serious anomalies in the foetus
This is what is known as eugenic abortion. The only requirement is that it should 
be performed within the first 22 weeks of gestation and the serious anomalies of 
the foetus are stated in a ruling issued prior to the intervention by two specialist 
doctors other than the one who is performing or supervising the abortion.
4.2.4.3.  Foetal anomalies incompatible with life or an extremely 
serious and incurable illness of the foetus 
The law distinguishes between the serious anomalies of the foetus, which allow 
for the termination of pregnancy within 22 weeks as described above, and the 
anomalies incompatible with life or an extremely serious and incurable illness 
of the foetus, in which case there is no limit to terminating pregnancy. The law 
does not specify what the differences between the two categories are.
The only formal requirement is that foetal anomalies must be stated in a 
medical ruling by a specialist other than the one performing the intervention, 
and, in the case of serious and incurable illness, that this be confirmed by a 
clinical committee.
In the previous Spanish legislation this distinction did not exist, so eugenic 
abortion came under a single expression, “serious physical or mental defects”, 
and the abortion was required to be performed during the first 22 weeks.
4.2.5. Regulation in criminal law
We ought to point out that the existence of a law of legal time limits for termina-
tion of pregnancy has not led to the criminal law on this subject being repealed. 
The Criminal Code continues to punish abortion, although with lighter sen-
tences than in the previous system, adapted, logically, to the new regulation.
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The woman who has an abortion (the Criminal Code uses the term “abor-
tion”, while the new law uses the expression “termination of pregnancy”) will 
be punished with a fine lasting six to 24 months (each day or month of the fine 
is equivalent to a particular sum of money according to the guilty party’s per-
sonal characteristics).
Those who perform the woman’s abortion, with her consent, will be sen-
tenced to one to three years in prison and be disqualified from working in the 
medical profession for a period of between one and six years (Art. 145). In 
Spain, if the prison sentence is less than two years and the person has no 
criminal record, it is usually suspended, and they will not have to go to jail.
If one observes the regulation, it can be seen how even in cases in which 
the abortion law is broken, neither the woman nor the healthcare personnel 
will go to prison: the former, because she will have to pay a fine, and the latter, 
because if there are no aggravating circumstances they will be sentenced to less 
than two years, whereby in principle they would not go to jail (there is an ag-
gravated subtype by which, if the abortion were performed after 22 weeks, the 
judge would impose the higher scope of the sentence. In the case of the wom-
an the fine would be higher, but in the case of the healthcare personnel the 
sentence would be between two and three years in prison, which would in-
crease the likelihood of having to go to jail).
If the abortion were performed in accordance with the substantial require-
ments established in the law (risk for the mother, unviability of the foetus or 
abortion for no reason but within the first 14 weeks), but without satisfying 
the formal requirements (information for the mother, not observing the three-
day period, clinics’ lack of authorization, the absence of rulings, and so on), 
the Criminal Code exempts the woman from punishment but penalizes the 
healthcare personnel with a fine and disqualification.
4.2.6. An attempt to reverse the reform14
In order to understand the attempted repeal that this law has undergone with 
the new government (the law was passed in 2010 by a socialist government and 
in 2011 a conservative government won the election), we have to place this 
 14 In this debate the article by M. Casado is interesting: “Consecuencias para las mujeres y su salud de 
la posible reforma de la ley del aborto.” Gac Sanit., 2014; 28 (6): 498-500. Also, in the editorial of 
Gaceta Sanitaria, vol. 26, no. 3, May-June 2012, pp. 201-202, see “¿Es la maternidad lo que hace 
auténticamente mujeres a las mujeres?”, by M. Casado.
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law’s process of gestation in its historical context, and so we must take a brief 
look back at how abortion has been regulated in Spain:
1) The Criminal Code of 1973, passed during the Franco dictatorship (the dic-
tator died in 1975), was the one used, with some modifications, in the demo-
cratic period in Spain until 1995. In other words, from 1978, when the Span-
ish Constitution was passed, to 1995 the Criminal Code of the dictatorship 
continued to be used. This Code punished abortion with jail sentences of 
between six months and six years, for both the woman and the healthcare 
personnel. If the mother had the abortion to “hide her dishonour” (getting 
pregnant out of wedlock), then the sentence could be six months in jail at the 
most, which symbolized the clerical and paternalistic spirit of the period. 
Furthermore, the sale or distribution of contraceptives was also banned (up 
to six months in jail).
2) This Criminal Code of 1973 was reformed in 1985 by the PSOE with the aim 
of decriminalizing abortion in three cases: rape, risk for the mother and anom-
alies in the foetus. The other penalties remained the same between 1985 and 
1995 (when the new Criminal Code was passed). That is, that if an abortion 
was performed outside the three cases allowed, the punishments continued to 
be very high, up to six years in jail. What the socialist government did in these 
cases was to pardon the women after they had been sentenced in court.
3) In 1995 the democratic Criminal Code was introduced, almost 20 years after 
democracy was a fact in Spain, also under the socialists. This code left the situ-
ation of abortion virtually intact. That is, it was still decriminalized in the 
three cases mentioned, but the sentences for the cases in which it was per-
formed outside these three cases were reduced: a fine or six months to a year in 
prison for the woman (one-year prison sentences could also be substituted by 
a fine, whereby the legislator made sure that the woman did not go to prison), 
and a spell in prison of between one to three years and disqualification for the 
healthcare personnel (just like now).
4) In 2010, 15 years after the democratic Criminal Code was passed, and more 
than 30 years after democracy returned to Spain, the Law of Voluntary Termi-
nation of Pregnancy that we have been analysing was passed.
The most conservative sectors of the Partido Popular and the government 
of the Autonomous Community of Navarre, also conservative, appealed 
against this law in the Constitutional Court.
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When they lodged the appeal, the court was asked to suspend the applica-
tion of the law until the appeal was heard, which would have halted the ap-
plication of the law for many years. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court 
ruled out taking that precautionary measure, and this is why the law is still in 
force now despite the fact that, eight years later, we are still waiting for a sen-
tence to be issued.
In 2011, the socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, which 
brought in the law, called an early general election due to the economic crisis. 
Mariano Rajoy, the leader of the Christian democratic Partido Popular, in-
cluded in his manifesto the idea of repealing the Law of Voluntary Termina-
tion of Pregnancy as soon as he won the election. 
The Partido Popular won and obtained an overall majority, which implied 
that it could modify the Law of Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy without 
the support, or even with the opposition, of the rest of the political parties. 
The principal architect of the counter-reform was the Minister of the Interior, 
Alberto Ruiz Gallardón, spurred on by the most conservative sectors of Span-
ish society. His project was entitled the “draft bill of the organic law for the 
protection of the life of the unborn child and the rights of the pregnant wom-
an”. The title could not be more significant, since the proposal revolved around 
the embryo and pushed the woman into the background. To everyone’s aston-
ishment, not only did the content of the counter-reform not return to the 
three legitimate cases for abortion of 1985 (rape, risk for the mother and mal-
formation of the foetus) but it was even more restrictive, forcing the woman 
to continue with the pregnancy even in cases of malformation of the foetus. It 
is worth taking a close look at the attempted reform to understand the full 
scope of its perverse nature:
 a) It punished “incitement” to abortion outside the three cases permitted by 
the law, with prison sentences of one to three years. With the reform, the 
woman was not punished, whether she caused the abortion voluntarily or 
through lack of caution. According to the doctrine (Muñoz Cuesta, 2014),15 
the instigator was sanctioned to prevent the incitement from going un-
punished applying the general rules (if the woman cannot commit a crime 
of abortion, then the instigator could not be punished for incitement to a 
“non-crime”, hence he or she should be punished specifically). The pun-
 15 Muñoz Cuesta, F. “Algunas consideraciones sobre el Anteproyecto de Ley Orgánica de modifi-
cación del delito de aborto.” Revista Aranzadi Doctrinal, no. 10/2014, BIB 2014/46.
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ishment of incitement with such a high sentence would have been a sword 
of Damocles for the people close to the person who wished to have an 
abortion.
 b) For a woman to be able to have an abortion for “psychological reasons”,16 
these had to cause “serious, permanent or long-lasting damage to her 
health”, a requirement that generated a fair amount of uncertainty (how to 
calculate permanence? How long did the damage have to last?). The At-
torney General’s Office warned that this requirement would increase the 
number of accusations due to abortion, since the 1985 reform did not dis-
tinguish between damage that was “permanent in time” and “non-perma-
nent”. 
 c) If the foetus might be born with malformations or with serious physical or 
mental defects, the woman could not have an abortion, according to the 
Regulatory Impact Analysis Memorandum, because “the law cannot con-
dition the value of the life of the unborn child to the expectations of its 
possible future disability, whereby it is excluded from the article, as an in-
dication for the decriminalization of abortion”.
The reform only permitted abortion if the foetus presented “an anom-
aly incompatible with life”,17 which, in its own words, was “associated with 
the death of the foetus or the newborn baby during the neonatal period”.
Even so, it was not enough for the foetus to be about to die, the moth-
er in this specific case (death, not an anomaly or illness in the foetus) was 
further required to show that it was causing “serious danger to her mental 
health”, which also “had to be permanent” (that is, the damage to her 
mental health had to last after the death of the foetus, for an unspecified 
but presumably much longer time.18 The woman therefore had to perform 
 16 The wording read, “That it be necessary, as the conflict cannot be resolved, from the field of medi-
cine, in any other way, to avoid serious danger for the life or the physical or mental health of the 
pregnant woman, provided that it is performed within the first 22 weeks of gestation. For these 
purposes, it will be understood that there is serious danger for the life or the health of the woman 
when pregnancy produces important damage to her health, permanent or long-lasting, according to 
medical scientific knowledge at that time, and it is thus stated in a report motivated and issued previ-
ously by two doctors in the speciality corresponding to the disease that generates the serious danger 
for the woman, different from the doctor who performs the abortion or under whose direction it 
takes place, and who do not work in the centre or establishment in which it is performed”. Draft bill 
for the Organic Law for the protection of the life of the unborn child and of the rights of the preg-
nant woman.
 17 This situation normally refers to cases of anencephaly.
 18 The literal tenor is as follows: “In the event that the serious danger for the mental health of the 
woman originates in the existence in the foetus of some anomaly incompatible with life, the report 
required in the previous paragraph will be issued by a single doctor [...] Abortion will not be punish-
sexual and reProduCtIVe health and Voluntary termInatIon... 103
a veritable legal and medical balancing act, through medical rulings, to be 
able to have an abortion in the sole event of certain death of the foetus 
after it had been born.
 d) The possibility was brought back of having an abortion in the case of a 
crime against sexual freedom, but it was hugely restricted for minors. Thus, 
in the case of girls of 16 and 17 who were not emancipated, their parents 
had to give their “consent” (a euphemistic expression that means that if the 
parents did not want their sexually assaulted daughter to have an abortion, 
she could not do so legally). If the minor was under 16, the law required 
the parents’ consent for her to be able to have an abortion. In the case of 
disagreements between the parents and the minor, a judge would decide, 
with uncertain criteria. Thus, let us imagine that a 17-year-old girl became 
pregnant after being raped. The parents and the judge could force her to 
have the baby, since the judge was legally entitled to refuse her the right 
to have an abortion if he/she considered that the girl “was not mature 
enough” to give consent. All this with the inherent contradiction in a law 
code that presupposed that a girl of 14 was mature enough to get married, 
but not to have an abortion three years later as a result of sexual assault.19 
Lastly, if the minor was under 16, the judge had to take into account, 
above all, the opinion of her parents (who, a priori at least, would be 
against abortion, otherwise they would obviously not have gone to court; 
although an even more paradoxical situation could arise: that the minor 
does not want to have an abortion, but her parents do want her to, and a 
judge has to decide).
 e) Moreover, even in just the two cases in which abortion was accepted (risk for 
the mother and sexual assault), the woman had to previously undergo indoc-
trination therapy in which she would be informed of the risks of abortion 
“for the woman’s health and for her future motherhood” and of the “expecta-
tions for the development of the child’s life”. There was even the possibility 
of other professionals and even relatives participating (if she could not be 
convinced, one supposes). If the woman managed to survive to this stage, 
able, even if 22 weeks of gestation are exceeded, provided that the anomaly incompatible with the life 
of the foetus had not been previously detected or it had been impossible to detect, with an accurate 
diagnosis, and it is thus stated in the report issued previously, in accordance with that required in this 
section, or when there is a risk for the woman’s life that is unavoidable, within what is clinically exi-
gible, through the protection of the life of the conceived baby through induction to childbirth.” 
Draft bill for the Organic Law for the protection of the life of the unborn child and of the rights of 
the pregnant woman.
 19 The minimum age for marriage was raised to 16 in 2015.
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then she could have an abortion, but she had to let a minimum of seven 
days pass. Moreover, the doctor who had taken part in the information 
had to issue a certificate without which the clinic could not perform the 
abortion (the law did not envisage what would happen if the doctor re-
fused to issue the certificate, or if he or she became ill).
 f ) It extended the conscientious objection of healthcare personnel to cover 
virtually any act or member of staff involved, as they could “refrain from 
any participation or collaboration in the voluntary termination of preg-
nancy”. 
The reform was favourably reported on by the Spanish judges’ governing 
body, the same General Council of the Judiciary that could not reach agree-
ment to report on the Law of Time Limits in 2010.20 Even worse, for its incon-
sistency, was the attitude of the Spanish Bioethics Committee. In 2009 this 
body reported favourably on the Zapatero government’s Law of Time Limits 
by 11 votes to one. And in 2014, it was in favour of Gallardón’s reform by the 
same margin. How can such nonsense be explained? Well, when the Partido 
Popular came to power in 2011 it replaced the members of the Spanish Bioeth-
ics Committee with other more conservative ones. The strangest thing about 
the case is that a member of the committee voted in favour of the Law of Time 
Limits in 2009, and against it five years later.21 The Attorney General’s Office, 
on the contrary, was not inconsistent. It issued a report against the Law of 
Time Limits in 2009 and in favour of Gallardón’s reform, with the odd quali-
fication, in 2014.22
 20 In 2009, the General Council of the Judiciary was unable to reach agreement to issue a report on the 
Law of Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy, since it was unable to achieve a majority of 11 out of a 
possible 21 votes. The president, Carlos Divar, chosen by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, added his 
vote to the nine conservative members to prevent the report approved by the studies committee from 
going ahead, supported by another nine progressive members and the writer of the report, Marga-
rita Uría, chosen by the PNV. The member from CiU, Ramon Camps, abstained. It is a historic 
circumstance, since it is the first time in 29 years that the CGPJ has not reported on a law (José A. 
Hernández, El País, Madrid, 23 July 2009).
 21 Spanish Bioethics Committee (2009): Opinion about the bill for the Organic Law of Sexual and 
Reproductive Health and Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy. (2014) Report on the draft bill of the 
Organic Law for the Protection of the Life of the Unborn Child and the Rights of the Pregnant 
Woman.
 22 The Prosecution Advisory Board is made up of 12 members. The death of a member from the pro-
gressive sector, the attorney Rafael Valero, meant that the six members elect of the conservative 
Public Prosecutors’ Association could issue a report opposed to the Law of Voluntary Termination of 
Pregnancy. The president of the Prosecution Advisory Board, Cándido Pumpido, the deputy attor-
ney and three members elect of the Progressive Union of Members issued an alternative report, that 
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Despite the conformity of the judges’ governing body, of the new Spanish 
Bioethics Committee, and of the Prosecution Advisory Board, the proposal 
was met with huge opposition and protest, even from the ranks of the Partido 
Popular, as it would be taking Spain back to the clerical paradigm of the years 
of the Franco dictatorship. This full-frontal social rejection forced it to be 
halted, and the minister resigned, feeling that his authority had been under-
mined by the Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy (September 2014).
Since then, Christian democrat Mariano Rajoy’s tacit strategy has been to 
wait for the Constitutional Court to rule on the appeal lodged by members of 
his party, something that has still not happened.
4.2.7. A controversial matter: the consent of minors 
One of the issues that generated the most political and social debate in the 
period when the new law was passing through parliament was the question of 
the minor’s autonomy that had to be acknowledged with regard to the possi-
bility of her deciding for herself to voluntarily terminate the pregnancy. One 
must remember that in Spain the Law of Patient Autonomy grants minors the 
power to decide for themselves with respect to their medical treatment from 
the age of 16,23 except for participation in clinical trials, abortion and assisted 
reproduction.
The decision to have an abortion is, nevertheless, a very controversial matter 
that shows up many of the differences between words and deeds, and the most 
widespread and inconsistent cases of social hypocrisy with regard to the free-
dom of minors and ideas about parental authority and its limits. 
The abovementioned Document of the Bioethics and Law Observatory had 
already talked about this, in 2002.24 As we see in its conclusions, the Observa-
tory’s Opinion Group proposed the following:
In the case of underage women, since they present special risks, it is necessary 
for: a) the validity of the consent of adolescents who are capable of under-
standing what they decide in the prescription of contraceptives, to be accepted; 
is, a dissenting opinion. With it, the Board was split (six to five). (María Peral, El Mundo, 24 June 
2009.)
 23 Law 41/2002, of 14 November, basic regulator of patient autonomy and of rights and responsibilities 
in matters of information and clinical documentation.
 24 Bioethics and Law Observatory Document on Sexual and Reproductive Health in Adolescence, by 
Casado and Ros.
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b) relevant measures to be adopted so that their access to the different methods 
of contraception, including the morning after pill, is real; c) in the legal instanc-
es of voluntary termination of pregnancy, the validity of the consent of the mi-
nors who are capable of understanding what they decide and its consequences 
should be accepted.
The law should arbitrate the necessary measures to ensure the validity of the 
consent given by minors aged between 16 and 18, given that the current health-
care legislation establishes that from the age of 16 minors can give consent per-
sonally without the need to resort to their legal representatives. Between 12 and 
16, the minor will be able to take a decision herself if she is mature enough to 
understand the scope of the intervention on her health, although the parents and 
legal representatives must be heard.
In the event of a dispute arising, the proper mediation by experts must be 
actively encouraged, or by an external committee, who will act as mediators be-
tween parents and adolescents, so that the decision is taken with the maximum 
consensus between the minor and her parents or legal representatives, with the 
minor’s interest always taking precedence.
The law we are analysing partially included this proposal, and article 13, 
section 4, established that:
In the case of women aged 16 and 17, consent for the voluntary termination of 
pregnancy corresponds exclusively to them in accordance with the general re-
gime applicable to adult women. At least one of the legal representatives, father 
or mother, persons with parental authority or guardians of women of this age 
must be informed of the woman’s decision. This information will not be neces-
sary when the minor claims with good reason that this will cause her a serious 
conflict, due to the certain danger of intra-family violence, threats, duress, bat-
tering, or there is a situation of upheaval or distress.
The wording of the article is a good example of the poor legislative tech-
nique used — or the lack of conviction in the legal decision adopted — that 
characterizes the new law: on one hand, in the first paragraph, autonomy 
was granted from the age of 16; then in the second paragraph it was limited, 
thus infringing the confidentiality of the doctor/patient relationship by re-
questing information from parents or guardians; finally, in the third and last 
paragraph, the minor only had to claim family strife and that was enough to 
exempt it from the requirement. What ought to have been clearly established 
was subject to an oscillation that moreover left a margin for interpretation so 
wide that it was not clear in what sense it was established, in practice, who 
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determines what degree of conflict is required nor how the grounds for the 
minor’s claim are decided. 
It is an especially regrettable matter, since the legislators could have sup-
ported their decision with rulings already in existence in our own context, 
some of them very relevant in this respect such as, for example, the report by 
the Bioethics Advisory Committee of Catalonia to which we referred previ-
ously. This report proposes that the updating of the regulation of voluntary 
termination of pregnancy must envisage that the minor aged between 16 and 
18 is considered capable, in principle, just as she is in other medical and health-
care situations. Thus, the pregnant woman aged between 16 and 18 could give 
her own consent to the termination of the pregnancy, and the woman’s con-
sent (whether a minor or not) would only be granted through a representative 
when she was clearly unable to make decisions, in the opinion of the medical 
team attending her as is the general rule. This clinical diagnosis would have to 
be reasoned and personalized, and be recorded in the corresponding clinical 
record. It is even recommended that it be made collectively and with the 
help of the clinic’s ethics committee. Aside from this, only in the case of seri-
ous danger, in a doctor’s opinion, should the minor’s parents or representa-
tives be informed; nevertheless, the necessary support and accompaniment 
should be provided and a period of reflection be proposed for the actual ter-
mination and to suggest to them the advisability of informing parents, guard-
ians or, where appropriate, a trusted adult who may be able to help her in this 
situation: sharing the decision with someone the minor does not wish to 
must not be imposed. In the opinion of the Committee, formulas must be 
provided that, in practice, increase the accompaniment of the minor who 
decides to terminate a pregnancy, as well as the certainty of the professionals 
who have to perform it and the tranquillity of society with respect to it, but 
the self-determination of the person, free, informed and competent, should 
always be respected and encouraged.
If this regulation was in itself insufficient, the situation has got worse with 
the reform introduced by the Partido Popular. As we have said, the repeal of the 
Law of Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy failed, but that did not prevent 
them from reforming, probably to try to appease the most reactionary sectors 
of their party, the precept that we commented on. 
And so, in 2015 Organic Law 11/2015, of 21 September, was published to 
reinforce the protection of minors and women with judicially modified capac-
ity in the voluntary termination of pregnancy, which regulated this matter in 
the following way:
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For the voluntary termination of pregnancies of minors or persons with judi-
cially modified capacity, besides the expression of their wishes, the express consent 
of their legal representatives will be necessary. In this case, any disputes arising 
with regard to the consent by the legal representatives will be resolved in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Civil Code. [The italics are ours.]
The consequence of this reform is that in order for a minor to have an 
abortion she must have not just information, but also the specific consent of 
her parents. If there is a conflict between the wishes of the minor, who wants 
to have an abortion, and her parents, who are opposed to it, the matter will be 
settled in court following the general rules. One of the problems with this 
pseudo-solution is that the legal time limits for abortion are very short (14 weeks 
from conception) and Spanish justice is quite slow, whereby, with the system 
of tests, appeals, reports, and so on, it may simply be unfeasible to fulfil the 
minor’s wish to terminate her pregnancy.
Besides, the reform was done indirectly, since the law of 2015 modified the 
Law of Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy, deleting the paragraph that al-
lowed minors to have an abortion without their parents’ consent, and it dele-
gated the regulation of this matter to Law 41/2002, of 14 November, which 
regulates patient autonomy, where the paragraph that we have just comment-
ed on was introduced (which is an ordinary law and not an organic law).
As we can observe, the title of the law, and the reform itself, continues the 
paternalistic paradigm that inspired Gallardón’s failed reform. Thus, the law is 
published to “reinforce the protection of minors”, as if there were no other way 
of protecting them than leaving such a personal decision to their parents, 
when the problem is often precisely the family. Moreover, ultimately, if the 
matter is taken to court, a judge has to decide, with who knows what criteria, 
and so it will depend on his or her ideology.
4.2.8. An outstanding matter: conscientious objection
A matter that remains to be settled in Spanish law is the establishment of a 
clear regulation of conscientious objection by healthcare personnel, allowing 
them on one hand to exercise their right to ideological freedom, of which 
conscientious objection is a part, at the same time ensuring that users of the 
health system receive the services they are entitled to. 
The case of abortion is one where objection is frequently present. The new 
law makes a brief and, in our opinion, imprecise reference to the matter in 
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article 19.2,25 so it would be advisable for the question to be developed in detail 
in a specific law.
The Bioethics and Law Observatory’s Document on Conscientious Objection 
in Healthcare 26 made contributions that could be taken into account in a pos-
sible development of the law. The proposal acknowledged the possibility of 
conscientiously objecting, given that it is consubstantial to democratic socie-
ties that their members can disagree with the legally established general rules. 
For practical purposes it should be stated that conflict does not arise in issues 
accepted generally, but it emerges in controversial issues, difficult cases or open 
problems, for which there is no unambiguous solution. In healthcare espe-
cially, the conditions for objection must be established in such a way that they 
ensure it can be practised and, at the same time, that they meet the require-
ments for the necessary social transparency and for the special requirements 
of tempo in healthcare to be reflected — that is, so that treatment is not un-
fairly delayed. In short, the aim is to regulate the exercise of objection practi-
cally and to speed up the procedures for the service to be provided by another 
non-objecting professional.
Conscientious objection is, in our legal system, the expression of the fun-
damental right to ideological freedom, established in art. 16.2. of the Spanish 
Constitution. Confrontation appears when the exercise of conscientious ob-
jection, derived from the right to ideological freedom, has consequences that 
affect the constitutional rights of third parties, as in the case of receiving le-
gally established healthcare services. If the exercise of ideological freedom 
comes into conflict with professional responsibilities, the problem must be 
resolved taking into account the principle of proportionality through the ap-
propriate consideration of its adaptability to means, ends and consequences. 
Under no circumstances can freedom be understood as an absolute right, since 
the limits of one person’s exercise of freedom are a third party’s freedom and 
 25 Article 19.2. Measures to guarantee the provision of healthcare services.
2. The healthcare service for voluntary termination of pregnancy will be performed in hospitals 
in the public health service or associated with it. The healthcare professionals directly involved in 
voluntary termination of pregnancy will have the right to exercise conscientious objection provided 
access to and quality of the service is not affected by the exercise of conscientious objection. The re-
jection or refusal to perform termination of pregnancy for reasons of conscience is always a personal 
decision by healthcare personnel directly involved in the performance of voluntary termination of 
pregnancy, which must be expressed beforehand in writing. In any case the healthcare professionals 
will dispense suitable treatment and medical attention to the women who need it before and after 
undergoing a termination of pregnancy.
 26 See the Bioethics and Law Observatory’s document on Conscientious Objection in Health Care, by 
Casado and Corcoy, the content of which is summarized in this chapter.
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their right to equal treatment. Not even from positions that regard freedom as 
a priority is it possible to deny that people who work in the public health ser-
vice are obliged to perform the duties that are entailed in the state’s responsi-
bility to protect health. Therefore, specifically with respect to abortion, it is 
proposed that the essential limit of conscientious objection by healthcare per-
sonnel should be the possibility of providing the service, and the exercise of it 
must meet certain requirements. Conscientious objection by a healthcare pro-
fessional may cause the patient harm, so it can only be accepted when it does 
not restrict mandatory healthcare. The Document makes it clear that it is the 
public authorities’ duty to establish a system that makes the exercise of free-
dom of conscience and the reception of healthcare possible at the same time.
It is, then, advisable to regulate the way in which healthcare personnel 
declare conscientious objection through a document that explicitly states 
which specific practices it affects, so that the healthcare manager can suitably 
organize the patients’ care, since with each case of conscientious objection 
patients’ proper care should always be ensured so that they may effectively 
exercise their rights. Therefore, hospitals and clinics must furnish the necessary 
means for the legally established services to be provided and, at the same time, 
provide the proper channels for workers to exercise their right to object; they 
must also establish a set of requirements to make sure that the objector really 
does have the convictions they claim to have. The possibility must be accepted 
of unexpected conscientious objection and also partial conscientious objec-
tion, which may also be unexpected, and which occasionally arises in extreme 
cases with respect to the performance of abortions.
Conscientious objection must be declared explicitly and the conditions, 
requirements and formalities, and the time limits to be able to exercise it, must 
be established. Conscientious objection may only be exercised due to behav-
iours that are effectively and directly affected by the beliefs on which objection 
is based. The formalization of the declaration of conscientious objection must 
be included in a register of the healthcare institution where it takes place. This 
register, insofar as its contents affect the right to privacy, must be protected in 
accordance with the current organic law of data protection.
4.2.9. Sexual health
The termination of pregnancy has obscured the fact that the law also regulat-
ed, for the first time in Spain, important questions referring to sexual health. 
Thus, article 2.b includes the definition of sexual health provided by the World 
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Health Organization: “Sexual health: the state of physical, mental and socio-
cultural well-being in relation to sexuality, which requires an atmosphere free 
of coercion, discrimination and violence”, establishing a series of measures 
that we shall divide into three levels:
 1) Measures for the population. The law establishes as rights access to informa-
tion and reproductive education, universal access to the services and pro-
grammes on this subject, access to safe and effective methods that make it 
possible to regulate fertility, and the elimination of all forms of discrimina-
tion, paying special attention to persons who have some type of disability.
 2) Measures for the public authorities. The law establishes as an obligation of 
the public authorities the provision of “comprehensive healthcare” servic-
es, adopting the necessary measures so that the population can gain access 
to family planning through the incorporation of “fourth-generation con-
traceptives”, and attending to women and their partners during pregnancy, 
birth and postpartum.
 3) Measures for healthcare personnel. The law establishes the need to train 
sexual and reproductive healthcare professionals, before they start working 
in healthcare centres and through continuous training programmes. 
However, this progressive regulation has been obscured by the clash with 
reality in which we are immersed. A good example is what has happened 
with the Morning-After Pill and pharmacies, which in Spain are private com-
panies to which the state grants the monopoly of drug dispensation. That is, 
they are private bodies that exercise semi-public functions, without being gov-
ernment civil servants (somewhat similar to the case of notaries). Moreover, it 
is necessary to stress that in many places in Spain there is only one pharmacy, 
or very few, depending on population size, whereby conscientious objection 
by the local pharmacist could make the population’s right to have access to 
fourth-generation contraceptive methods unviable.
As we said earlier, the Bioethics and Law Observatory published a Docu-
ment on Conscientious Objection. In this document we recommended the need 
to bear in mind that pharmacies, as “private healthcare establishments provid-
ing a public service and subject to healthcare planning”, must take steps to en-
sure the administration of medications and healthcare products to which users 
are entitled, in such a way that the conscientious objection that pharmacists 
may hypothetically exercise is not detrimental to the service that pharmacies 
must provide to citizens. For this, planning measures for the purpose of ensur-
ing the provision of the service should be outlined. 
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The surprising sentence of the Spanish Constitutional Court that we com-
mented on came in this context of anomie. The Junta de Andalucía adminis-
tratively sanctioned a pharmacist because he did not stock condoms and the 
Morning-After Pill for reasons of conscience. After exhausting the administra-
tive channels and the courts, the pharmacy managed to get the Constitutional 
Court to partially admit its appeal for protection, in the following sense:27
 1) The Constitutional Court considered that the sanction for not stocking 
the Morning-After Pill infringed the pharmacist’s right to conscientious 
objection. The fact that the pharmacy was in the centre of the city of Se-
ville, which would allow hypothetical users to go to another one nearby, 
was one of the aspects that the court took into account (despite not check-
ing if it was indeed so). Moreover, as if that was not enough, the court ar-
gued that the pharmacist was sanctioned not for refusing to supply this 
pill, but for not having the minimum stock necessary to dispense it if 
someone asked for it.
 2) The Constitutional Court considered that conscientious objection did not 
allow the pharmacist to refuse to dispense condoms, whereby it agreed for 
the sanctioning procedure to be restarted so that the Junta de Andalucía 
could process it again (it would probably have timed out).
 
The sentence has received a great deal of criticism, as it represents a notable 
regression on the subject of fundamental rights, it contradicts itself (why yes 
to the pill and no to condoms?), and it contradicts other sentences, not just of 
the Constitutional Court, but also of the European Court of Human Rights, 
for example in Pichon and Sajous v. France, which in an identical situation 
denied conscientious objection to pharmacists.
The sentence in fact generated three dissenting opinions, with arguments 
that could not be more caustic, something uncommon among magistrates of 
the same court. These opinions state that the sentence is “a pronouncement 
with a marked ideological bias” (Valdés, Dal-Ré), “To pretend that obedience 
of the law may depend on everyone’s moral code is a clumsy caricature of the 
right to conscientious objection” (Ollero Tassara) and “Today it is the dispen-
sation of the contraceptive pill, tomorrow it could be obligatory vaccination, 
or the obligation to pay taxes, or many other things, affected by the refusal to 
do one’s legal duty by appealing to the right to conscientious objection, adapt-
 27 Sentence of the Constitutional Court no. 145/2015, of 25 June. RTC 2015/145.
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ed to the wishes of whoever employs objection, without the need for legal 
regulation of the matter” (Asua Batarrita). 
4.2.10. The outcome of the law
The inclusion in the same law of public policies on sexual and reproductive 
health and the termination of pregnancy has unquestionably been a success. 
Uniting educational, social and healthcare measures and treating abortion as a 
medical act is wholly desirable and responds to a long-standing demand. Nev-
ertheless, one must bear in mind that — given the vague wording of many 
precepts — we will have to wait for more time to pass before we can see how 
effective the application of the law has been. With the added matter, in the 
case of Spain, that the transfer of powers over healthcare to the different au-
tonomous communities has so far generated clearly evident territorial inequal-
ities in access to safe abortion, which come on top of all the other already 
known and usual ones that abortion entails. Furthermore we must not forget 
the insecurity generated by not knowing what the Constitutional Court is go-
ing to decide, especially with the precedent that we have just mentioned about 
the Morning-After Pill. In this respect, it is interesting to quote the assessment 
made by Betlem Cañizar, Marisa Fernández and Montserrat Cervera:
Despite incorporating improvements with respect to the law in effect up to now, for 
many feminists and areas of society, the new law does not completely resolve the 
lack of legal protection of women and doctors in relation to this practice […]. From 
the strictly legal point of view, we can say that the result of this legislative change 
has been very limited since, despite the improvements, it has missed the opportu-
nity to implement a pioneering legal idea. Many of the law’s initial intentions have 
turned into generic declarations of principles that do not correspond to the regula-
tory part. Influenced by more conservative attitudes, the proposal does not recog-
nize rights, it does not legalize abortion (it is still in the Criminal Code), and, 
moreover, it limits women’s right to decide freely and responsibly about maternity. 
Seen from a possibilist perspective, of course, the majority of women will legally be 
able to have an abortion without being forced to give a reason, given that around 
88% of abortions take place before week 12 of gestation, a situation that enters 
within the terms of the new law. But, as we said, from a perspective of the acknowl-
edgement of women’s rights and autonomy, the result is more limited.28 
 28 See the paper by Betlem Cañizar, Marisa Fernández and Montserrat Cervera, Sin Permiso, 28 Febru-
ary 2010, at www.sinpermiso.info/texts/index.php?id=3138.
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In sum, the law, with a reasonable criterion in the context, increases the 
protection of the foetus with the gradual possibilities of being viable. Between 
weeks 14 and 22 of gestation a medical ruling proving the existence of serious 
danger to the woman’s life or health or of anomalies in the foetus is required. 
However, we insist in stressing that on this point the law is more restrictive 
than the previous one, which did not establish any time limit in relation to the 
risk for the woman’s health. Lastly, nor does the law clearly resolve the prob-
lems entailed in the late detection of certain foetal anomalies that are discov-
ered after week 22 of pregnancy and give rise to very critical situations.
5. Towards a European canon29
Europe is subject to the dialectical tension that arises when secular attitudes 
clash with ultra-religious ones, not necessarily Christian (for example, in Tur-
key the man’s consent is necessary for the woman to be able to have an abor-
tion). From the point where these two fault lines meet, from the silence of 
European laws on the controversial points and the ambiguity of the European 
high courts, there emerge interpretations that support one position or the 
other. Through reading different reports, rulings, recommendations and sen-
tences, we have chosen a series of thematic areas that may be useful when it 
comes to understanding the complex situation in Europe.
1) Respect for women’s autonomy. Both the Council of Europe and its Parlia-
mentary Assembly have made the case for member states to respect women’s 
autonomy and to ensure that, if an abortion is performed, it should be done 
without endangering the woman and she should have the necessary informa-
tion.30 These bodies maintain that prohibition does not reduce the number of 
abortions, but it sends these practices underground, with the resulting appear-
ance of “abortion tourism” and the increased risk for women’s physical and 
mental health31 and female mortality.
 29 This heading is part of the subject “La interrupción del embarazo en Europa”, part of the materials 
of the master’s degree in Bioethics and Law taught at the Bioethics and Law Observatory, University of 
Barcelona, whose author is Manuel Jesús López Baroni.
 30 Report no. 11.537 of the Council of Europe’s Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Men 
and Women. 17 March 2008; Resolution 1607/2008, of 16 April, of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe, entitled Access to Safe and Legal Abortion in Europe.
 31 This last idea comes from Resolution 2001/2128, of 6 June, of the European Parliament (EU), on 
Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights.
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2) Law of time limits. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
recommended establishing a system of time limits in Europe, as it is the most 
effective policy for ensuring women’s autonomy.32 Along the same lines, the 
European Parliament required member countries of the European Union to 
legalize abortion, “in order to make it more accessible to all and thus eliminate 
the risks of illegal practices”.33
In Europe the system of time limits, with 12 weeks to be able to terminate 
pregnancy, 14 in the case of Spain, is the majority model. Other countries, like 
Finland or Great Britain only allow abortion in certain circumstances, but 
these are wide-ranging.34
3) Formal requirements for the termination of pregnancy. The Parliamentary As-
sembly of the Council of Europe has publicly shown its concern about the fact 
that in many European countries such strict formal requirements are estab-
lished that, in practice, they prevent, block or delay access to a safe and acces-
sible abortion (repetitive medical reports, the lack of doctors willing to per-
 32 Resolution 1607/2008, dated 16 April 2008, of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
entitled Access to Safe and Legal Abortion in Europe.
 33 Resolution 2001/2128, of 6 June, of the European Parliament (EU), on Sexual and Reproductive 
Health and Rights.
 34 Abortion has been legalized in most countries in the European Union. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Switzerland have a law of time limits up to 12 weeks of gestation. The period 
extends to 24 weeks in the Netherlands, 18 weeks in Sweden and 90 days in Italy. On the contrary, in 
Portugal it only reaches ten weeks. Once these limits have been passed, some countries continue to 
allow abortion due to specific indications and within new limits. Up to the second trimester, it is ac-
cepted when danger for the mother’s life is indicated in Austria, Denmark, Slovakia, France, Hungary, 
Luxemburg, Norway, the Czech Republic, Romania and Switzerland; when the mother’s life is in 
danger in Austria, Denmark, France, Luxemburg, Norway and Switzerland; due to malformation of 
the foetus in Austria, Denmark, Slovakia, France, Luxemburg, Norway, the Czech Republic and Ro-
mania; or due to rape in Slovakia, Hungary, Luxemburg, Norway and the Czech Republic. In the 
Czech Republic “medical reasons” are also added, in Hungary in the event of a “serious crisis situa-
tion”, and in Austria it is allowed up to the second trimester for girls under the age of 14. In Greece 
abortion is accepted in cases of rape up to week 20 and due to malformation of the foetus until week 
24. In the United Kingdom there is a law of indications whereby it is possible to abort up to week 24 
due to danger because of the mother’s physical or mental health or financial and social problems. In 
countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France and the United Kingdom there are no time 
limits for abortion when there are risks of malformations in the foetus. Nor when there is serious risk 
for the life of the mother in Belgium, France, Luxemburg and the United Kingdom and due to 
“medical reasons” in Germany. Casado; M.; Corcoy, M.; Ros, R.; Royes, A. (coords.). Document 
on Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy. Bioethics and Law Observatory. University of Barcelona, 
April 2008.
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form it, excessive waiting periods, the lack of suitable facilities, and so on).35 In 
this respect, the European Court of Human Rights established that:
[…] although the state enjoys a broad margin of appreciation for defining the cir-
cumstances in which it authorizes abortion (sections 321-238 supra), once the deci-
sion has been made, the corresponding legal framework must “show a degree of 
consistency and make it possible to suitably attend to the different legitimate inter-
ests at stake in accordance with the obligations derived from the Convention” 
(S. H. et al. v. Austria (ECHR, 2010, 56), no. 57813/2000, sec. 74, 1 April 2010).36 
[…] once the legislator has decided to authorize abortion, the corresponding legal 
framework should not be conceived in such a way that it actually limits the possibil-
ity of gaining access to this intervention.37 […] the Convention aims to guarantee 
not just the rights that are theoretical or illusory but also those that are practical and 
effective […] the state has a positive obligation to create a procedural framework 
that allows a pregnant woman to effectively exercise her right to a legal abortion.38
In other words, countries are free to authorize abortion or not, but once 
this is a legal reality, formal and/or factitious obstacles cannot be put in place 
that make it unfeasible. 
In this respect, the European institutions have rejected the policies of indi-
rect boycotting, like, for example, the “Mexico City Policy” introduced by 
President Ronald Reagan of the USA in 1984, suspended in 1993, and reintro-
duced by George W. Bush in 2001 (it is thus called due to the place where it 
was proclaimed for the first time).39 They are actions aimed at cutting or elim-
inating the public subsidies received by the non-governmental organizations 
which, as a last resort, send women to abortion clinics.
The European Parliament, faced with the application of this kind of policy 
in Central and Eastern Europe, requested the European Commission to make 
up for these budgetary shortages by subsidizing these organizations directly,40 
so that they could continue to offer guidance to women.
 35 Resolution 2001/2128, 16 April 2008, of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
 36 A, B and C v. Ireland. Grand Chamber. Sentence of 16 December 2010, ECHR/2010/116.
 37 Tysiac v. Poland. Sentence of section four, 20 March 2007, ECHR, 2007/20.
 38 ECHR. P. and S. v. Poland. Sentence of the European Court of Human Rights, of 30 October 2012. 
ECHR/2012/96.
 39 Also called the global gag rule. Its effects vary, covering family planning policies or permitting public 
funding in the case of rape or risk for the mother. In January 2017, President Donald Trump reintro-
duced this doctrine (Federal Register/vol. 82, no. 15, Wednesday, January 25, 2017, Presidential Doc-
uments, 8495), which had been suspended during the Obama presidency.
 40 Resolution 2001/2128, of 6 June 2002, of the European Parliament on Sexual and Reproductive 
Health and Rights.
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4) Importance of sexual and reproductive health policies. The Council of Europe41 
and its Parliamentary Assembly42 each issued documents urging the promo-
tion of effective sexual and reproductive health policies to prevent pregnancy, 
as it has been shown that they reduce the number of abortions. The Parliament 
of the European Union, taking the matter further, advocated the provision of 
free or inexpensive contraceptives and sexual and reproductive health services 
to the most underprivileged groups, such as young people, ethnic minorities 
and social outcasts, encouraging emergency contraception (the Morning-After 
Pill) and allowing it to be distributed without a prescription at reasonable 
prices.43
A point of reference for Europe is the French Veil Law (Law 75/17, of 17 
January 1975), since it “included the regulation of VTP in the public health 
code, considering that this intervention, which affects women particularly, 
could not be subjected to a regime of healthcare guarantees different from all 
other interventions, when it is performed under the established legal terms” 
(Bach et al., 2014).44 The opposite of this model is Poland, where there is no 
sexual education, and Ireland, where family planning is only funded if “natural 
methods” are used. Moreover, the three bodies mentioned have insisted that 
the idea must not be transmitted that abortion is just another method of con-
traception.45 
Lastly, European Parliament Resolution 30.172/92, of 8 July 1992, approving 
the European Charter of Children’s Rights, establishes that children must be 
provided with education on the subject of sex, as well as the necessary medical 
care with the inclusion of birth control measures, while respecting philosophi-
cal and religious convictions. In this respect, the Spanish Council of State sum-
marized the doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights (sentences 1976/5, 
of 7 December, Kjelsen, Busk and Pedersen v. Denmark, and […] v. Spain, 
ECHR JUR/2006/242834, of 25 May 2000) in the following way:
 41 Report no. 11.537 of the Council of Europe’s Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Men 
and Women (17 March 2008).
 42 Resolution 1607/2008, dated 16 April 2008, of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
 43 Resolution 2001/2128, of 6 June 2002, of the European Parliament on Sexual and Reproductive 
Health and Rights.
 44 Report on the draft bill of the Organic Law for the Protection of the Foetus and the Rights of the 
Pregnant Woman. Dissenting opinion on the report passed by the plenary session of the General 
Council of the Judiciary in session of 13 June 2014, formulated by Roser Bach Fabregó, Mar Cabreras 
Guijaro, Victoria Cinto Lapuente, Álvaro Cuesta Martínez, Clara Martínez de Careaga García, Ra-
fael Mozo Muelas, Concepción Sáez Rodríguez and Pilar Sepúlveda García de la Torre.
 45 In line with the Declaration and the Programme of Action of the United Nations Conference on 
Population and Development. Cairo, 5-13 September 1994.
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a) Parents do not have a right to absolutely veto children’s sex education, just as 
they cannot deprive them of generic education; b) the instruction must be “ob-
jective and scientific” and “exclude any tendency to indoctrination”, so it must 
not “extol sex or incite pupils to begin practices prematurely that are dangerous 
for their equilibrium, their health or their future, or reprehensible to parents”; 
c) sex education must be provided “delicately” paying special attention to the 
children’s age and gender; d) if the subject taught is “excessively categorical and 
explicit” and, consequently, “harmful for children who are vulnerable because of 
their age”, then it must be banned, as occurred with a sex education text with-
drawn from circulation by the British authorities (Handside v. UK, 7 December 
1976, 1976/6). [The summarized adaptation of their arguments is ours].46
5) Legal consequences for women. The Parliament of the European Union called 
upon the governments of member states and candidate countries to refrain 
from prosecuting women who had had an illegal abortion47 (in Spain, for ex-
ample, this policy is only half implemented, as the woman is not prosecuted if 
the formal requirements for an abortion are lacking, but she may be found 
guilty if an abortion is performed outside the cases or periods permitted by the 
law). In this respect, the Programme of Action approved at the Fourth World 
Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995) referred to section 8.25 of the Pro-
gramme of Action of the ICPD held in Cairo in 1984, where there was an 
undertaking by governments to consider reviewing laws that envisaged puni-
tive measures against women who had had an illegal abortion.
6) The right to abortion in European law. Neither the European Convention on 
Human Rights,48 nor the European Convention on Bioethics,49 nor the Char-
ter of Fundamental Human Rights of the European Union said anything 
about the termination of pregnancy, which has led to contrasting interpreta-
tions. This silence has generated the following positions:
 46 Council of State. Ruling 1384/2009 on the draft bill of the Organic Law of Sexual and Reproductive 
Health and Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy (17 September 2009).
 47 Resolution 2001/2128, of 6 June 2002, of the European Parliament on Sexual and Reproductive 
Health and Rights, in accordance with the Declaration and the Programme of Action of the United 
Nations’ Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 15 September 1995).
 48 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome (4 November 
1950).
 49 Convention of 4 April 1997 for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being 
with regard to the Applications of Biology and Medicine, Oviedo, 4 April 1997. Ratified by Spain 
through instrument of ratification of 23 July 1999. RCL 1999\2638, this Convention came into force 
on 1 January 2000.
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6.1. The movements opposed to the termination of pregnancy interpret this 
legal loophole in the sense that in Europe there is no right of access to abor-
tion, nor to performing it.50 The Spanish Council of State, reporting on the 
Law of Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy of 2010, argued that “the right 
to abortion” was “something unknown in the legal systems of countries near to 
us that are liable to be taken as models, […] that it is not even mentioned in 
the international instruments relative to women’s rights (see Resolution 48/104, 
of 20 December 1993, article 3) and whose formulation is groundless in our 
legal system”.51
Nevertheless, the reality is more complex, since what happens is simply that, 
faced with the absence of a particular law on this matter, the European Court of 
Human Rights has decided not to rule on it, either one way or the other (“There-
fore, the Court must not enquire, in this case, into whether the Convention 
guarantees the right to abortion.” Tysiac v. Poland), and in fact, the Council of 
State’s report that we mentioned earlier acknowledges this fact: “the European 
Court of Human Rights has refused to issue a ruling.” However, once again we 
must qualify this, because although it is true that the court does not acknowl-
edge a specific right to abortion, it is aware that in practice numerous coun-
tries recognize that women have this possibility, whence it infers that the pro-
tection of the unborn child cannot be absolute in Europe:
Unconditional respect for the protection of prenatal life or the idea that the 
rights of the future mother are less important does not automatically justify, by 
virtue of the Convention, a prohibition of abortion based on the wish to protect the 
life of the unborn child. Contrary to what the (Irish) government maintains, 
based on certain international declarations, […] the regulation of the right to 
have an abortion does not pertain exclusively to the contracting states either. 
[…] the Court must determine if the Irish state’s prohibition of abortion for 
reasons of health or welfare is compatible with article 8 of the Convention, based 
on the said criterion of just equilibrium, on the understanding that the state 
must be recognized as having a broad margin of appreciation.52 [Our italics.]
 50 Prosecuting Council’s report on the Gallardón project. (Jean-Jacques Amy v. Belgium, ECHR.) Pros-
ecuting Council’s report on the draft bill of the Organic Law for the protection of the life of the 
unborn child and the rights of the pregnant woman. Eduardo Torres-Dulce Lifante, State’s Attorney 
General, president of the Prosecuting Council (12 June 2014).
 51 Council of State. Ruling 1384/2009 on the draft bill of the Organic Law of Sexual and Reproductive 
Health and Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy. 17/9/2009.
 52 A, B and C v. Ireland. Grand Chamber. Sentence, of 16 December 2010. ECHR/2010/116.
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Lastly, on the question of the right to have an abortion, it is interesting to 
point out that the Spanish Council of State, taking into account the doctrine 
of the Spanish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human 
Rights, proposed the following wording of the Spanish Law of Termination of 
Pregnancy:53
This makes it advisable to qualify the confused, and therefore, controversial 
wording of article 12 of the draft bill consulted, referring, as we see later on, not 
to a right to have an abortion but to the healthcare services necessary for the 
voluntary termination of pregnancy. It is enough for these purposes to say “it is 
guaranteed” given that the expression “is acknowledged” is typical of constitu-
tional declarations of fundamental rights. It would also be necessary, as alterna-
tive wording, to replace the present one with the following: “The voluntary ter-
mination of pregnancy is legal, performed in the conditions envisaged in this law 
that will be interpreted…”.
The final wording of the Spanish Law of Voluntary Termination of Preg-
nancy of 2010 establishes the following:
Access to the voluntary termination of pregnancy is guaranteed in the conditions 
that are determined in this law. These conditions will be interpreted in the most 
favourable way for the protection and effectiveness of the fundamental rights of 
the woman who requests the intervention, in particular, her right to freely develop 
her personality, to life, to physical and moral safety, to privacy, to ideological 
freedom and to non-discrimination. [Our italics.]
The conclusion that we can draw about the “right to have an abortion” is 
that the main European laws on the subject remain silent on this point and the 
European Court of Human Rights has not wished to give an express ruling, 
but that this is no obstacle for the legislation of a specific country to acknowl-
edge as a subjective right the right to the voluntary termination of pregnancy, 
as has been the case in Spain. In the face of a situation of alegality, not illegal-
ity, there is nothing to prevent new rights from being acknowledged, and, as 
the European Court of Human Rights itself states:
 53 Council of State. Ruling 1384/2009 on the draft bill of the Organic Law of Sexual and Reproductive 
Health and Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy. 17/9/2009.
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The Court has already found that there is consensus among a substantial major-
ity of the contracting states of the Council of Europe for the permission of abor-
tion and that the majority of Contracting Parties have resolved, in their legis-
lation, the conflicting rights of foetus and mother in favour of greater access to 
abortion.54
6.2. Every European country can freely regulate the issue of abortion (pro-
hibit it, or accept a system of time limits or indications), it being the European 
Court of Human Rights’ duty to judge this hypothetical regulation, taking 
into account two parameters, proportionality and consideration of the inter-
ests at stake. However, if a member state decides to regulate the termination of 
pregnancy, then “the legal provisions must, first and foremost, ensure that the 
pregnant woman’s legal position is clear” (Tysiac v. Poland, ECHR, 2007/20).
In this respect, the European Parliament has pointed out that, while recog-
nizing that the regulation of reproductive health is the competence of each 
member state, “the European Union can play a supporting role through the 
exchange of best practices”.55 Similarly, the Parliamentary Assembly urged 
member states of the Council of Europe to “examine, update and compare 
national and international policies and strategies of the member states of the 
Council of Europe relative to population, health, and sexual and reproductive 
rights”.56
The importance of reciprocal influences in Europe can be observed in the 
sentence of the West German Federal Court of 25 February 1975, in which it 
stated that “according to established biological and physiological knowledge, 
human life exists from the fourteenth day after conception”. It is the establish-
ment of the 14-day rule as a precedent, which in turn is in line with the War-
nock Report, that has legitimated the distinction between pre-embryos (under 
14 days) and embryos (from that day on), and which in turn has made artificial 
reproduction and embryonic stem cell research possible in Europe. That West 
 54 P. and S. v. Poland. Sentence of the European Court of Human Rights, 30 October 2012. ECHR/2012/96.
 55 Resolution 2001/2128 of the European Parliament on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, of 
6 June 2002.
 56 As the European Court of Human Rights said (A, B and C v. Ireland), the Parliamentary Assembly 
pointed out that, while progress had been made after the Programme of Action of the International 
Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, 1994, “Nevertheless the results continued to 
be not very favourable with regard to school attendance, equity and equality between the sexes, in-
fant and maternal mortality and morbidity, and universal access to sexual and reproductive health-
care services, including family planning and the services that perform safe abortions”. For that rea-
son, the ACPE urged member states of the Council of Europe to examine and compare funding to 
guarantee the comprehensive application of the ICPD’s Programme until 2015.
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German sentence also influenced the famous sentence of the Spanish Consti-
tutional Court in 1985, which declared termination of pregnancy in the three 
typical cases (rape, malformation of the foetus and danger to the mother’s 
health) to be constitutional.57
6.3. In Europe, when does human life begin? As the European Court of Hu-
man Rights clearly states, “one might search in vain in the legal and social 
systems of the contracting states for a uniform European concept of morality, 
in particular on the issue of knowing when life begins”.58 […] “This jurispru-
dence was confirmed in the referenced Vo case (ECHR 2004, 52), in which the 
Court ruled that it was neither desirable nor possible to answer the question of 
whether the unborn child was a ‘person’, in the sense of article 2 of the [Euro-
pean] Convention [of Human Rights].” The consequence of this view is that 
the European court delegates to the different states the establishment of the 
exact moment when human life commences.
Lastly, the Spanish Council of State, in its report on the Law of Voluntary 
Termination of Pregnancy of 2010, remembered how the European Commis-
sion’s European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies consid-
ered that in Europe two paradigmatic ideas were opposed to one another: 
“the one that considers that the embryo is not a human being, and therefore 
does not merit unlimited protection, and the other one according to which the 
embryo enjoys the moral status of every human being, and must, therefore, 
benefit from wide-ranging protection.”59
6.4. Women’s private life. Analysing the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the European Court of Human Rights has pointed out that, although 
article 8, like article 2, does not guarantee the right to have an abortion, the 
 57 The following sentences, together with a judicial decree, for the moment make up the constitu-
tional jurisprudence on the status of the embryo and the foetus in Spain. Sentences of the Consti-
tutional Court 53/1985, of 11 April, on the constitutional nature of the bill for the organic law to re-
form article 417 bis of the Criminal Code of 1973, for the legalization of abortion in certain cases; 
sentence 212/1996, of 19 December, on the unconstitutional nature of Law 42/1998, of 28 December, 
of donation and use of human embryos and foetuses; sentence 116/1999, of 17 June, on the unconsti-
tutional nature of the Law on Assisted Reproduction Techniques; ruling of the Constitutional Court 
no. 90/2010, of 14 July, RTC\2010\90, which agrees not to suspend the application of the Law of 
Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy while an appeal on grounds of unconstitutionality lodged 
against the said law is being processed.   
 58 ECHR. A, B and C v. Ireland.
 59 Council of State. Ruling 1384/2009 on the draft bill of the Organic Law of Sexual and Reproductive 
Health and Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy. 17/9/2009.
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fact that a country prohibits abortion for health reasons does affect article 8, 
namely, women’s right to privacy, whereby this specific prohibition could be 
legitimately examined by the court. It maintained that:
The essential object of article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary inter-
ference by the public authorities. […] Whereas the Court has declared that arti-
cle 8 cannot be interpreted as a right to abortion, it has found that the prohibi-
tion of abortion when it is requested for health and/or welfare reasons comes 
within the sphere of the right to respect for one’s private life and as a conse-
quence of article 8 […] the notion of private life in the sense of article 8 is 
applied to the decisions to be a parent and not to become one. [It refers to a 
case of rape. The clarification is ours.]60
7) The consent of minors. In the case of the rape of a minor, her right to have an 
abortion takes precedence over her parents’ opinion on the matter. Thus, in 
the case of a minor who wanted to have an abortion after being raped, the 
European Court of Human Rights considered the following:
The Court acknowledges that in a situation of an unwanted pregnancy the moth-
er of a minor is not affected in the same way. It is of the opinion that it cannot be 
considered that legal guardianship automatically confers on the parents of a mi-
nor the right to make decisions about the minor’s reproductive options, because 
the minor’s personal autonomy in this area must be taken into account.61 [Our 
italics.]
If we compare it with the Gallardón reform, which we mentioned earlier, 
we can see that its proposal (that it should be a court of law that decides, and, 
if the parents are opposed to it, the parents’ decision will be taken into account 
especially if the minor is 15 or younger) was contrary to the doctrine of the 
European court.
8) Conscientious objection. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Eu-
rope established in a resolution that “no person, hospital or institution will be 
coerced, blamed or discriminated against for refusing to perform, authorize, 
 60 P. and S. v. Poland. Sentence of the European Court of Human Rights, of 30 October 2012. ECHR/ 
2012/96.
 61 P. and S. v. Poland. Sentence of the European Court of Human Rights, of 30 October 2012. ECHR/ 
2012/96. 
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participate in or assist in the performance of an abortion, euthanasia or any act 
that causes the death of a human foetus or an embryo for any reason”.62
This resolution has been interpreted by the movements opposed to abor-
tion as a reinforcement of the conscientious objection of healthcare person-
nel to cover not just those directly involved in the performance of the abortion 
(as established, for example, in article 19.2 of the Spanish Law of Voluntary 
Termination of Pregnancy of 2010), but also the staff that take part indi-
rectly (anaesthetists, midwives, etc.). However, this interpretation should 
not be deduced from the literal tenor of the paragraph that we have cited, 
despite the dramatic nature of its wording (“the death of a human embryo”), 
given that the resolution simply encourages conscientious objection to be 
guaranteed, something that incidentally already appears in other European 
legal texts.
Moreover it is usually overlooked that, in section 2 of this same resolution, 
the Parliamentary Assembly emphasized the need to make the right to consci-
entious objection compatible with the right of patients to receive healthcare 
when necessary, and also the fact that the absence of specific regulation on this 
matter may disproportionately affect women, especially those who live in rural 
areas or lack financial resources. In this respect, the Spanish Law of Voluntary 
Termination of Pregnancy, of 2010, stresses that the right to conscientious 
objection must not prevent women from exercising their right to voluntarily 
terminate their pregnancy (Art. 19.2).
9) The status of the embryo with regard to patents. In 2011, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union issued a sentence that caused a great commotion, as it 
maintained that, “every human egg, after fertilization, must be considered a 
human embryo […] bearing in mind that fertilization can initiate the process 
of development of a human being”.63
This sentence has been used by movements opposed to abortion as an ar-
gument in their favour (for example, in a dissenting opinion by members of 
the Spanish General Council of the Judiciary.)64 Nevertheless, nothing could 
be further from the truth, since the sentence was issued in the context of the 
 62 Resolution 1763/2010, of 7 October 2010, of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
on the right to conscientious objection in healthcare.
 63 Sentence of 18 October 2011. TJCE\2011\316.
 64 General Council of the Judiciary. Dissenting opinion of members Nuria Díaz Abad and Juan Ma-
nuel Fernández Martínez on the report on the draft bill of the Organic Law for the protection of the 
unborn child and the rights of the pregnant woman.
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application of patents, specifically, of Directive 98/44/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, of 6 July 1998, relative to the legal protection 
of biotechnological inventions. 
Therefore, the sentence was intended to define which parts or elements of 
the human body may not be the object of biotechnological patents, specifi-
cally excluding the human embryo for the reason given above, in a context in 
which fragments of human DNA had begun to be patented in the USA. The 
sentence had nothing whatsoever to do with the termination of pregnancy in 
Europe or with embryonic stem cell research, also taken from embryos and 
legal in many European countries.
In sum, the situation of the voluntary termination of pregnancy in Europe 
reproduces the cultural, geographical, religious and ideological complexity of 
the continent, and for this reason we have been unable to show a single con-
sistent and indubitable policy or law with regard to it.
Despite this, we can argue that in Europe: a) countries are free to decide 
whether or not to regulate the termination of pregnancy; b) the majority have 
opted for a system of time limits, following the recommendations of the 
Council of Europe and the European Union; c) the weight of the Catholic 
religion restricts, making it unviable, the termination of pregnancy in Ireland 
and Poland, despite the fact that their laws permit it in certain cases; d) the 
European Court of Human Rights has established that, once countries allow 
the possibility of having an abortion in their legislation, they must not prevent 
it indirectly by imposing unnecessary formal requirements or pressuring wom-
en; e) the court gives priority to a minor who has been sexually assaulted over 
and above the opinion of her parents, in the event that they are opposed to 
abortion; and f ) lastly, the status conferred on the embryo by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union refers solely and exclusively to the impossibility 
of obtaining patents for it, without this in any way affecting the termination of 
pregnancy or embryonic stem cell research.
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5	 assisted reproduction
1. Introduction1 
Assisted reproduction techniques offer the possibility of being biological par-
ents to people who, without the help of these biotechnological advances, would 
not be able to have children. In our context, these techniques are used to treat 
medical problems, and to respond to social demands and the personal situa-
tions of individuals or couples. Their use has led to a rethink on numerous 
issues that it was believed were established,2 the concepts of paternity or ma-
ternity especially.
The widespread use of assisted reproduction techniques has made it neces-
sary to come to terms with unprecedented situations, concepts and ideas, such 
as preimplantation diagnosis, genetic counselling, dissociation between ge-
netic material and maternity, the possibility of mixing several people’s DNA, 
and sex selection. In an atmosphere of widespread controversy in society, they 
are all in need of specific regulation. Furthermore, assisted reproduction tech-
niques have opened the doors to research subjects, inconceivable until very 
recently, totally unconnected to reproduction, such as therapeutic cloning or 
the use of embryonic stem cells to obtain all kinds of human body cells.
As is usually the case in bioethics, the advantages that they bring come 
with problems that are hard to define. For example, the interrelationship be-
tween the new reproductive possibilities and the existing laws in Spain has 
given women more autonomy when it comes to being mothers, even without 
the need for a male, but as a side effect it has also generated new forms of pres-
 1 This chapter is based on the previous articles by Casado, M. (1997) “Reproducción humana asistida: 
los problemas que suscita desde la bioética y el derecho”, Papers 53, pp. 37-44, and López Baroni, 
M. J. (2015) “Bioética y Multiculturalismo: Políticas Públicas en España (1978-2013). El hecho cultural 
ante la revolución biotecnológica”. University of Barcelona, pp. 289 and 290.
 2 Unless otherwise stated, when talking about assisted reproduction reference is made to artificial in-
semination (homologous, with material from the couple, and heterologous, with material from the 
donor) and in vitro fertilization and its different techniques.
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sure, the most extreme being the objectification and commercialization of 
their bodies.3
Spain was one of the first countries to have specific legislation on the sub-
ject, in 1988, despite being heavily criticized at the time. Nevertheless, this law 
represented very important progress because, by regulating in detail the use of 
assisted reproduction techniques, it gave healthcare personnel, clinics and us-
ers essential legal certainty. In addition it contributed to the legitimization and 
normali zation of their use, which generated a favourable perception in society, 
due to the guarantee that this law represented, because, as is well known, the 
law fulfils the function of legitimizing the behaviours that it regulates and does 
not prohibit.
Moreover, this law placed us in the orbit of the more advanced countries 
culturally close to Spain, since it followed the guidelines set by the Council of 
Europe since 1978 and those established in several international reports. Among 
these documents one must mention those by the Warnock Committee (Unit-
ed Kingdom, 1984) and the Benda Committee (West Germany, 1985), the 
immediate precedents of the Palacios Report, approved by the Spanish parlia-
ment in 1986 and which paved the way for Spain to become scientifically and 
socially modern. 
2.  Regulation of assisted reproduction  
techniques in Spain
As we have said, human assisted reproduction was first regulated in Spain in 
the 1980s through Law 35/1988, of 22 November, of Assisted Reproduction 
Techniques, and Law 42/1988, of 28 December, on the Donation and Use of 
Human Embryos and Foetuses or of their Cells, Tissues and Organs.
With these two laws the aim was to protect the fundamental rights of par-
ents, children and donors of genetic material, and those of surrogate mothers, 
inspired by the principle of the protection of the child rather than by the couple’s 
point of view. Thus, issues were regulated such as homologous artificial insemi-
nation, with special consideration given to it post mortem, heterologous artifi-
cial insemination (by donor) performed in stable heterosexual couples and in 
single women, in vitro fertilization in its different cases, the matter of the legal 
 3 See the interesting analysis by G. Sarrible in “The Not So Sacred Image of Motherhood”, in Young 
Women and Life Choices (by various authors), a monographic study carried out under the auspices of 
UNFPA, published by Sid Occasinel Publication Series, Rome, May 1992.
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status of embryos, surrogate motherhood, the filiation of children born using 
these techniques, the characteristics of the donation of genetic elements and the 
different responsibilities deriving from assisted reproduction techniques.
The question of paternity was resolved by following a criterion of formal 
adjudication of paternity, derived from having previously agreed to it in writing 
— in an authenticated document — when accessing the techniques. It is inter-
esting to point out that, after centuries of struggling to be able to establish the 
biological father’s paternity, claiming for it the free investigation of paternity,4 
the material criterion gave way to the formal one with assisted reproduction 
techniques, as also occurs with adoption. Maternity is established by giving 
birth, a physical event that determines filiation whatever the origins of the 
genetic material. With regard to donors, the law established the principle of 
gratuity, making the clinic responsible for the health data, as anyone could be 
a donor. Additionally, the law allowed for general information about the do-
nor but not their identification. This was one of the reasons why the law was 
challenged, which led to an intermediate solution being adopted of allowing 
research but not granting it legal effects.
An important aspect that must be taken into account is that both Law 
35/1988 and Law 42/1988 regulated issues referring to life prospects. The first 
one defined the concepts of “pre-embryo”, “embryo” and “foetus”. Given that 
birth determines legal status, we must point out that the embryo does not pos-
sess rights, since these are only possessed by persons. Embryos are legally pro-
tected assets, but they cannot be considered to be persons or individuals. For 
this reason, they do not possess fundamental rights. The doctrine of the Con-
stitutional Court restricts the protection of the legal system to persons, hence 
life is a fundamental right related to birth.
Moreover, for the law to protect the embryo it must be alive, developing, and 
this prompts especially relevant questions: must surplus embryos, created in 
vitro, be destroyed? Can they be used in experiments? If they are conserved, 
until when? If there are defects can they be genetically modified and reimplant-
ed? The law permitted manipulations for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes 
only: any intervention in the embryo or the foetus must be for the purposes of 
its wellbeing. 
A complex question is the distinction between viable and unviable em-
bryos, a distinction established many years ago by law with respect to the 
 4 Until the Constitution of 1978 was passed, investigation of paternity was prohibited in the Spanish 
Civil Code in the interests of a paternalistic and traditional idea of the family unit.
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person. The law of 1988 established that research could be carried out with 
unviable embryos (those that, if they were transferred to a woman, would not 
lead to a viable pregnancy); and that viable embryos, but not transferred, could 
be frozen for a maximum period of five years. However, the law did not estab-
lish what would happen after that time, thus generating a great deal of doubt 
and hesitation. While some argued that they should be able to do research 
with these (viable) embryos, others considered that they could only be trans-
ferred to women (whether or not they were the owners of the said embryos).
Moreover, one must remember that the two laws of 1988 were each the 
subject of a non-constitutionality appeal by a group of Partido Popular MPs. 
Among other arguments, they said that the Law of Assisted Reproduction af-
fected the structure of the family and the development of the child’s personal-
ity, as it allowed women to be able to use assisted reproduction techniques 
without having a male partner.5 The Constitutional Court rejected this appeal 
in 1999, basing itself on the famous sentence of 1985 that declared abortion to 
be constitutional.6 Furthermore, the court upheld in its reasoning that the 
Constitution does not regulate one single type of family, opening up the range 
of possibilities to single-parent families and to the irrelevance of the sexual 
variable (the declaration of same-sex marriage as constitutional, almost 20 years 
later, consolidated precisely this line of argument).7
As the Constitutional Court rejected the appeals, in 2003 the Partido Pop-
ular reformed the 1988 Law of Assisted Reproduction (which had been passed 
by the Socialists). The reform was particularly conservative, as it hindered both 
the possibility of researching with pre-embryos, and in vitro fertilization. It 
prevented more than three pre-embryos in each cycle from being created, which 
moreover could only be used for procreation purposes, and not research. With 
this, if the attempt to get pregnant failed, the whole process would have to be 
repeated, with the cost, in terms of health and finances, that this represented 
 5 “The same incongruence can be ascribed to other passages of the law: while the exposition of reasons 
refers to the ‘human couple’ — which would per se disregard the constitutional protection of mar-
riage — article 6 refers to the ‘single woman’, or any woman; the allusion to the fundamental rights 
and freedoms in the exposition of reasons would merely be an obvious example of the perversion of 
the language which subverts the system and supposes an arbitrariness by the legislator, which the 
Court is called upon to put a stop to. The object, in principle praiseworthy, of the law would eventu-
ally lead to a substantial alteration of the concept of the family and the rights of children; by making 
conception by single women possible, keeping the father — the donor — anonymous.” Constitu-
tional Court (Plenary), Sentence no. 116/1999 of 17 June; RTC 1999\116.
 6 Sentence no. 53/1985, of 11 April, of the Constitutional Court, RTC 1985\53.
 7 Constitutional Court (Plenary), Sentence no. 116/1999 of 17 June; RTC 1999\116; and 12/1996. Both 
sentences outline and improve ST 53/1985 mentioned in the previous note.
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for women. The ultimate aim of this reform was to adapt artificial reproduc-
tion to Catholic doctrine, ensuring that there would be no motherless pre-
embryos.
In 2006, with the Socialists back in power, this issue was reformed once 
again through Law 14/2006, of 26 May, on Human Assisted Reproduction 
Techniques. The most novel thing about this law, still in force, is that it al-
lowed for the creation of pre-embryos that were necessary to ensure reproduc-
tion, that is, that more than three pre-embryos could be created (although 
they could only be transferred to the woman three at a time, to avoid multiple 
births). Given that in this way surplus embryos were generated, the law al-
lowed them to be used in research, destroyed, or frozen for use in procreation 
later. 
This law establishes that in order to undergo this treatment there must be 
“reasonable possibilities of success”. This is a euphemistic way of referring to 
the age of the prospective mother, a reference that is completed with article 6.2 
of the Law of Assisted Reproduction, which requires the woman to be in-
formed of the risks for the offspring “that may result from maternity at a 
clinically inappropriate age”. The problem of “grandmother-mothers”, women 
at an advanced age who can, based on these techniques, get pregnant, is not 
clearly dealt with in the law.
Lastly, reproductive cloning is prohibited, thus indirectly permitting ther-
apeutic cloning, very useful for research (for example, for the obtainment of 
embryonic stem cells).8
3. Social aspects of assisted reproduction
At the present time the debate about certain issues involved in the use of these 
techniques is ongoing, since increasingly widespread access to human assisted 
reproduction techniques requires an analysis that takes into account the finan-
cial aspects and the repercussions with regard to access to biological resources 
in the health system. The French National Ethics Committee, always a point 
of reference in these issues, has repeatedly and clearly pointed out that very 
profound changes are taking place in the way of conceiving a child (and in 
 8 Thus, article 36.2 of the Law of Biomedical Research establishes that “2. The use of any technique for 
obtaining human stem cells is permitted, for therapeutic purposes or for research, which does not 
entail the creation of a pre-embryo or of an embryo exclusively for this purpose, in the terms defined 
in this law, including the activation of oocytes through nuclear transfer”.
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what it means to be parents), as forms of procreation are evolving quickly and 
the technological limits are shifting to extremes that until recently were un-
thinkable.9 It is therefore necessary to pay very close attention to the ethical 
aspects and to try to construct an informed social debate to permit decision 
making on legal policy in keeping with the feelings of society. 
Furthermore, it may be said that society’s attitude to assisted reproduc-
tion is currently one of widespread acceptance, although this is set against a 
backdrop of moral and religious ideas opposed to it. It is interesting to point 
out that in its doctrine, the Catholic Church is opposed to it, but in practice 
it does not insist on its prohibition — unlike in other issues, abortion espe-
cially. The other major religions, Orthodox, Judaism and Islam, are not in 
favour of the use of assisted reproduction techniques either; the minority Re-
formed Churches are rather more permissive.
From radically different positions, the consideration of respect for women’s 
rights means that feminist analyses are not in favour of these techniques either. 
The belief that in certain cases women are put under pressure, that the infor-
mation is not as explicit as it ought to be with regard to the highly intrusive 
nature of the procedures (egg donation, for example), and the idea that in-
formed consent is neither so informed nor so free in some cases, leads them to 
wonder whether there might be some obscure areas behind the undoubted 
advantages that should be made clear and debated together.
It is clear that the same traditionally patriarchal approaches underpin the 
new technologies. What is presented as an achievement for women has im-
portant costs that must be taken into account, since once the process has 
begun control over it is completely out of their hands, and what is considered 
to be a new reproductive option could turn into a new form of oppression. 
The existence of other alternative choices must be made clear, such as adop-
tion; it must be remembered that success rates are low, in some assisted repro-
duction techniques especially; and if they fail, having to accept sterility over 
and again — and definitively — generates further suffering. 
Society must decide if the right to life also implies the acknowledgement 
of the right to create life, and what the reach and limits of reproductive rights 
are. Does the right to have children at all costs exist? Although this question 
refers not only to the financial aspect, we should not lose sight of the fact that 
the distribution of resources is a problem of the first order with regard to 
 9 Comité Consultatif National d’Éthique pour les Sciences de la Vie et de la Santé, Avis 126, de 2017 
sur les demandes sociétales de recours a l’assistance médicale a la procréation. www.ccne-ethique.fr/fr/ 
publications/avis-du-ccne-du-15-juin-2017-sur-les-demandes-societales-de-recours-lassistance.
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health. Healthcare budgets are necessarily limited and the costs of health in-
crease in step with the standard of living and the possibilities of the technique. 
This implies that costs must be limited, which means choosing priorities in the 
population’s healthcare. Services and their financing must be placed in order 
of importance according to the priorities of the population to which public 
health programmes are addressed. We shall now refer to the principal points 
that are currently being debated.
3.1. Sex selection
Every cell in the human body contains a double set of chromosomes, except 
for eggs and sperms, which only have one set. Since assisted reproduction 
makes it possible to isolate sperms, it is possible to know if they carry a Y or an 
X chromosome, in other words, if they will give rise to a male or a female. This 
information makes it possible to choose the sex of one’s children, which could 
have great repercussions in biomedicine. 
Natural selection has evened out the birth of boys and girls, although the 
proportion is not exactly 50%, which allows us to deduce that the alteration of 
this proportion on a large scale could have repercussions for the survival of our 
species. For this reason, we wonder whether we should replace the randomness 
inherent in pregnancy with a conscious and deliberate choice of one sex or the 
other; and, in this case, what requirements should be met. We must take into 
account that socio-political factors have historically favoured one of the sexes. 
For example, in China, a collateral effect of the one-child policy was that in 
just a few decades the male population exceeded the female. The reason for 
this is that, in an eminently agricultural economy where physical strength is 
important, parents resorted to killing baby girls to ensure that the only legally 
permitted child would be a boy. Studying this issue in detail, Amartya Sen, the 
winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1998, demonstrated with figures 
that there were more than one hundred million fewer women in southeast 
Asia,10 the consequence of the policies of exclusion in both education and 
healthcare. These precedents explain the precaution with which the idea that 
couples should be allowed to choose their children’s sex is approached.
There is on the other hand no justification for preventing sex selection in 
specific cases (family balance, for example; a couple who, hoping for a girl, are 
 10 Sen, A. (1995). Nueva Economía del bienestar. Escritos seleccionados. University of Valencia, p. 361.
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going to have their fourth boy) and/or in socio-political contexts where the 
ratio of men to women remains stable. Indeed, if assisted reproduction allows 
for countless choices related to parenthood, how does one justify that chil-
dren’s sex cannot be chosen too? From this perspective, it is considered that the 
prohibition on choosing the sex of one’s children is an unjustified taboo and 
that, even from the point of view of the social situation in the countries we 
have mentioned, pre-implantation selection is better than subsequent female 
infanticide. It would be enough, therefore, to impose reasonable requirements 
so that parents may exercise this option (for example, having more than one 
child of the same sex).
Notwithstanding that, article 26.c.10 of the Spanish Law of Assisted Re-
production regards sex selection that is not for therapeutic ends, or for unau-
thorized therapeutic ends, as a very serious infringement, and stipulates fines 
of up to one million euros. In other words, selection is only permitted in the 
event of the existence of hereditary diseases linked to the X or Y chromosome.11 
It is a very widespread prohibition, established also in article 14 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Bioethics. However, an important fact is that sex selec-
tion is not punishable in criminal law. Articles 159 and 160 of the Criminal 
Code penalize the fertilization of eggs for purposes other than procreation, 
reproductive cloning, procedures directed at race selection and altering the 
genotype other than for therapeutic reasons, but not sex selection, whereby we 
may infer that society does not disapprove of it as strongly as it does other 
practices associated with assisted reproduction or genetic manipulation.12
 11 In a court in Mataró a 45-year-old woman, the mother of five male children, requested that sex selec-
tion be accepted in order to conceive a female. The judge issued a favourable ruling on 2 August 
1990, against which the prosecutor, who had already issued an unfavourable report, appealed. The 
Audiencia de Barcelona revoked the ruling of the court in Mataró on 12 November 1990, and in the 
higher court’s ruling it stated that it is “the mother for the child and not the child for the mother”. 
On the contrary, in favour of sex selection, see Eguzcue (1993). “Sex Selection: Why Not?”. Human 
Reproduction, vol. 8, no. 11, p. 1777.
 12 The objective of the first preimplantation genetic diagnosis was precisely to ascertain the sex of the 
embryo in certain families that were known to be carriers of gender-linked diseases (Alan Handyside, 
1990). The question is whether there may be more causes, besides medical ones, that justify sex selec-
tion. In February 2003, the Bioethics and Law Observatory published a Document on Sex Selection 
which urged the public authorities to legalize sex selection by parents. Some of the recommendations 
were the following: “2. Although it is not possible to speak of the existence of a right to choose the 
sex of one’s future children, we consider it unreasonable for the state to prohibit it — as is currently 
the case — and that it should be authorized if reliable techniques exist and if the means employed 
for it are proportional to the end it is desired to achieve: 3. Sex selection through the selection of 
spermatozoids for the reason of satisfying the preferences of the parents, should be authorized”. Casa-
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Sex selection — its rejection for non-therapeutic reasons — has in fact 
been the only case that has given rise to the intervention of the courts in Spain.
Lastly, sex selection confronts us with the alternative that places making de-
cisions according to strictly individual criteria in opposition to resolving matters 
in accordance with the collective interest. From legal and ethical, medical and 
sociological points of view, the free selection of the sex of one’s children generates 
problems that may be resolved differently if one considers it to be simply an 
individual decision, or as something that has repercussions in the community. 
This leads us to the fundamental dilemma between the individual’s rights and 
those of the group: to what extent can an individual be asked to renounce their 
best interests on behalf of a generic group?
The very idea of the world and society will be decisive when identifying the 
interests at stake and establishing what values should be protected and their 
order of importance. The conclusions reached must be compared with those 
of society as a whole in a free and informed discussion. The existence of a par-
ticular law does not definitively settle the issue: laws and society are mutually 
interrelated and the evolution and the life of both are largely derived from this 
influence.
3.2. Oocyte donation
Oocyte donation poses specific problems, including the debate about whether 
simple compensation should be established or there should be a payment for 
donation. Bearing in mind that the oocyte donor has to undergo a treatment 
not without its risks and make a number of journeys to the clinic, compensa-
tion is considered acceptable. In Spain, the amount of compensation paid 
must follow homogeneous criteria and be set by the government, as proposed 
by the scientific companies involved and the assisted reproduction clinics.
Nevertheless there is fierce debate, since although the gratuity rule in do-
nation is still in force, in a context of the commercialization of interpersonal 
relationships and of the trafficking of the human body, the discussion about 
whether compensation is actually that or a concealed payment is a very rele-
vant one, even more so when the economic crisis allows financial incentive to 
“buy the willingness” to do what is praised as caring and altruistic. It is known 
do, M. (coord.). Document on Sex Selection. Bioethics and Law Observatory, February 2003, at 
http:// hdl.handle.net/2445/11371.
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that given the differences between average and low salaries in neighbouring 
countries, what for some is compensation may for others clearly be regarded as 
payment. This has given rise to several cases of so-called donor tourism — yet 
another form of reproductive tourism that takes place in a globalized world 
due to the differences in the law and spending power between countries. 
In 2001 the Bioethics and Law Observatory published a Document on Oo-
cyte Donation in which,13 among other considerations, it made the following 
recommendations: a) be especially rigorous with the information supplied to 
potential donors, information that should describe the risks, both present and 
future, in as much detail as possible; b) a civil liability insurance policy should 
be created, thus avoiding the consequences of the hypothetical contingencies 
falling on the healthcare personnel or the public administrations; c) the au-
thorities should set a level of compensation according to fair and uniform 
criteria, bearing in mind both the potential dangers to which donors are ex-
posed and the opinion of the scientific companies involved and the assisted 
reproduction clinics; and lastly, d) the campaigns used to capture possible 
donors should not be advertisements to encourage it, but they should provide 
serious thorough information.
3.3. Cryopreservation of oocytes by young women 
The other side of the coin of this technology is that, due to the demands of 
their job, many women freeze their eggs for when they may hopefully enjoy 
job stability; they are sometimes prompted to do so by the company they work 
for, as has happened with Apple and Facebook. This, which may be seen as an 
achievement, also has its downside, since it shows us how assisted reproduc-
tion techniques can be used to perpetuate or mask job insecurity, especially 
women’s.
In France, for example, this practice is prohibited if it is not for therapeutic 
purposes (before chemo- or radiotherapy treatment, for example), but cryo-
preservation is increasingly widespread as a precaution with a view to a possi-
ble late pregnancy due to having to postpone maternity for work reasons. 
Given that the hormonal stimulation and egg extraction procedures are not 
innocuous, we consider that society must reconsider the social model that 
forces women to suffer this tremendous age imbalance between getting preg-
 13 Document on Oocyte Donation, at http://hdl.handle.net/2445/11372.
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nant and working. What is more, with this a new market is generated that, for 
reasons of proportionality, medical expenses, the lack of guarantees in the re-
sults and even the need to ask for them, is hard to defend.14
3.4. Donor anonymity
Spain is one of the countries where most in vitro fertilizations are performed, 
due, among other things, to the fact that its legislation ensures egg donors’ 
anonymity. Indeed, the general rule is, in principle, anonymity, although the 
law establishes two important exceptions: a) a minor or her representatives 
may obtain general information about the nature of the donor. This right is 
also enjoyed by the woman receiving gametes or pre-embryos; b) in the event 
of danger to the woman’s life and health, or if it is essential in criminal pro-
ceedings, the clinic must reveal the donor’s identity. Even so, the information 
does not imply publicity about donors; it can only be used to avoid danger or to 
achieve the proposed legal end, and it does not generate reciprocal rights or 
responsibilities (maintenance payments, inheritance, etc.).
Donor anonymity is currently a controversial subject and there seems to be 
a tendency to lift anonymity. Several countries have reversed it and have seen 
donations fall drastically; for this reason, clinics are opposed to it and justify 
the permanence of the current legislation.
The fact is that anonymity goes against the increasingly widespread tendency 
to acknowledge the existence of the so-called right to know one’s origins (which 
is not disputed in the case of adoption, for example). This right of the child to 
know their biological origins leads ultimately to the disclosure of the identity of 
the person who supplied the genetic material, even when it is not necessary for 
health reasons, simply because it is a right in itself.
In this respect, the Bioethics Committee of Catalonia has recently issued a 
ruling on this matter in which, still with some reluctance, it advocates for it to 
be possible to know donors’ identity. Specifically, conclusion number 12 reads 
as follows:
The consequences that may result from the suppression of anonymity in the case 
of gamete donation cannot be reasons for the state depriving the person con-
ceived with gametes from a donor of an important aspect of their life: the free-
 14 On this point see the abovementioned Avis 126, of the French CCNE, 2017.
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dom to choose what significance they attach to the genetic components of their 
identity.15
In fact it depends on how article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child is interpreted, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 20 
November 1989 and ratified by Spain on 26 January 1990, in which it estab-
lishes that children have the right, as far as is possible, to know their parents 
and be cared for by them.
Although we shall analyse it in greater detail in the next section, we must 
point out that the Portuguese Constitutional Court has declared the law per-
mitting surrogate motherhood and the anonymity of oocyte donors to be un-
constitutional.16 The sentence maintains that children’s right to know who 
their parents are in a genetic sense (egg and sperm donors) prevails over the 
latters’ legal right to anonymity up to now. Some have interpreted that this 
part of the sentence is a form of boycotting not surrogate motherhood but 
assisted reproduction techniques (this same court, although with a different 
composition, had years earlier ruled in favour of anonymity), as it will reduce 
the already scant donations even further. We must add that this is the first 
time that egg donors’ right to anonymity has been declared unconstitutional, 
something that sooner or later could affect the rest of the continent. 
Lastly, the advances in biocomputing and the creation of huge genetic 
databases are making anonymity a thing of the past, since it is increasingly easy, 
both technically and financially, to take a sample from a person and locate their 
genetic parents.
3.5. Saviour siblings
In vitro reproduction techniques make it possible to create several embryos, 
the reason why their usefulness transcends the objective of reproduction, go-
ing as far as those typical of biomedicine. Indeed, when choosing which em-
bryos are transferred to a woman (legally no more than three), the ones are 
chosen that a priori seem to be in the best state to ensure a viable pregnancy. 
That is, three pre-embryos are chosen from the group created, and the selec-
tion criterion is not chance, but the greatest viability to ensure pregnancy. 
 15 Terribas Sala, N.; Farnós Amorós, E. (coords.) (2016). El derecho a conocer los orígenes biológicos 
y genéticos de la persona. Bioethics Committee of Catalonia.
 16 Constitutional Court. Sentence 225/18, May 2018.
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However, this selection may be made not just from the point of view of achiev-
ing pregnancy, but also with the aim of avoiding the development of chromo-
somal or genetic anomalies, some of which may be hereditary. This is what 
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis is for, to ensure that not only does the 
transferred pre-embryo have more possibilities of development, but also that 
it is free of potential anomalies that may result in illnesses in the near future. 
In the case we are now looking at, prenatal diagnosis is used to select pre-
embryos that not only meet the above requirements (viability for the preg-
nancy, absence of certain chromosomal or genetic anomalies) but which in 
addition are histologically compatible with other siblings already born but 
which are sick. The usefulness of the saviour sibling for a brother or sister (it 
could also be used to help its parents) lies in the possibility of obtaining he-
matopoietic (blood) stem cells from the umbilical cord, or in the possible 
performance of a bone marrow transplant.
In fact the search for siblings whose blood might be compatible with a sick 
child is not new, but in the past it was carried out using random methods (for 
example, engendering a child by natural methods in the hope of it being com-
patible and, if it were not, trying again and again, without any legal limits). 
This explains why the debate on this subject did not begin in earnest until the 
year 2000,17 when pre-embryos were selected for the first time with the aim of 
saving or helping a child already born.
The Law of Assisted Reproduction of 2006 legalized this kind of medical 
action, justifying its moral legitimacy in the preamble:
Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis opens up new pathways in the prevention of 
genetic diseases for which treatment is presently lacking, and to the possibility 
of selecting pre-embryos so that, in certain cases and under the proper administra-
tive control and authorization, they may help to save the life of the sick relative.
The term saviour sibling, besides not being very scientific, is in fact pejora-
tive and has been created by people opposed not to the selection of pre-embry-
os but to any progress in biomedicine that is contrary to the doctrine of the 
Catholic Church.18 
 17 Pinto Palacios, F.; Marcos del Cano, A. (2016). “‘Bebé medicamento’, protección de la salud y sistema 
sanitario público: una reflexión desde el principio de justicia”. Universitas, no. 24, pp. 243-265.
 18 The comparison between moral and religious ideas is also worth bearing in mind. Thus, the re-
proaches aimed at the family that had the first saviour sibling were answered in the following way: 
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The prohibition of this kind of medical intervention is part of a narrative 
that also justifies the prohibition of in vitro fertilization, divorce and contra-
ception, with the underlying danger, always present in this kind of imposition, 
of a slippery slope that ends in a political theocracy where any kind of thinking 
at odds with the clergy is pursued (the American Protestant neocons include 
the spreading of creationism in schools in the narrative package).
Indeed, behind the moralistic appearance of expressions such as instru-
mentalization of life, a violation of the Kantian mandate (treat every individ-
ual as an end in him or herself, and not merely as an instrument), or the listing 
of the countless psychological calamities that await the pre-embryo thus se-
lected, there lies hidden a monolithic and fundamentalist narrative that wants 
the entire population to be governed solely and exclusively by axioms based on 
blind and unthinking faith. There are many Catholics who use the latest re-
productive techniques, which shows once again that the problem does not lie 
in the beliefs but in those who try to impose theirs and use apparently scien-
tific arguments to universalize theological statements. As the title of the excel-
lent study by Fernando Pinto stresses, saviour siblings are “born to save”, and 
that is the perspective from which we must examine this issue.19
3.6. Surrogate motherhood
Few issues arouse more debates in bioethics than the question of surrogate 
motherhood, hence there is not even any agreement over what to call it. Thus, 
we can find a range of expressions that oscillate between the pejorative (for 
example “wombs for rent”) and the euphemistic (“gestation by substitution”), 
with achromatic shades such as the heading of this section.
Basically, through this practice a woman engenders a child that has been 
ordered by another or others, and then hands it over, either paid for or free 
of charge, to those persons (called clients). The gestation may be the result of 
completely alien genetic material or with her own eggs, a matter that has im-
portant repercussions as far as the facility of the procedure to achieve preg-
nancy and the connection of the intended parents with the future child are 
concerned.
“They claimed that their decision sought to preserve the good of the family and that, in accordance with 
Jewish law, they were obliged to use all the means at their disposal to preserve Molly’s life.” Ibid.
 19 Pinto Palacios, F. (2015). Nacidos para salvar. Un análisis ético-jurídico del “bebé medicamento”. 
UNED.
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The embryo may contain genetic material of the gestating mother (she 
provides the egg) or not (the egg or the embryo is donated by a third party); 
the embryo may contain genetic material of the man and the woman who 
order the surrogate motherhood (they supply the egg and the sperm); it may 
contain genetic material of just one of the two (for instance in the case of 
same-sex couples); or even of neither of them (as in the case of the donation or 
even the purchase of this material).20
In an extreme situation, up to five people could take part in the surrogate 
motherhood: the gestating mother, the couple who eventually take the child, 
and a man and a woman who supply the sperms and oocytes but who are un-
connected with the previous ones. And if on top of that there is donation of 
mitochondrial DNA, we could include a sixth person. 
There are additionally many intermediate problems: the possibility of 
abortion, the possibility of the baby being born with health issues, of the fault 
lying with the gestating mother for not looking after herself; or with the egg 
donors due to genetic problems, with the hospital, or a third party, or chance; 
that the gestating mother wants to keep the baby and break the contract, that it 
is the contracting parties who decide not to continue with it once pregnancy has 
begun, that there is a multiple pregnancy and they have not agreed on what to 
do with the surplus embryos. Other aspects that have to be taken into account 
are the rights of the child to know who its biological parents are; the legal prob-
lems derived from the fact that fertilization takes place in one country, the con-
tract is signed in another, the birth takes place in a third country and the hand-
over in a fourth, or contractual problems arising from the participation of third 
parties (oocyte donors, intermediaries, etc.), among other things.
 20 In a sentence of the European Court of Human Rights, Italy was condemned because it withdrew 
parental authority from a couple over a minor who had been conceived in Russia through a com-
pany in the surrogate motherhood business (in Russia it is legal). It was discussed whether for sur-
rogate motherhood to be legal, the genetic material had to be from at least one of the contracting 
parties. In Russia this question is not regulated, but it was deduced that the genetic material could 
be donated by third parties without this preventing it from being a surrogate motherhood (the argu-
ment of the Russian lawyer of an intermediary company was really ingenious: the fact that the couple 
have to provide genetic material does not mean that it actually has to be theirs, as there is nothing to 
stop them from buying it in an egg bank and, then, yes, supplying it...); and from the court’s sen-
tence, condemnatory for Italy, it must also be inferred that it is not necessary for the genetic mate-
rial to be from one of the contracting parties for it to be considered a legal case of surrogate mother-
hood. Moreover, the Court considered that checking whether the father was the biological father or 
not was an interference proscribed by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights (section 2). Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy. Sentence of 27 January 
2015. A similar problem justified the condemnation of France in Mennesson v. France. Sentence of 
26 June 2014. European Court of Human Rights. JUR 2014/176908.
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The French National Ethics Committee, mentioned above, has repeatedly 
shown itself to be opposed to the practice and has insisted on the dangers for 
the gestating mother and the instrumentalization and commercialization 
of the people involved; it also refutes legitimization based on an idea of au-
tonomy that entails a “mutation anthropologique majeure” and the de facto 
prioritization of the clients’ interests.21
To understand the position of Spanish legislation, which, as we have said, 
declares these types of contracts null and void,22 we have to distinguish three 
paradigms.
The first would advocate the possibility of a woman offering herself as a 
gestating mother for a price.23 It would be a neoliberal model in which some-
one offers their body like any other good or service. It would be based on the 
contractual freedom typical of a pure capitalist system. Who best describes this 
paradigm is a lawyers’ association with 400,000 members:
The American Bar Association observes that, “it is undeniable that the hiring of 
services for gestating children by substitution in return for money represents a 
market”. It praises this “market” and it observes that, “market-based mechanisms 
have made the efficient functioning of gestation by substitution possible interna-
tionally”. The American Bar Association rejects that the rule of the child’s higher 
interest be applied to gestation by substitution, it rejects most of the forms of 
examining suitability and assessing the competence of the aspiring parents, it 
rejects that limits be imposed on the payments made to surrogate mothers and 
gamete donors, it rejects that requirements for the issuing of licenses be imposed 
on gestation by substitution agencies, it rejects the rights to birth certificates or 
to information about personal origins, it rejects the Hague Convention on the 
Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption 
(1993) […]. The American Bar Association claims that, “any and all efforts that 
are addressed to regulating the international gestation by substitution market in 
itself are on the wrong track”. In fact, it advocates that all international instru-
 21 See Avis 110 of 2010, Problèmes éthiques soulevés par la gestation pour autrui, and the abovementioned 
Avis 126 of 2017 of the CNNE, at www.ccne-ethique.fr/fr/publications/problemes-ethiques-souleves-
par-la-gestation-pour-autrui-gpa.
 22 The Supreme Court recalled in a sentence that this solution is in keeping with that recommended 
in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on the Progress of Biomedical Sciences, CAHBI, 
of the Council of Europe. Supreme Court. Civil Court. Sentence no. 835/2013, of 6 February. RJ, 
2014/833.
 23 On this point, see Lamm, E. (2018). “Gestación por sustitución y género: repensando el feminismo.” 
In: García Manrique, R. (coord.). El cuerpo diseminado. Estatuto, uso y disposición de los biomate-
riales humanos. Aranzadi.
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ments in matters of gestation by substitution should dispense with the human 
rights dimension; hence it rejects the “regulation of the gestation by substitution 
industry for the purposes of reducing human rights violations”.24
The nightmare scenario that we can imagine is the creation of farms of 
women in developing countries so that couples from industrialized countries 
can go there to look for a mother for their babies, that is, the exploitation on 
an industrial scale, through bioethical tourism, of surrogate motherhood. Be-
sides, what difference is there between selling a child and surrogate mother-
hood at a price? In California, where these kinds of practices are permitted, it 
is considered child selling if the contract is signed during pregnancy (or after 
birth), but it is not child selling if it is signed before pregnancy. The distinction 
could not be more arbitrary: what if it is signed between the creation of the 
embryo and its transfer to the woman? Can it be signed after transfer, but 
before it attaches to the uterus? Can it be signed retroactively?
This is the paradigm that the Spanish Supreme Court categorically rejects:
But along with it, in our legal system and in that of the majority of countries 
with legal systems based on similar principles and values, it is not accepted that 
the spread of adoption, even international, and the advances in human assisted 
reproduction techniques may infringe the dignity of the gestating woman and 
the child, commercializing gestation and filiation, objectifying the pregnant 
woman and the child, allowing certain intermediaries to profit from them, mak-
ing possible the exploitation of the state of need in which poverty-stricken young 
women find themselves and creating a sort of selective citizenry in which only 
those who have high financial resources can establish parent-child relationships 
that are out of reach for the majority of the population.25 
The second paradigm would advocate the same possibility, but without a 
price, that is, for free. Only the expenses generated by the operation would be 
paid (health care, postnatal care, etc.). The criticism that is usually made in 
this case is that a concealed market would be generated, as it is difficult to 
understand why a woman would undergo a pregnancy of this kind if she has 
 24 United Nations Organization, Special Rapporteur’s report on the sale and sexual exploitation of 
children, including child prostitution, the use of children in pornography and other material that 
shows the sexual abuse of children. Council of Human Rights. 37 period of sessions. 26 February to 
23 March 2018.
 25 Supreme Court. Civil section. Sentence no. 835/2013, of 6 February. RJ, 2014/833.
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no previous dealings with the potential parents. However, this was the model 
proposed in 1989 by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on Pro-
gress in the Biomedical Sciences (CAHBI), the predecessor of the Steering 
Committee on Bioethics, when it recommended that:
1)  No doctor or establishment shall use artificial procreation techniques for the 
conception of a baby that will be carried by a surrogate mother.
2)  No contract or agreement between a surrogate mother and the person or cou-
ple on whose account she carries the baby may be invoked.
3)  All intermediation between the people involved in a surrogate maternity must 
be prohibited, as well as all forms of related advertising.
4) Nevertheless, in exceptional cases established by national legislation, countries 
shall be able to envisage, without making an exception to section 2 of this 
Principle, that a doctor or an establishment may proceed to fertilize a surro-
gate mother using artificial procreation techniques, on condition: a) that the 
surrogate mother shall not profit in any way from the operation; and b) that 
the surrogate mother may, after the birth, choose to look after the baby. 
This model, with qualifications, is the one put forward as a proposal in the 
Bioethics and Law Observatory.26 Basically, this institution’s view is that sur-
rogate motherhood should be prohibited as a general rule because it consti-
tutes a form of objectification and commercialization of women. However, if 
(even knowing that numerous international organizations have ruled in this 
same way, that regulations to legitimize faits accomplis should not be estab-
lished, and that in comparative law the regulations are diverse) the state de-
cides to regulate this practice, it would be necessary to establish requisites that 
offer minimal guarantees. 
These requisites would be that: a) there is no fee; b) the gestating mother 
has a direct link with whoever finally takes charge of the child; c) that the ge-
netic material should be from at least one of the contracting parties, d) that it 
is not the gestating mother’s first pregnancy; e) that a judge should intervene 
in a voluntary jurisdiction file, both before the contract is signed, to avoid 
abuses, and after the birth, with the aim of guaranteeing the woman’s right to 
change her mind. 
 26 On this point read Navarro Michel, M. (2018). “La gestación por sustitución, ¿debe ser regulada? 
Y, en su caso, ¿cómo?” In: García Manrique, R. (coord.) El cuerpo diseminado. Estatuto, uso y dis-
posición de los biomateriales humanos. Aranzadi.
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The third model would be the Spanish one.27 The contract is null and void, 
whereby the person gestating is the mother to all intents and purposes. There 
is no specific penalty for this kind of contract, which does not preclude it be-
ing a crime if it is considered that an illegal adoption has taken place.28 The 
problem in our case is that, in today’s world, there is nothing to stop someone 
going to countries where this kind of contract is legal and returning to Spain 
with the baby.29 Some rather uncomfortable case law has been produced with 
this issue.
If the couple come back from another country with a certificate that es-
tablishes them as the baby’s legal parents, there are three possibilities: a) if it 
is a man and a woman, no questions are asked, whereby it is presumed that 
the baby has been gestated by the mother and the certificate is regarded as 
valid; b) if it is two women, no questions are asked either, presuming that one 
of the two is the biological mother; but c) if it is two men, there is no option 
but to ask.
This third case is the one that ended in the Spanish courts. Indeed, due to 
the attempt by the Registry Office to enter two men as parents in considera-
tion of the “priority interest of the minor”, the courts found against the cou-
ple. The argument of the court in Valencia to refuse registration and to ques-
tion the validity of the certificate they provided was that “in the current state 
of science, [men cannot] conceive or engender.”30
In fact, there is an underlying symbolic question with regard to this case. 
As the minor’s interest prevails, in practice he or she has all the rights despite 
coming from a surrogate mother from another country. And in the case of two 
 27 On feminism and support for the prohibition of surrogate motherhood, it is interesting to read 
Palop, M. E. (2018). “Argumentos contra la gestación por sustitución.” In: García Manrique, E. R. 
(coord.) El cuerpo diseminado. Estatuto, uso y disposición de los biomateriales humanos. Aranzadi.
 28 Thus, article 221 of the Criminal Code establishes that: 
1. Those who, in return for financial gain, hand over to another person a child, their own or any 
minor even though there is no tie of filiation or kinship, avoiding the legal procedures of guardian-
ship, fostering or adoption, for the purpose of establishing a relationship analogous to that of filia-
tion, will be punished with prison sentences of one to five years and will be disqualified especially 
from exercising the right to parental authority, tutelage or guardianship for a period of four to ten 
years.
2. The person who receives the child and the intermediary will be punished with the same sen-
tence, even if the minor was handed over in a foreign country.
 29 The analysis made by Encarna Roca, a Supreme Court magistrate, in her 2015 paper entitled “Dura 
lex sed lex. O de cómo integrar el interés del menor y la prohibición de la maternidad subrogada” is 
interesting. Boletín del Ministerio de Justicia, June, pp. 301-338.
 30 Sentence no. 193/2010, of 15 September, Court of First Instance Number Fifteen of Valencia, AC 
2010\1707.
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men, there is nothing to prevent one of them from being named as the father 
and the other as the hypothetical adopter. In fact, this was the solution offered 
by the Spanish Supreme Court, adoption or fostering, in the case we are dis-
cussing.31 It was just that the couple wanted both of them to appear as parents 
(they had been to California, where this kind of contract is legal, and they re-
turned from the USA with a certificate to prove that they were the contractu-
ally legitimate progenitors) and for this reason registration was refused.
The truth is that it is difficult to get it right in an issue that is beginning to 
move billions of dollars/euros, with middlemen, agencies, tax revenue, and so 
on, in a context of huge social, political, economic and legal inequalities, and 
with the underlying problem of children who are already here with us and who 
must be legally protected. As the dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court 
sentence, cited above about the baby from California, argued (it voted against 
granting validity to the Californian surrogate motherhood by five to four):
This statement cannot be generalized […] besides: a) it is a manifestation of the 
right to procreate, especially important, for those who cannot have genetic chil-
dren of their own, as in this case; b) the gestating mother’s power of consent can-
not simply be underestimated; c) the mother’s consent is given before the legal 
authority that ensures it is given freely and in full knowledge of the consequences; 
and d) as it is a free and voluntary agreement she is hardly being objectified or 
exploited against her freedom and autonomy and under no circumstances does it 
affect the interests of the minor that is born into a family that loves it. It is the 
child who is given a family, and not the family that is given a child, and it is up 
to the state to offer a legal framework that protects it and provides it with the 
necessary legal certainty.32
As we said earlier, Portugal, which was one of the few European countries 
where this practice was legalized, has just looked on with astonishment as the 
Constitutional Court has declared this law unconstitutional.33 The sentence 
 31 Supreme Court. Civil Section. Sentence no. 835/2013, of 6 February. RJ, 2014/833.
 32 In another part of the dissenting opinion the following is stated: “[...] it is obvious that when pre-
sented with a fait accompli such as the existence of minors in a family that acts socially as such and 
which has acted legally in accordance with foreign law, applying the domestic regulation as a ques-
tion of public order harms the children, who could find themselves in situations of neglect, like the 
one in the Italian case, and they are deprived of their identity and family nucleus in contravention of 
international law, which requires consideration of the interests of the minor, an identity that prevails 
over other considerations, as was pointed out by the Court of Justice of the European Union”. Su-
preme Court. Civil Section. Sentence no. 835/2013, of 6 February. RJ, 2014/833.
 33 Constitutional Court. Sentence 225/18, May 2018.
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will not be applied retroactively, as it would cause absolute turmoil in the cou-
ples who have made use of this possibility, but it has important symbolic con-
sequences for all other Western countries.
Lastly, the UNO has issued a stern statement against this practice, which 
it generally equates with child trafficking. However, it urges countries to take 
steps to regulate it.34
To sum up, the alternatives are: a) prohibiting this institution complete-
ly and absolutely to avoid the objectification and commercialization of women, 
and b) regulating as far as possible a practice that is already unstoppable in the 
world. In this second case, if it is regulated, it must be considered whether it is 
done free of charge or whether surrogate motherhood becomes just another 
product or service on the market, where the price is set by supply and demand. 
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6	 the end of life
1. Introduction1
The treatment of euthanasia poses problems that in order to be resolved col-
lectively require broadbased, thorough social debate. Since the 1970s various 
surveys have been carried out in Spain, of both healthcare personnel and the 
general public. In all of them the percentage in favour of regulating euthanasia 
is somewhere in the region of 80%. Nevertheless, the various attempts at regu-
lation have been unable to approach the subject with the necessary depth and 
the regulatory solutions have always turned out to be unsatisfactory or flawed.
In the media, information relative to the end of life periodically monopo-
lizes most of the news about bioethics. Although this prominence sometimes 
gives way to interest in discoveries based on the genome, big data or artificial 
intelligence, the continual bombardment of news of cases of euthanasia makes 
it clear that the issue is still highly topical and it comes back stronger with each 
new case. In Spain the repercussions of the case of Ramón Sampedro are well 
known, and the film Mar adentro (The Sea Inside), based on the case, is one of 
the most outstanding on the issue.2
In a context in which death is increasingly medicalized,3 the conflict ap-
pears initially between volition (respect for autonomy) and certain ideas about 
 1 This chapter is an update and a rewriting of the one written by M. Casado in the early 1990s, in La 
eutanasia. Aspectos éticos y jurídicos, editorial Reus, Madrid, 1994. It moreover incorporates consid-
erations made by her in the Document on the Right to End One’s Own Life Under Certain Circum-
stances, by the University of Barcelona’s Bioethics and Law Observatory, Signo, Barcelona. 2004. On 
the legislation in the autonomous communities and advance directives documents, see López Ba-
roni, M. J. (2005). Bioética y multiculturalismo: políticas públicas en España (1978-2013). El hecho 
cultural ante la revolución biotecnológica. Universidad de Barcelona, Ch. II.
 2 García Manrique, R. (2011). La medida de lo humano: ensayos sobre bioética y cine. Navarra: Civi-
tasThomson Reuters. There are also some interesting films dealing with this issue, among them Mil-
lion Dollar Baby and Johnny Got His Gun.
 3 Méndez, V. (2003). “El modo tradicional y el modo tecnológico de morir”. Revista ROL de Enfer-
mería. Also (2002), Sobre morir. Eutanasias, derechos, razones. Madrid: Trotta.
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the right to life.4 Multiple factors, however, play a part in it, including medical 
judgment and those derived from the patient’s circles, those of a religious na-
ture, those resulting from the distribution of resources, from the safeguarding 
of legitimate interests of third parties, and so on, which in many cases get in 
the way of determining what the patient’s best interests are, and respect for his 
or her wishes. At present, the ends of medicine themselves are being ques-
tioned: prolonging life at any cost is not the goal of medicine. Even the Coun-
cil of Europe says this.5
Respect for people’s basic rights also implies being able to make decisions 
about one’s own health. Respect for the person’s autonomy in healthcare is a 
process that has been developing gradually: through the introduction of the 
requirement for informed consent, with the acceptance that competent people 
can exercise their right to refuse any medical treatment or action including so-
called life support, and through the enactment of laws that regulate advance 
directives (living wills). This development must continue, giving these real 
content and admitting, moreover, the possibility that the free exercise of au-
tonomy may also materialize through the right to end one’s own life in certain 
cases. In other words, accepting what is commonly known as active voluntary 
euthanasia.
The discussion about the legitimacy of euthanasia must be tackled from a 
twofold point of view: as a matter of respect for people’s autonomy, and one of 
solidarity with those suffering.6 The initial reference in this discussion is the 
traditional invocation of the person’s autonomy and dignity, because euthana-
sia is an individual and, by definition, autonomous decision. Also, because the 
harming of the rights of other subjects cannot be invoked, since, also by defi-
nition, that decision only affects two parties directly: the one requesting it and 
the one performing it. 
 4 In 2016, coordinated by Albert Royes, the collective book Morir en libertad was published, in which 
members of the Bioethics and Law Observatory compiled articles and documents published in re-
cent years on this subject. As it states in the book’s introduction, “The right to a dignified death, the 
right to be able to choose the moment and the way of putting an end to one’s own life — having, in 
order to do so, the essential professional assistance for the purpose of avoiding more suffering — 
when the continuation of life is perceived and felt as something bad and not something good, hence 
the book’s title”, at www.publicacions.ub.edu/ref/índices/08395.pdf.
 5 Recommendation 1418/99 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
 6 CCNE, Avis sur la fin de vie, ârret de vie, euthanasie, of 27 January 2000, Paris. It can be consulted 
at www.ccne-ethique.fr/francais/avis/a_063.htm and CCNE, Avis concernant la proposition de résolu-
tion sur l’assistance aux mourants..., of 24 June 1991, Paris. It can be consulted at www.ccne-ethique.
fr/francais/avis/a_026.htm#deb.
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2.  Underlying values: from the sanctity 
to the quality of life
It is often thought that there is a tendency to go from one system of protect-
ing life that corresponds to the paradigm of its sanctity, to a system of protection 
that takes into account a more qualitative point of view:
Sanctity is the distinctive trait of the tendencies that aspire to protect human life 
as such, without considering possible physical or mental deficiencies or their 
social usefulness. By qualitative orientation I mean all the aspects that do not 
describe life as inviolable or susceptible to valuation per se, but as something 
qualitatively adjustable or, in any case, not excluded a priori from all considera-
tion with other interests.7
Professor Albin Eser considers that the widespread opinion that protection 
is in decline — “from the sanctity to the quality of life” — is to some extent a 
prejudice and that both principles ought to be combined as harmoniously as 
possible; furthermore, he attempts to ascertain when a particular legal system 
is more inclined towards a sacred or, on the other hand, a qualitative consid-
eration of life, in doing so reviewing German criminal law. In any case, it does 
not seem surprising that life, traditionally considered to be sacred and inviola-
ble, should be increasingly exposed to a qualitative assessment, and with this 
— as a necessary consequence — be compared and considered with other 
values.8
It is usual to agree that Christianity introduced the conditions for which 
the law went from a system of consolidation and stratification and of qualita-
tive discrimination of human life to the consideration that, as a creation of 
God, every person is equal and all human life is sacred and inviolable per se, 
for oneself and for others, without taking into consideration its physical qual-
 7 Professor Albin Eser of the University of Freiburg, director of the Max Planck Institute, is one of the 
best-known experts on this subject and his paper on the transformations of criminal law’s protection 
of life, “Entre la santidad y la calidad de vida”, the translation of which was published in the Anu-
ario de Derecho Penal of 1984, p. 747ff, is fundamental for an understanding of the subject.
 8 On the contrast between the ethics of the sanctity of life and of the quality of life, Joseph Fletcher 
reaches conclusions different to those upheld by Eser when claiming that “traditional ethics based on 
the sanctity of life, which was the classic doctrine of medical idealism in its pre-scientific stages, must 
give way to the ethics of the quality of life. This occurs for humane reasons. It is the result of the 
successes of modern medicine, not of its failures”. See the article by J. Fletcher, “The Sanctity of Life 
Versus the Quality of Life”, from Euthanasia, in Humanhood: Essays in Biomedical Ethics. New York: 
Prometheus Books, 1979, pp. 149-158.
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ity or social status. In neither Roman law, nor in Germanic law codes — and 
even less in earlier law codes — had this been so. The death of a slave was seen 
as a crime against property; and even reparations for the death of a person were 
graded according to his or her status, age and sex, something that by the way 
is also the case now in the amounts of compensation due to accidents estab-
lished by law, and in the premiums and reimbursements for illness by private 
companies. Ancient philosophers did not consider human life a value as such, 
but it was linked to its social usefulness. Plato and Aristotle advocated demo-
graphic policy measures such as the exposure of infants or abortion. The influ-
ence of religious principles and canon law on the medieval legal system was 
thus the main reason for the acceptance of this idea of life as a value in itself, 
as included for example in the Caroline Law, the first criminal law code pro-
mulgated in Germany in 1532 by Emperor Charles V. 
Nonetheless, to put things in their true perspective it is necessary to men-
tion that not even in the frameworks of the greatest protection of life have 
exceptions to this principle, more or less striking or concealed, ever ceased to 
be made. The classic exceptions to the prohibition to kill, as Eser recalls, con-
stitute important breaches in the protective fence of life and they include cases 
in which biological life was ab initio denied its human nature, and cases in 
which the death of a person was justified for different reasons. It is necessary 
to agree that, “by attempting to impose the protection of life through the de-
struction of life, the claim to its sanctity is suspended. By being able to destroy 
life for the safety of other legal assets, it becomes a ponderable object”, al-
though “the classic exceptions to the prohibition to kill represent only the re-
action to an illegal aggression — at least from a typical-ideal perspective — 
where the life destroyed had already been staked previously. In this, legitimate 
self-defence, the death penalty and death in a defensive war are fundamentally 
distinguished from the cases […] in which the life destroyed is not an aggressor 
but a victim: termination of pregnancy, euthanasia and suicide”. In these cases, 
life becomes a value worthy of being considered and even displaced by material 
interests or social needs. The quality of life comes before existence itself.
Similar problems arise in this respect with regard to both the beginning 
and the end of life, and expecting clear defining and delimiting criteria from 
medicine or biology would be illusory. The more these sciences progress, the 
more difficult it is to confirm qualitative leaps. This makes it even more neces-
sary to establish a legal regulation and to develop serious reflection on the 
matter, if we do not wish to find ourselves reduced to the systematic adoption 
of a series of medical and pragmatic solutions, dictated by virtue of the cir-
cumstances, which, incidentally, is what has been happening up to now.
the end of lIfe 153
Although it is difficult to approach and study in detail the problem of 
whether absolute values and universal laws exist, and the real history of human 
beings, it must be acknowledged that life has never been a right of this sort. If 
it can be compared to other values, such as defence, sacrifice, punishment, and 
so on, why can’t it be compared to the quality of it? Or to the will to live, with 
the imperative of volition? The aim is also to produce consideration of all these 
issues.
3.  Classic but rather obscure distinctions:  
active/passive euthanasia and ordinary/
extraordinary means
When analysing different legal systems from a historical perspective, one sees 
that, although it may be considered legitimate to put an end to somebody 
else’s life for one’s own good, this is not the case if the same act is performed 
for that person’s own good. Likewise, one can put an end to one’s own life for 
the benefit of one’s fellow man or woman in an act of heroism — for example, 
saving a person who is drowning — but the same act would not be well 
thought of — on the contrary, it would be reproached — if one ends ones own 
life for one’s own good (suicide). Punishments have even been established for 
suicide, a complete paradox and a true reflection of the unease that such issues 
usually give rise to. Illustrative examples are, in canon law, the refusal to bury 
people who have committed suicide in holy ground, or, in Roman law, the 
seizure of the inheritance by the state.
Leaving aside the subject of suicide and considerations of a legal and mor-
al nature about it, as far as euthanasia is concerned this attitude is reflected in 
the different ways in which active and passive euthanasia are regarded. For 
some people killing is worse than allowing someone to die. Ignoring for the 
moment the legal questions, whose methods of reasoning are in some ways 
peculiar, is it true, from a moral point of view, that such a distinction exists?
The example put forward by James Rachels is enlightening, when referring 
to the case of babies with Down syndrome that moreover present congenital 
defects such as, for example, intestinal obstruction, which requires the baby to 
be operated on immediately in order for it to survive. In some cases, the doctor 
and the parents decide not to operate and to let the baby die: however, although 
it may be simple in a theoretical discussion to decide that these babies must be 
allowed to die, it is different when one observes how infection and dehydration 
slowly end the life of a child who could be saved. “I understand that there are 
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people who are opposed to all kinds of euthanasia and insist that such children 
must live. I also understand why other people are in favour of putting down 
these babies quickly and painlessly. But what reason is there to allow dehydra-
tion and infection to weaken a tiny being for hours and days? The doctrine 
that allows a baby to dehydrate and languish, but prevents it from being given 
an injection to put an end to its life without suffering, is so obviously cruel 
that it needs no further refutation.”9
In the proposed example, the reason why the relatively easy surgical opera-
tion to remove the intestinal obstruction is not performed is none other than 
Down syndrome, by reason of which the parents and the doctor are of the 
opinion that the best thing for the child is to die:
But we see that this situation is absurd, regardless of the point of view that eve-
ryone adopts with respect to life and the potentials of these babies. If the life of 
such a child is worth preserving, then what difference does it make if it needs a 
simple operation? Or, if one thinks that it is better for such an infant to die, what 
difference does it make if it happens to have an obstructed intestinal tract? In 
either case, the question of life and death is being decided on irrelevant grounds. 
The key issue here is Down syndrome, not the intestines. The issue should be 
resolved, if it has to be, on this basis and not on something as irrelevant as 
whether or not the child’s intestinal tract is blocked […].10
It is rather superficial to suppose that, because nothing has been done to 
hasten death, one is not a party to it. By not doing anything one is doing 
something: deciding what form of behaviour to adopt, just as in any action. 
Omission is consequently taken into account not just by the law, but in the 
moral evaluation of this behaviour.
In general, human beings feel a huge devotion for rules in themselves and 
an underlying fear of making important decisions individually without the 
backing of dogmatic guidance. This is the kind provided by systems of moral-
ity that establish prohibitions or taboos, indicating what must or must not be 
done without taking into account the consequences, simply because it is thus 
ordained, regardless of the results of such behaviour. Opposed to this kind of 
ethics — of duty — are systems of finalistic guidance that value the acts per-
 9 New England Journal of Medicine, no. 929, 1975. This example is repeated as, among others, it is also 
collected by P. Singer in his Practical Ethics and M.D. Farrell repeats it in his article “La justificación 
de la pena en los casos de eutanasia: un análisis ético”, in the Anuario de Derecho Penal, no. 21, 1983.
 10 Rachels, J., op. cit., p. 47ff.
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formed by the consequences obtained, according to whether they have served 
human values and to how they have done it; for them, the supreme good is 
happiness, human wellbeing, not sticking to the rules or important principles. 
If actions and omissions must be equally important, why should this not be 
the case in the issue of euthanasia? If one thinks that killing is no worse than letting 
someone die, one must accept that active euthanasia is no worse than passive. 
Nevertheless, most people do not think this, and nor do the doctrines of the 
major religions, or the declarations of medical ethics, such as those of the Brit-
ish Medical Association, the American Medical Association, the World Medi-
cal Association, and the majority of the deontological codes of colleges of 
physicians.
An initial distinction is usually established between the acts that produce 
death decisively and positively and others that allow death to occur by ceasing 
to apply certain life support procedures that in medical terminology are known 
as “extraordinary means”.
The traditionally accepted view starts by considering as indisputable that 
no one — a doctor, or anybody else — can intentionally terminate the life of 
a patient. At the same time, it is accepted that there are other cases in which it 
is permissible to cease to use certain types of means to maintain life although 
this may shorten it and even cause the patient’s death. This approach may be 
called inconsistent, but it is the one that prevails in normal clinical practice.
Doctors have always taken part in making decisions about the end of life 
and it is currently considered good practice to limit, suspend or not begin 
treatment in certain circumstances even though this may lead to the patient’s 
death: it is what is usually called limitations on therapeutic efforts, limitation 
of treatment or, simply, passive euthanasia. In any hospital, every day decisions 
are taken to suppress treatments when the agony is prolonged, with the said 
interruption resulting in the patient’s death. The tactic of letting someone die 
is the solution used given that, with what is now available, it is indefensible to 
always do everything technically possible to maintain biological life. Unless 
one is absolutely pro-life, the dignity, the wellbeing and the wishes of the per-
son in question must be taken into account; this means taking into considera-
tion the quality of life and not just the mere biological survival of extreme 
prolifism. 
With regard to the use of ordinary or extraordinary means, it is equally dif-
ficult to establish a fixed distinction, since the means that are now totally ha-
bitual were considered to be extraordinary not long ago; moreover, what for 
some cases is extraordinary will not be in others. Several factors must be taken 
into account, such as the possibility of success, the level of quality of the life 
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that one is trying to preserve, survival time, the suffering caused to the patient 
and his or her family by the treatment and the cost of the therapy, not just to 
the individual and his or her family but also from the point of view of the 
group, bringing into play a matter of so-called health economics. All these fac-
tors must be pondered together, and although some are objectively pondera-
ble, others will depend on the patient’s subjective situation, which is always 
more difficult to assess. Paul Ramsey says that:
[…] ordinary means for the maintenance of life are all the medications, treat-
ments and operations that offer a reasonable hope of benefit for the patient and 
which may be obtained and used without entailing expense, pain or other exces-
sive problems. Extraordinary means for maintaining life are all the medications, 
treatments and operations that cannot be obtained without entailing expense, 
pain or other excessive problems, or which, if used, would not offer a reasonable 
hope of benefit.11
None of these definitions has as yet provided a criterion that may be used 
to determine whether a treatment is obligatory or not:
But, when is the cost too much? Is $10,000 too much? If it saved the life of a 
young woman and returned her to perfect health, $10,000 does not seem exces-
sive. But if it only prolonged the life of a diabetic suffering from cancer for a 
short while, $10,000 might be excessive. It is not just a case of what is excessive 
varying according to the case. It is that excessive depends on whether prolonga-
tion would be beneficial for the person in question. Secondly, how can we tell if 
a treatment will benefit the patient? Remember that we are talking about treat-
ments for the prolongation of life; the benefit, if there is one, is the continuation of 
life. Whether the continuation of life is a benefit or not will depend on the details 
of each case. Once again, the question lies in the fact that, to decide if the treat-
ment to maintain life is beneficial, we must first decide whether, for the life that 
is at stake, such a prolongation will be good.12
Ultimately, it is a question of pointing out that both the distinction be-
tween ordinary and extraordinary means and active and passive euthanasia, 
and even the introduction of intentional factors as determinants in the assess-
ment are rather unclear and even irrelevant. It seems obvious that, morally, 
 11 Ramsey, P. (1992). “Más distinciones impertinentes.” In: Baird, R. M.; Rosenbaum, S. E. Eutana-
sia: los dilemas morales. Barcelona: Martínez Roca, Ch. 8, pp. 68-59.
 12 Rachels, J., op. cit., p. 71ff.
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active and passive euthanasia are one and the same, and if one is declared to 
be acceptable, the other must also be; and active euthanasia might even be 
preferable sometimes.
The arguments against this approach insist on the fact that in passive eu-
thanasia the doctor does nothing to cause the patient’s death, since the sick 
person ends up dying of the disease he or she was suffering from. But, as has 
been said, not supplying a medicine is a deliberate omission, as conscious as 
the opposite, and therefore equally attributable to the person who does it.
4.  The terms of the debate and the question  
of dignity
The conceptual confusion still underpinning the debate about euthanasia is 
without doubt closely linked to the ambiguity existing around the different 
meanings attributed to the word euthanasia. According to some the term refers 
to any medical treatment that shortens the life of a sick person and it is also 
associated with the act of letting people die. For others, it is equivalent to com-
passionate homicide, or to homicide for the good of the victim. For some it is 
identified with homicide at the request of the person who is dying and helping 
someone to commit suicide. And there are also some who understand it as the 
act of putting an end to the lives of undesirable people, or as causing the death 
of those who are suffering.
The consequence of these different meanings of the term euthanasia, with 
different and even divergent ethical and legal appraisals in which descriptive and 
prescriptive definitions are mixed up without distinction, is that when euthana-
sia is discussed it is not at all obvious what the debate is about. The great variety 
of meanings of the many definitions devised in order to distinguish between the 
different types of euthanasia — active and passive, direct and indirect, voluntary, 
not voluntary and involuntary — have given rise to a series of types that are no 
help when obtaining criteria for making decisions in the specific cases. As these 
classifications are not applicable to all the different definitions of euthanasia, and 
as they are liable to be combined with one another, their use has generated a 
terminological complexity that makes discussing the different problems under-
lying the issue of euthanasia even more difficult.13
 13 Méndez Baiges, V. “La muerte contemporánea: entre la salida y la voz”, in op. cit. Royes (2016). 
Morir en libertad.
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Euthanasia is an action in two acts, each of which has a different protago-
nist. In the first one, the protagonist is the sick person who is suffering from a 
serious disease that would necessarily lead to their death or which causes them 
permanent suffering, difficult to bear, and it is this person who takes the ethi-
cally legitimate decision to end his or her life peacefully and in a dignified 
manner. This sick person has free will, or they had it when they signed an ad-
vance directives document. This first act is truly basic and, in turn, it is the 
basis of the second. 
The second act consists of the medical intervention that causes death 
quickly, efficiently and painlessly, and it would in fact be illegal if the existence 
of the first act could not be confirmed. But it is necessary, because it complies 
with the sick person’s free decision. For this wish for a good death to be ful-
filled, the doctor’s help is necessary, given that, in accordance with current 
knowledge, drugs will have to be prescribed and administered correctly. And 
the reason why this medical intervention is required is practical, since the pro-
fessional knowledge will ensure that death occurs as peacefully as is hoped for. 
The reasoning that upholds the sick person’s free decision is moral auton-
omy. A law that tried to impose euthanasia on all who are incurably sick and 
in pain would not be legitimate, but a law that accepts it in certain very precise 
cases and includes the necessary precautions to prevent possible errors in either 
of the two acts that contribute to it would be.
The debate is open: should a terminally ill patient’s wish to die be respected? 
Does one have to collaborate in it? What treatment should be used when the 
moment of death draws near? Who can decide if the patient has not expressed 
his or her wishes and is unable to do so? Some of the greatest difficulties in this 
area arise when deciding on the interruption of treatments in sick people with 
irreversible disorders of consciousness who are unable to express their wishes 
and who have not made previous arrangements. Not forgetting the special case 
that is the persistent vegetative state in which, upon having to decide on some-
one’s behalf, one may choose to resolve it by attributing to the situation a sig-
nificance that takes into account the presumed wishes of someone who is no 
longer competent. This frequently turns the issue into a problem of proof, as 
happened in the case of the famous Nancy Cruzan sentence.
The assessment of the subject’s quality of life can also be used as a criterion, 
or trying to guess what their wish would have been, as happened previously in 
the case of Karen Quinlan. It is a thorny issue, because on top of medical and 
biological opinion one would have to add an assessment of the subject’s qual-
ity of life from the human and personal point of view, but which, in these 
cases precisely, cannot be established. The appraisal of the patient’s best inter-
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ests can also contribute new directions and arguments, but it may actually be 
for the best, as happened in the case of Tony Bland, if these patients do not 
have interests.14 
The approach is different in Anglo-American countries, staunch defenders 
of autonomist criteria, and in Latin countries, which have shielded themselves 
behind the pretext of respect for life. One has to bear in mind that Catholic 
tradition is immersed in a general delegation of responsibility to other more 
qualified hands in the technocratic treatment of conflicts. Whereas in the 
Protestant tradition, the basis of the current thinking that we call Anglo-
American, people are far more accustomed to deciding for themselves. The 
habit of free examination has left different marks of the custom of always act-
ing with dogmatic guidance.
In our opinion, this discussion is a matter of extreme situations. In the new 
millennium, the debate about euthanasia should be held from a twofold point 
of view: as a question of respect and of solidarity. The attitude to euthanasia is 
a true test of validation of the acceptance of the principle of autonomy; a prin-
ciple in which we claim to concentrate not just moral decisions but the gen-
eral life of our society (which at least agrees to be defined as liberal).
If we truly respect someone else’s autonomy, this respect must be shown in 
the acceptance of decisions that we do not necessarily share.15 Accepting and 
respecting opinions and behaviours of which we approve is not difficult in the 
slightest. The test of tolerance, in the most positive and active sense of this term, 
comes with our consideration of behaviours whose reasons we do not share. 
Why, then, is the issue of euthanasia still approached so virulently in 
some areas of society? In our opinion, the reason lies in the enormous burden 
of ideology attached to this debate, the reason why certain attitudes seek ref-
uge in maximalist and, in many cases, intolerant attitudes. Among the detrac-
tors of euthanasia one frequently senses an attitude that leads to a clash of 
absolutes (of course this is not the only area in which these attitudes appear), 
whereas the defenders of the right to die in freedom approach it as a question 
of respect.
 14 The different paradigmatic cases in the discussion on euthanasia have been opening up the debate 
about the possibility of withdrawing life support measures. First the respirator, in the case of Karen 
Quinlan (1975); then the nasogastric tube, in that of Nancy Cruzan (1983), and later, with that of 
Tony Bland (1993), in which the House of Lords — as the highest court of appeal — ruled that Tony 
“had no interests”. See Singer, P. (1997). Repensar la vida y la muerte. El derrumbe de la ética tradi-
cional. Buenos Aires: Paidós, pp. 67-87.
 15 An essential work of reference is Dworkin, R. (1994). El dominio de la vida. Una cuestión acerca del 
aborto, la eutanasia y la libertad individual. Barcelona: Ariel.
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Both sides invoke the defence of human dignity, but they obviously under-
stand it differently. There are two main schools of thought when interpreting 
and making sense of dignity, and even the notion of human rights: the Chris-
tian and the secular. If the discussion is not explained, it may become a dia-
logue of the deaf: agreement is impossible if the same words mean different 
things.
Although we referred above to the traditional invocation of the person’s 
autonomy and dignity, resorting to the framework of the general approach, we 
have to complete this analysis by considering the other approach to the prob-
lem of euthanasia mentioned at the beginning and which may be more profit-
able: solidarity and respect.
Speaking about this sense of compassion does not mean understanding 
this concept paternalistically, but it appeals to a supportive idea of people’s 
relationships, to a view of the problem that accepts exceptional openings for 
exceptional cases. Moreover, it is a case of circumscribing the field of agree-
ment in accordance with a strict definition of the term, linked to the subject’s 
request and to the meeting of requirements that guarantee volition.
I believe this is a good route to agreement between habitually opposing 
positions. To end with, I would also like to submit for the reader’s considera-
tion two questions underpinning any bioethical agreement and which, more-
over, may come prior to it: first, the specification and limitation of the objec-
tives that can be achieved and their provisional nature; of course this is more 
awkward and insecure than being comfortable with eternal truths, as it de-
mands greater responsibility due to decisions made freely. And second, re-
membering explicitly that we can agree that a type of behaviour is correct al-
though we may not agree with the reasons for it. Only in this way is it possible 
to construct specific one-off agreements, rather than empty generic consensus.
Having thus clearly shown the implications of this important social de-
bate, it is now time to show the contribution that legal considerations can 
make to it. 
5. Euthanasia in relation to fundamental rights
Being able to freely choose a dignified death as an individual right is a demand 
that is considered appropriate to modern societies that take a secular approach 
when dealing with the problems of death. The right to a dignified death has 
been named as one of the fundamental rights, as a question that affects the 
quality of life, third-generation rights that may be connected to social rights, 
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relative to health, including it as one of the rights of the patient. In the Gen-
eral Healthcare Law and Law 4/2002, the basic regulator of patient autonomy 
and of rights and responsibilities in matters of information and clinical docu-
mentation, the patient’s informed consent is established as a general principle 
with regard to treatments that he or she must follow and their possible inter-
ruption. The said law also includes various declarations of sick people’s rights, 
such as the right to control one’s own destiny, bodily integrity, religious assis-
tance according to one’s beliefs, privacy, and in sum, comprehensive care given 
by qualified professionals. 
It is not difficult to link these concepts to that of the dignity of human life, 
basic in the Spanish legal system. The constitution mentions human dignity, 
along with freedom, as one of the most important values of our legal system. 
In article 1.1, and in 10.1 which protects the dignity of the person and their 
right to freely develop their personality, or in 16.1 which guarantees ideological 
freedom, or in article 15, the fundamental principles that must be taken into 
consideration for the purposes of establishing a correct relationship between 
the prohibition on killing and the right to individual self-determination are 
established. 
In short, the acknowledgement of the right to life in our system is designed 
to provide guarantees: against the state and against other citizens. It is more-
over a personal right that is exercised according to the wishes of its holder. It is 
not an absolute right: the right to life may clash with other rights and it must 
be duly considered.
From a strictly legal point of view, it is not possible to place the right to life 
above the freedom of the individual. The concept of personal dignity is basic 
in the interpretation and determination of the scope of the fundamental rights 
recognized in the first title of the constitution and it seems difficult to impose 
an idea of the right to life such that it is incompatible with human dignity. 
From the analysis of the constitution we learn that the essence of rights and 
freedoms lies in the free development of the personality, in the person’s full 
development and improvement, individually and socially. Therefore, all legis-
lation must respect all the rights and freedoms expressed in the other chapters 
of the constitutional title. 
One must bear in mind that the Criminal Code must be applied in the light 
of the constitutional principles, since it is these that determine which legal assets 
are deserving of legal protection. The consideration that the constitution has a 
direct and immediate normative value leads us to consider that the higher values 
it recognizes, such as freedom, equality and human dignity, must inform the 
entire legal system and, consequently, they must also be considered informative 
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principles and limits of criminal law. As a result, the treatment by criminal law 
of certain behaviours liable to be thought of as euthanasia forces us to make an 
interpretation in accordance with that laid down in fundamental law.
In the case of direct active euthanasia — taken to mean executive acts that 
cause an effective shortening of the patient’s life — the application of the 
Criminal Code may class such behaviour as manslaughter (articles 138 and 142) 
or murder (articles 139, 140 and 141), depending on the circumstances that are 
appreciated. However, the presence of the victim’s consent, accompanied by 
the requirements of “his or her express, serious and unequivocal request, in the 
event that the victim was suffering from a serious illness that would necessar-
ily lead to death or would produce severe permanent suffering, difficult to 
bear”, places direct and voluntary active euthanasia within the type included 
in article 143.4 of the Criminal Code, for which an extenuation of the sentence 
by one or two degrees is envisaged.
This law, which is considered to be a compromise solution, was adopted in 
our code after an intense social debate, since in the previous law such behav-
iour represented executive assistance for committing suicide, with it being 
possible to take the victim’s wish to die, their consent, into consideration as an 
extenuating circumstance. In cases where this wish to die could not be ex-
pressed until the last moment, the courts could appreciate the existence of a 
merciful motive to extenuate the sentence. This implied, in certain cases, that 
it was necessary to force the legal instruments to achieve a materially just solu-
tion; this includes a degree of chance in the application of the law that is not 
at all desirable and which goes against all the repeated wishes for legal cer-
tainty that are characteristic of the rule of law.
6.  Legislation in the autonomous  
communities of Spain
The fact that the Spanish state has exclusive competence in criminal law has 
caused some autonomous communities to regulate this subject with active 
euthanasia as the horizon, but without being able to recognize this right due 
to the fact it does not fall within the scope of their powers. For this reason, 
efforts have been focused on regulating the right to a dignified death within 
the reduced framework in which it was possible, as in Andalusia, or on propos-
ing a state-wide change to the Spanish parliament, as happened in Catalonia.
Beginning with the Spanish autonomous communities’ lack of compe-
tence to be able to regulate active euthanasia, we are going to analyse the three 
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most noteworthy attempts to regulate assisted suicide. We shall study the An-
dalusian Law of Dignified Death, the bill for the decriminalization of eutha-
nasia and assisted suicide in Catalonia, and the way in which the living will has 
been developed in different autonomous communities.
1) Law of Dignified Death in Andalusia. In 2010, Law 2/2010, of 8 April, was 
passed, on rights and guarantees for the dignity of the person in the process of 
dying in Andalusia. The characteristics that we can highlight in this law are the 
following:
1.1. In 2010, the year the said law was passed, the PSOE, a social democratic 
party that on more than one occasion has positioned itself in favour of regulat-
ing active euthanasia, was in power in both Spain and Andalusia. In fact, the 
Andalusian law was seen as a test for observing how viable a more ambitious 
state-wide law might be. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s Socialist government, 
in power in Spain from 2004 to 2011, might well have tackled the subject had 
it not been for the economic crisis that in 2011 forced it out of government 
before time (we should remember that during its term in office other social 
advances were achieved, such as the voluntary termination of pregnancy or 
same-sex marriage, unthinkable in Spain a few years earlier).
1.2. The law we are examining was achieved through consensus between the two 
main political parties in Andalusia, the PSOE and the Partido Popular, a Chris-
tian democratic party opposed to regulating active euthanasia. For this reason, 
the content of the law is rather ambiguous and the end result bittersweet.
Indeed, for the PSOE, the law was considered to be an advance because it 
regulated, within the framework of the state, “dignified death”. But the PP also 
valued the law positively because it regulated what was already being done and 
at no time did it ask awkward questions. In sum, the fact that both parties 
considered themselves to be the victors shows the true limits of this law.
1.3. The law was inspired by or was the consequence of two cases, Leganés and 
Echevarría, massively reported in the media. 
The Leganés (Madrid) case began with an anonymous tip-off that accused 
a group of doctors at Severo Ochoa Hospital of causing the death of more than 
400 people through malpractice in the sedation of terminally ill people. After 
two years of investigations, the courts closed the file on the case and decreed 
that was there no crime, nor was there any malpractice. In the meantime, there 
were wrongful dismissals, groundless rulings, libels blown up by the more 
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conservative newspapers, and so on, which generated great uncertainty in 
healthcare personnel, not just in Madrid, but in the whole of Spain, since it 
transmitted the idea that anyone could find themselves mixed up in a media 
witch-hunt such as this one. 
The Echevarría case is based on the story of a woman who was connected 
to apparatus to keep her alive in a religious hospital in Andalusia. Both the 
woman and her family asked for her to be disconnected. Due to the refusal of 
the healthcare personnel, who belong to a religious order, she had to be taken 
to a public hospital. After a bitter debate, in which several rulings were re-
quired, she was disconnected. Although the Consultative Board of Andalusia 
voted in favour of disconnecting the woman, a single dissenting opinion 
against it was issued that stated the following:
Advance directives thus come within the cases of healthcare to avoid any un-
wanted therapeutic cruelty at the end of life. But under no circumstances can 
they justify that a patient, in full possession of her mental faculties, […] could 
request “that they let her die painlessly, after being sedated, and that she be dis-
connected from the artificial breathing mechanisms”. The case we are looking at 
here — suspension of the treatment with mechanical ventilation that will neces-
sarily result in death, being previously sedated for it, at the specific request of the 
patient herself — is not in any way envisaged in the current legislation.16
In other words, at the time this occurred, there was no state or autono-
mous law on how to proceed in this kind of case, or at least the matter had not 
been regulated explicitly. For this reason, the law in Andalusia that we are 
commenting on tried to fill this gap in the law, partly to specify patients’ rights 
(principle of autonomy), and partly to provide legal coverage to the healthcare 
personnel who take decisions in such difficult situations (legal certainty).
1.4.  The law did everything it could to avoid using the term euthanasia. Thus, 
in the preamble to it we can find the following paragraph:
On the contrary, the refusal of treatment, the limitation of life support means 
and palliative sedation must not be defined as acts of euthanasia. These acts never 
deliberately seek death, but to alleviate or avoid suffering, respect patients’ au-
 16 Dissenting opinion formulated by councillor Sánchez Galiana to the ruling of the Permanent Com-
mittee of the Consultative Board of Andalusia on the Optional Consultation presented by the Min-
ister for Health of the Junta de Andalucía, in Bensusan Martín, P. (2007). “Problemas jurídicos ac-
tuales sobre la vida y la muerte.” Revista Andaluza de Administración Pública, no. 68.
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tonomy and humanize the process of death. Accepting the right of sick people to 
refuse a particular healthcare intervention is merely showing exquisite respect for 
personal autonomy, for everyone’s freedom to manage their own life, assuming 
the consequences of the decisions they make. [Our italics.]
As can be observed, the term euthanasia (active, passive, direct, indirect, 
etc.) was treated as a taboo, so consensus and politically correct expressions 
prevailed above all else with the aim of getting the law passed.
1.5. The law employs a catalogue of definitions to explain the legal significance 
of some acts. Thus, the law defines therapeutic obstinacy as a way of prolonging 
biological life without the real possibility of improvement or recovery (what is 
known as dysthanasia); it defines the “limitations on therapeutic efforts” as the 
withdrawal or non-introduction of medical treatment, due to the fact that this 
treatment will not result in the patient’s improvement (what is known as passive 
euthanasia); it defines palliative sedation as the administration of drugs to re-
lieve the agony (what is known as indirect euthanasia); and, lastly, it grouped 
the series of medical interventions aimed at treating a terminal illness and re-
ducing the suffering under the expression palliative care. 
2) Law of Decriminalization of Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in Catalonia. In 
2017 an initiative was promoted in the Parliament of Catalonia for a proposi-
tion to reform Organic Law 10/1995, of 23 November, in the Criminal Code, 
to be tabled in the Spanish parliament, for the purposes of decriminalizing 
euthanasia and assisted suicide. The parliamentary initiative had the participa-
tion of members of the University of Barcelona’s Bioethics and Law Observa-
tory, a body that in 2003 had published a report entitled Document on the 
Patient’s Right to End His or Her Own Life Under Certain Circumstances: Dec-
laration on Euthanasia, which included the general lines that were later tran-
scribed to the Catalan bill.
In this case, the purpose of the proposal was not a law exclusively for 
Catalonia but to modify the Criminal Code for it to be valid for the whole of 
Spain. It was proposed to add a paragraph to article 143 of the Criminal Code 
with the following wording:
Sole article:
Modification of section 4 of article 143 of Organic Law 10/1995, of 23 November, 
of the Criminal Code, which will be worded in the following terms:
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“4. Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs, upon the ex-
press, free and unequivocal request of a person who has a serious illness that 
would necessarily lead to their death, or an incurable disease that will cause them 
serious physical or mental suffering and which is deemed to be permanent, any-
one who causes or cooperates with acts necessary for the safe, peaceful and pain-
less death of this person, will be exempt from responsibility, in the framework 
established by the law.”
The parliamentary initiative advocates the right to a dignified death and 
proposes to create the suitable institutional framework so that a citizen may 
make the informed and autonomous decision that most suits their personal 
worldview. For this, the proposal uses as a model the legislation in the Nether-
lands; it proposes to organize a palliative care unit that will be on standby 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week; it requires the initial and comprehensive training 
of the staff working in it; it promotes the creation of an observatory to perma-
nently gather the information necessary to improve the service, etc.
Lastly, the initiative provides important information on how the sensibility of 
Spanish society has changed in recent years, in the sense of being more favourable 
to a change in the law such as the one being promoted. Thus, in the legislative 
initiative a survey carried out in 2015 by The Economist in 15 countries is men-
tioned, where it was reported that 78% of those interviewed were in favour of 
assisted suicide being regulated in Spain, as opposed to 7% who were against it.
7. The legal framework of advance directives17 
The Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
the Dignity of the Human Being with Respect to the Application of Biology 
and Medicine, of 1997, came into effect in Spain in the year 2000 with the 
resulting obligation of the state to adapt the current laws to its provisions. It is 
the international legal reference on advance directives: “previously expressed 
 17 See Casado, M.; Royes, A. (eds.) (2010). Repercusión e impacto normativo de los Documentos publi-
cados por el Grupo de Opinión del Observatori de Bioètica i Dret sobre las voluntades anticipadas y 
sobre la eutanasia. Barcelona: Signo, at www.bioeticayderecho.ub.es/documentos. Also, Royes, A. 
“El consentimiento informado y los Documentos de Voluntades Anticipadas.” In: Casado, M. (ed.) 
(2007). Nuevos materiales de bioética y derecho. Mexico City: Fontamara, pp. 159-176. Also, along the 
same lines, López Baroni, M. J. (2005). Bioética y multiculturalismo: políticas públicas en España 
(1978-2013). El hecho cultural ante la revolución biotecnológica. University of Barcelona, Ch. ii, at 
http://diposit.ub.edu/dspace/bitstream/2445/66784/1/MJLB_TESIS.pdf.
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wishes will be taken into consideration, with respect to a medical intervention, 
by a patient who, at the time of the intervention, is not in a situation to ex-
press his or her wishes” (Art. 9). At the same time, the Convention establishes 
generally that any intervention in the sphere of healthcare requires the free and 
informed consent of the person affected, which may be revoked at any time. It 
is a case of giving appropriate information about the purpose and the nature 
of the intervention, and about its dangers and consequences. Both the Spanish 
state and the autonomous communities have modified or enacted different 
laws to adapt not only to the precepts of the Convention, but also to respond 
to a social demand and adapt the law to a reality framed in a process of the 
democratization of rights in the field of healthcare: the transition from medi-
cal paternalism to autonomy in healthcare, with its unquestionable advantages 
and its imbalances through practice.
The enactment of Law 41/2002, of 14 November, the basic regulator of 
patient autonomy and of rights and responsibilities in matters of information 
and clinical documentation (LAP), paved the way towards the acknowledge-
ment of the right to decide, to refuse a treatment or not to be informed, and 
to clearly state in writing — and in advance, that is, through advance direc-
tives — what actions are permitted or refused by a person, patient or user of 
the health system when they are unable to express their wishes themselves. The 
establishment of this new model of relationships (between healthcare profes-
sional and user or doctor and patient) is not only determined by the above-
mentioned Law 41/2002, although it is true that it is the first to include the 
possibility of issuing advance directives (Art. 11).18 A precept developed in due 
 18 Article 11. Advance Directives. 
1. Through the advance directives document, an adult, capable and free, expresses their wishes in 
advance, for the purpose of these being complied with when they reach situations in whose circum-
stances they are incapable of expressing them personally, about the care and treatment of their health 
or, after their death, about the fate of their body or the organs in it. The grantor of the document may 
moreover designate a representative so that, when the time comes, he or she may serve as their inter-
locutor with the doctor or the healthcare team to ensure compliance with their advance directives.
2. Every health service shall regulate the proper procedure so that, when the time comes, com-
pliance with everyone’s previous instructions, which must always be in writing, is guaranteed.
3. Advance directives in contravention of the legal system, the lex artis, or those that do not 
correspond to the de facto situation that the interested party may have foreseen at the time of ex-
pressing them will not be applied. A reasoned record of the annotations related to these directives 
will be kept in the patient’s clinical records. 
4. Advance directives may be freely revoked at any time in writing. 
5. For the purposes of ensuring the effectiveness throughout Spain of the advance directives 
expressed by patients and formalized in accordance with the provisions of the legislation of the re-
spective autonomous communities, the National Register of Advance Directives will be created in 
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form by Royal Decree 124/2007, of 2 February, by which the national registry 
of advance directives and the corresponding automated personal data archive 
are regulated.
Moreover, article 9 of the Convention avoids using terms or expressions, 
such as euthanasia or living will, which might cause controversy. After it came 
into effect in Spain, in 2000, a controversy arose over the name of the docu-
ment that included these wishes, which is worth commenting on.
There are three expressions — instrucciones previas (previous instructions), 
declaración de voluntades vitales anticipadas (advance directives) and testamento 
vital (living will) — that formally, and a priori at least, mean the same thing, 
since the regulation of assisted suicide in Spain is the same for the whole coun-
try, given that the state has competence in criminal law. Nevertheless, the au-
tonomous communities and the state chose different formulas according to 
the ideology of the party or parties in power and, therefore, to the degree of 
tacit desirability of the regulation of assisted suicide.
Thus, the autonomous communities most opposed to active euthanasia 
used the expression instrucciones previas, with which they transmitted the idea 
that the patient informs the healthcare personnel of their wishes, but under no 
circumstances must these prevail over the lex artis. This is the formula most 
opposed to assisted suicide, as it gives healthcare personnel control to the det-
riment of the patient. It was, for example, the formula the Spanish state adopt-
ed when José María Aznar of the PP was prime minister in 2002.19
The autonomous communities most prone to regulating active euthanasia 
used the expression testamento vital, for its connotations clearly favourable to 
the patient’s wishes being respected above all else, including, if possible, as-
sisted suicide. It is the most militant formula, because it reinforces the impor-
tance of the citizen’s wishes, which are no longer mere instructions but some-
thing more serious, a will.
the Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs, which will be governed by the laws that are deter-
mined in due form, by agreement of the Inter-territorial Board of the National Health System.
 19 Law 41/2002, of 14 November, basic regulator of patient autonomy and of rights and responsibilities 
in matters of information and clinical documentation. Article 11.1 establishes that “Through the ad-
vance directives document, an adult, capable and free, expresses their wishes in advance, for the 
purpose of these being complied with when they reach situations in whose circumstances they are 
incapable of expressing them personally, about the care and treatment of their health or, after their 
death, about the fate of their body or the organs in it. The grantor of the document may moreover 
designate a representative so that, when the time comes, he or she may serve as their interlocutor 
with the doctor or the healthcare team to ensure compliance with their advance directives.” 2. “Ev ery 
health service shall regulate the proper procedure so that, when the time comes, compliance with 
everyone’s previous instructions, which must always be in writing, is guaranteed.”
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Lastly, an intermediate expression between the two is the declaración de 
voluntades anticipadas, which has been used above all when there has been no 
wish to be too controversial about the issue, but at the same time the inten-
tion was to make patient autonomy important. The case of Andalusia is para-
digmatic. In 2003 its Socialist government promoted a law of declaración de 
voluntades anticipadas, due to the fact that the PP, opposed to this kind of 
document, was in power in Spain, and they mutually challenged each other’s 
bioethics legislation in the Constitutional Court. But in 2010, Andalusia mod-
ified its legislation and called the said document a testamento vital, in a context 
in which the Socialists were also in power in Spain and it seemed that it would 
at last be possible to make progress in the regulation by the state of active eu-
thanasia.20 
Another significant example of the ambivalence of this formula is that of 
the Balearic Islands, as it called its document a declaración de voluntades an-
ticipadas with the warning, if there was any doubt, that “the law does not en-
shrine, under any circumstances, direct active euthanasia”.21
In conclusion, and as we can observe, the three documents are cloaked in 
ideological connotations. In fact, none of the three can differ in its content, 
since active euthanasia is still prohibited in Spain, but in some way the vo-
cabulary used (instructions, declarations, will) tells us tacitly what is the atti-
tude to assisted suicide of those promoting the law. The culmination of politi-
cal correctness is the European Convention on Bioethics, which speaks to us 
of “previously expressed wishes”, in the hope of pleasing everyone. 
8. The right to live (and die) in freedom
Many of the moral and legal discussions about the right to die that society is 
presently having are largely motivated by what is understood by the term eu-
thanasia, which has gradually acquired the specific nuance of a medical act 
necessary to make death easier when requested by the sick person or, even, the 
connotation of mercy killing. Where euthanasia is concerned terminological 
 20 Law 5/2003, of 9 October, of The Declaration of Advance Directives in Andalusia, was completed 
with Law 2/2010, of 8 April, of Rights and Guarantees of the Dignity of the Person in the Process of 
Dying. In the law of 2010 the expression “living will” is used, equating it expressly in a glossary to 
the “declaration of advance directives”.
 21 Preamble to the Law of Advance Directives of the Balearic Islands, Law 1/2006, of 3 March, LIB 
2006\77.
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precision is essential; this also occurs in most areas of knowledge: conceptual 
delimitation is one of the most enlightening spheres of reflection for scientists 
and philosophers, and it moreover constitutes a meeting place for all.
Depending on what euthanasia is considered to be, people will be prepared 
to accept it or not; depending on whether or not it is possible to establish a 
clear, precise meaning that delimits this conceptual field, it will be possible to 
reach agreement about the different ways of tackling it and it will consequent-
ly be feasible to draft a precise regulation that will provide the longed-for legal 
certainty without being detrimental to freedom and human dignity. Despite 
what certain initial coincidences might suggest, in this field things are neither 
clear nor easy. This is shown by the intense discussion in contemporary society 
about euthanasia, the sense or not of its legal regulation and, where appropri-
ate, specific formulas and legislative articles. Pope John Paul II even declared 
that euthanasia is the big issue of the late twentieth century. Sharing, more-
over, many of the fundamental problems that affect the issue of abortion, the 
problems with euthanasia are the kind that at any moment could affect each 
and every one of us — we all know that, where death is concerned, the ratio is 
still one per capita.
There are conflicting legal assets in the issue of euthanasia and this neces-
sarily means that the choice of prioritizing one over the others entails weighing 
them up. The different approaches point to the existence of various possibili-
ties of assessing the underlying interests and the priorities in their protection. 
The same thing happens with other manifestations of legal tensions, for example 
in the conflict between freedom and equality, or in the clashes between the right 
to information and to privacy that often cause so many disputes in the media, as 
is well known.
The greatest difficulty lies in making the right to a dignified death — which 
means not receiving inhuman or degrading treatment, the refusal of treat-
ment, self-determination and the right to decide about one’s own body, freely 
ending one’s own life, privacy — compatible with an idea of the right to life 
that, in practice, would like to be absolute, as far as euthanasia and abortion 
are concerned, but which, on the contrary, accepts consideration in its clash 
with different and, occasionally, merely material interests. 
This idea of the right to life, even against the person’s wishes, must give 
way to ideas more in keeping with the secular nature of the state and with re-
spect for the right to self-determination, bearing in mind the importance that 
the law attaches to the consent of the interested party and which in our system 
is far clearer than the concept based on guaranteeing the right to live at any 
cost. This does not in any way mean that the guarantees must be weakened, 
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but that it is necessary always to consider that they are established in favour of 
— and not against — the person who has the right to be respected, in all 
senses. 
Just as in the case of abortion, legislators have established a series of in-
stances in which it is considered that, given a series of specific pre-established 
circumstances, certain behaviours will not be punishable, although they may 
in fact be wholly typical, in the case of euthanasia the sick person’s wishes 
could be taken into consideration to establish either a cause for justification, 
or include an absolutory excuse, owing to the existence of a conflict of inter-
ests. These solutions would enable the courts to appreciate, in each case that 
came before them, whether or not there was an actual case of euthanasia, and 
they moreover have the precedent that the law already envisages similar treat-
ments not just for abortion but also in other cases of a conflict of values, as in 
theft between members of the same family.
The law must have a coherent response to enable it to provide a solution to 
the real problems that arise in society, no matter how new, unforeseen and 
controversial they may be, and even though it is foreseen that the legal solu-
tion adopted may be conflictive and even insufficient. It is, in sum, a case of 
regulating the existing reality, not a detached ideal situation.
Just as happened with issues that were in principle very problematic, like 
the reiterated example of divorce and abortion, or transplants, assisted repro-
duction and genetic manipulation, a complete legal regulation of euthanasia is 
something that must be tackled without delay, as it would make it possible to 
avoid immeasurable human suffering and help to clarify situations for which 
the legal response is anything but clear.
The death of Ramón Sampedro gave us a sad example of the true nature of 
the problem: after a long, complicated journey through the national and inter-
national courts of law, the tragic occasion seems to have arisen for which the 
crime defined in article 143.4 could be used for the first time.
It is known that the power of the law as a factor of social change is limited, 
but it exists, to a certain extent at least, and it must try to guide these changes 
in the direction that the majority of society demands, bearing in mind also 
that social issues never stand still.
Volition is, in any case, the key aspect of this regulation that should be 
established, respecting the right of doctors and healthcare personnel to consci-
entious objection, to participating in such acts by informing the patient of 
their right to change doctors, and enacting laws to make it easier for them to 
exercise their right to decide, while safeguarding their right to live, if they so 
wish. This law must pay special attention to overcoming problems derived 
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from the possibilities of manipulation of consent and, in such situations, of 
any kind of abuse aimed at obtaining illegal financial gain, by establishing 
that, in the event of this happening, such behaviour is punished appropriately. 
All these problems with legislative policy are complex and difficult to resolve 
but they are by no means unresolvable if they are tackled with the necessary 
rigour and respect.
9. Palliative care
Any regulation of euthanasia has to be extremely careful also with regard to 
respecting the rights of the terminally ill who do not wish to resort to eutha-
nasia or hasten the moment of death.
In this respect, it would be advisable to work for the introduction of pal-
liative care units to attend to the terminally sick, beyond recovery, who require 
technical care that relatives are unable to provide and which, moreover, needs 
the human dedication so necessary at such a time. 
The best-known initiative of this kind are the British hospices, centres 
where terminal patients are looked after in a family atmosphere, but which 
are equipped with every facility to be able to attend to the needs arising due 
to pain.
This hospice movement began in the UK in 1948, thanks to the efforts of 
Dr Cicely Saunders at St Thomas’s Hospital. Twenty years later, in 1967, it 
became a symbol of the best possible care for the terminally ill with the crea-
tion of St Christopher’s Hospice. In the 1980s, the number of hospices in-
creased and, moreover, new ways of applying their principles appeared, such as 
hospitalization units known as palliative care units within large hospitals, or 
home care teams, those of support and control of the symptoms, and day units 
which, maintaining the same principles of action, attempt to reduce the cost 
of these programmes. This tends to rise sharply due not just to what they rep-
resent in themselves, but to the greater staff numbers needed by these pro-
grammes: degenerative diseases, ageing of the population, the rise in the num-
ber of cancer and, even more, AIDS sufferers.
In Spain, some hospitals are equipped with palliative care units organized 
with a similar philosophy to that of the hospices system, and which are grow-
ing in importance. There is also the Spanish Society for Palliative Care.
The headquarters of the Catalan-Balearic Society for Palliative Care is in 
the College of Physicians of Barcelona, whose statutes consider the institu-
tion's main objective to be care of the physical, emotional, social and spiritual 
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aspects of people with terminal diseases, without the reasonable possibility of 
responding to treatment, whether caused by cancer, AIDS or any other chronic 
and progressive illness. It operates along the same lines as its counterparts, the 
Association for Palliative Medicine of Great Britain and Ireland, or the Interna-
tional Association for Hospice and Palliative Care, and it is extremely active. 
Several important documents have been published in recent years, by both 
the Spanish Society for Palliative Care and the Catalan-Balearic Society for 
Palliative Care, including:
 1) Guide to Emotional Support for Patients at the End of Life and Their Loved 
Ones (February 2010).22 This document advocates providing emotional 
support and including psychological aspects in decision making, detecting 
the psychological complications resulting from these processes, and reliev-
ing the suffering of the patient and his or her loved ones.
 2) Care through Food.23 This document tackles end-of-life nutritional issues 
(for example, the chapter entitled Asthenia, Nutrition and Anorexia in 
Cancer), myths are debunked (if you don’t eat you won’t get well, you can’t 
take the medicine on an empty stomach, etc.), nutritional recommenda-
tions are made (for example, taking part in choosing the menu will im-
prove the patient’s degree of control and self-esteem), and so on.
 3) Practical Guide for Handling Irruptive Pain in Cancer.24 This document 
lists advice, recommendations and treatments for relieving irruptive pain 
in cancer, defined as “a transitory exacerbation of pain that appears, either 
spontaneously or related to a predictable or unpredictable specific trigger, 
despite the existence of an adequately controlled stable basal pain”.
 4) Guide to Music Therapy in Palliative Care.25 This document analyses the 
patient’s involvement in musical and creative experiences, and to what ex-
tent they may have an impact on the improvement of his or her quality of 
life at this stage.
 22 Societat Catalano-Balear de Cures Pal·liatives Acadèmia de Ciències Mèdiques i de la Salut de Cata-
lunya i de Balears, at www.academia.cat/files/204-5908-FITXER/GuiaparalaatencionemocionalCast.
pdf, last visited May 2018.
 23 Librán, A. (ed.), at www.academia.cat/files/204-5901-FITXER/ComoCuidarAlimentando2014.pdf.
 24 Garzón Rodríguez, C.; Farriols Danés, C.; Rovira Oliva, G.; Rodríguez Trujillo, M.; 
Porta i Sales, J., at www.academia.cat/files/204-5902-FITXER/GUIACas tellanov1.pdf.
 25 Alegre, A.; Bellver, I.; Del Campo, P.; Navarro, C.; Ripa de la Concepción, A.; Rodríguez, P., 
at https://es.scribd.com/document/360699786/Grupo-de-Trabajo-de-Musicoterapia-de-La-Sociedad-
Espanola-de-Cuidados-Paliativos-MUSPAL, last visited, May 2018.
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Lastly, the World Health Organization has appointed Xavier Gómez 
Batiste, the director of the Chair of Palliative Care at the University of Vic 
(Barcelona) and the person who introduced palliative care to Catalonia, 
for the purpose of organizing the palliative care programmes in this or-
ganization, taking into consideration not only clinical factors but also, in 
his own words, “dignity, spirituality and loneliness”.26
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7	 transplants
1. Introduction1
The first bioethical conflicts in which the media coverage made a big impact 
on public opinion arose over heart transplants, since the possibility of replac-
ing a patient’s damaged heart with another healthy one from a deceased donor 
originated, apart from the natural scientific paradigm shift, a series of very 
important ethical and conceptual issues. Thus, questions such as human iden-
tity or the concept of death itself took on a new dimension thanks to the new 
technologies, generating an interesting debate that, over time, has been trans-
formed into a state of opinion favourable to this kind of operation.
The reality is that progress in surgical techniques and immunosuppressive 
drugs have made it easy to perform a large number of transplants, with a rea-
sonable level of success from the technical point of view, and this has contrib-
uted to them being widely accepted in society. Moreover, regulation of trans-
plants has allowed them to become widespread and, consequently, in the 
context of safeguarding the right to health, the adoption of incentivizing cri-
teria of solidarity and social wellbeing. 
The two mainstays of the success of the Spanish model have been, on one 
hand, making every citizen a potential donor through the regulation of pre-
sumed consent (the deceased’s organs can be removed and donated provided 
that they have not stated their opposition to it), with the requirement of altru-
ism in donation (financial gain is prohibited, as the human body and its parts 
cannot be the source of profit). On the other hand, no less important, is the 
model of transplant coordination, according to which in every transplanting 
hospital — and also those that only perform organ removals — there are pro-
 1 The precedent for this chapter was the chapter on bioethics and transplants in the book by Casado, M. 
(comp.) (2007). Nuevos materiales de bioética y derecho. Mexico City: Fontamara; and Principios 
éticos y nuevos problemas de los trasplantes. Manual de coordinación de trasplantes. Barcelona: Trans-
plant Procurement Management. Les Heures. University of Barcelona. Fundació Bosch i Gimpera, 
2005, pp. 337-346.
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fessionals specifically trained for this task, which includes the obtainment of 
the family’s consent (assent). The Spanish transplant model goes hand in hand 
with a high level of financial investment and has highly motivated personnel 
whose competence is recognized, and therefore this model has been copied in 
many countries.
2. Historical and legal context
Although we have become accustomed to the good acceptance that transplants 
enjoy in contemporary society, the reality is that, historically, not only has it 
been necessary to overcome technical obstacles, but moral ones as well.
Due to the prohibition, shared by Romans, Christians and Muslims (with 
honourable exceptions), on dissecting cadavers, for many centuries it was 
thought that the human body was similar to a pig’s, because doctors such as 
Galen had used these animals for their research and had extrapolated the re-
sults to human beings. As recently as the 1950s, Pope Pius XII spoke in these 
terms about transplants, then incipient:
To demonstrate that the extirpation of organs necessary for transplantation from 
one living being to another is in accordance with nature and legitimate, it is 
placed on the same level as that of a particular physical organ performed in the 
interest or for the benefit of a complete physical organism. The individual’s limbs 
would here be thought of as members and parts of the total organism that is 
humanity, just as — or almost — they are part of a person’s individual organism. 
The argument then goes that if it is permitted, in case of need, to sacrifice a par-
ticular part (hand, foot, eye, ear, kidney, sex gland) to the organism of man, it 
would be equally legitimate to sacrifice this particular part to the organism of 
humanity (in the person of one of its sick members). The end pursued by this 
line of argument, curing another’s person’s illness, or relieving it at least, is un-
derstandable and praiseworthy, but the method proposed and the proof on which 
it rests are erroneous.2
Religious taboos, irrationality, theological disquisitions, unjustified fears, 
and so on, have historically been obstacles as formidable as those inherent 
in discovering the secrets of nature, hence the huge difficulties that progress 
 2 Pius XII. Address to cornea donors. Unione Italiana dei Ciechi and Associazione Italiana de Medici 
Oculisti (14 May 1958), in Díaz Moreno, J. D. (1968). “Los trasplantes de corazón y su problemáti-
ca moral”. Arbor, April 1, no. 69, p. 268.
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in fields such as biomedicine or biotechnology has faced, similar to those that 
cosmology faced in its day.
Now that religious prejudices have been overcome, it can be said that organ 
transplants are one of the bioethical problems that have been most promptly 
regulated in different countries.3
In the case of Spain, the law establishes a series of general principles that 
attempt to combine the freedom of the person and the right to one’s own body 
with the altruistic act, with respect to society, that organ and tissue donation 
represents. The requirements demanded by law are the following:
1) The existence of a therapeutic end (although in the case of tissues — from a 
dead donor — teaching or research interest is also acceptable, as long as the 
ethical requirements for biomedical research are respected). In this sense, it 
may be said that the framework established by constitutional law for the safe-
guarding of health is in operation, which also includes the legally established 
presumption that every cadaver is a potential donor. Obviously the right to 
decide about one’s own body exists, but it must be exercised while the person 
is still alive. When the person dies, if they have not made use of their right to 
arrange something else, the value of solidarity with society as a whole takes 
precedence (we should remember that, from a legal point of view, the cadaver 
would be considered a thing).4 
 3 In the case of Spain, the regulation of this issue is the now classic Law 30/1979, of 27 October, regu-
lating the removal and transplantation of organs, which despite its age is still in force; Royal Decree 
1723/2012, of 28 December, regulating the activities of obtainment, clinical use and territorial coor-
dination of organs destined for transplantation, and establishing requisites of quality and safety; and 
Royal Decree 1825/2009, of 27 November, by which the Statute of the National Transplant Organiza-
tion is approved. By the Council of Europe, that laid down in the European Convention on Human 
Rights in Biology and Medicine, especially chapters VI and VII and in the additional Protocol on the 
transplantation of organs and tissues of human origin, which completes it, both ratified by Spain. At 
European Union level, there is Directive 23/2004/EC, of the European Parliament and the Council, 
of 31 March, relative to the establishment of quality and safety regulations for the donation, obtain-
ment, evaluation, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human cells and tissues; Di-
rective 2010/53/EU of the European Parliament and the Council, of 7 July 2010, on quality and 
safety regulations of human organs destined for transplantation; Implementation directive 2012/25/
EU, of 9 October, with the information procedures for exchange between member states of human 
organs destined for transplantation; and Directive 2015/566/EU, of 8 April, which applies Directive 
2004/23/EC with regard to procedures for verification of the equivalence of the quality and safety 
regulations of imported cells and tissues. Lastly, there is the Declaration of Istanbul on organ traffick-
ing and transplant tourism, in which guidelines are established for avoidance of commercialization 
and financial discrimination in this matter.
 4 We could add that the additional Protocol on the transplantation of organ and tissues of human origin 
establishes that “tissues will be assigned only to patients appearing on an official waiting list, according 
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2) Confidentiality. The law establishes that information may not be disclosed 
that would make it possible to identify either donors or receivers. Publicity about 
donation for specific cases of people or clinics is therefore not authorized. Obvi-
ously, in the case of inter vivos donation, this requirement does not apply.
3) Gratuity. This issue arouses controversy in international forums, since it 
questions whether the European model of gratuity, established specifically in 
article 21 of the Convention on Bioethics, is exportable. The different socio-
economic reality of some countries in the developing world poses the need to 
guarantee the existence of alternatives so that, in certain places, people are not 
obliged to resort to selling organs in order to financially ensure their survival 
and that of their family. The information we receive periodically about cases of 
organ trafficking (even by people condemned to death, as in the case of China) 
makes it clear, once again, that situations of extreme poverty and the lack of 
transparency encourage and provide cover for clandestine and iniquitous traf-
ficking that we must all condemn.
This requirement poses specific problems when exchange exists between 
countries with very different legal and cultural systems. For this reason, the 
European Union passed Implementing Directive 2012/25/EU, of 9 October, 
with the information procedures for exchange between member countries of 
human organs for transplantation. In this respect, the Protocol to the Conven-
tion on Bioethics establishes that:
In the case of international agreements about organ exchange, the procedures 
must also guarantee effective and justified distribution among all the participat-
ing countries, bearing in mind the principle of solidarity within each country.
Following this line of avoiding abuses or immoral practices in interna-
tional contexts, article 15.1 of the Royal Decree of 2012 establishes that, in 
Spain, human organs for transplantation entering or leaving the country will 
be subject to prior authorization by the Ministry of Health, Social Services 
and Equality, through the National Transplant Organization.
The establishment of especially scrupulous requirements between the dif-
ferent countries has been completed with specific calls to the medical com-
to transparent objective regulations, and duly justified as regards medical criteria” (Spain signed the said 
protocol through the Instrument of ratification of the additional Protocol to the Convention Relative 
to Human Rights and Biomedicine on the Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin, 
signed in Strasbourg on 24 January 2002. BOE no. 25; Thursday 29 January 2015). 
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munity, due to the privileged position it occupies in this kind of operation. 
Thus, article 4 of the additional protocol on the transplantation of organs and 
tissues of human origin establishes the following:
Article 4. Professional obligations and rules of conduct and protocol
Any intervention in the field of the transplantation of organs or tissues must be 
made respecting professional regulations and obligations, and the rules of conduct 
applicable in this matter. [Our italics.]
The ultimate aim is to avoid the commercialization of organs. Thus, the 
Declaration of Istanbul supplies two important definitions that must be borne 
in mind:
Organ trafficking is the obtainment, transportation, transfer, concealment or re-
ception of persons living or dead or their organs by way of a threat, the use of 
force or other forms of coercion, kidnapping, fraud, deception or abuse of pow-
er or of a vulnerable position; the handing over or receipt of payments or profits 
by a third party to obtain the transfer of control over the potential donor, aimed 
at exploitation through the removal of organs for transplantation.
The commercialization of transplants is a policy or practice in which an organ is 
treated as a commodity, including its purchase, sale or use to obtain material 
benefits.
However, the law has not put an end to the abuses that have direct or in-
direct repercussions on the issue of gratuity. Therefore, based on the fact that 
“the algorithms of organ allocation are very complex and include analytical 
data that can be manipulated”, Chloë Ballesté tells how, in recent years, sev-
eral cases of “fraudulent manipulation of analytical results by healthcare pro-
fessionals for the purpose of giving patients an advantage and prioritizing their 
transplants” have been uncovered in Germany.5 
And in Spain, in 2017 the Spanish Supreme Court confirmed a sentence by 
a provincial court in which two Spaniards were found guilty of paying a beggar 
from outside the EU to donate a kidney. The High Court ruled that an error 
of prohibition (not knowing that donation for money is prohibited) could not 
 5 Ballesté, C. “Donación y trasplante de órganos y tejidos: ¿altruismo o negocio?” In: Casado, M. 
(coord.). De la solidaridad al mercado. El cuerpo humano y el comercio biotecnológico. Barcelona: 
Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona, p. 242.
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be alleged for this type of case, which creates an important precedent for fu-
ture cases.6
In sum, we must stress that the requirement for gratuity is rooted not only 
in the concept of dignity, but it is also based on the value of fundamental 
equality among human beings and on the principle of non-discrimination for 
reasons of money, sex, race, nationality, or any other kind. Moreover, the risks 
concerning the continuity of this requirement are coming faster and faster due 
to technological progress, which is making it possible to divide the human 
body up into countless parts (cells, organs, genes, etc.) that may be the object 
of direct or indirect commercialization,7 or facilitating contact between inter-
ested parties without going through the proper channels (for example, through 
the creation of computer applications to put potential donors in contact with 
those in need of organs).
4) Education and publicity. Organ donation must always be encouraged gener-
ally, stressing especially its altruistic and voluntary nature. Indeed, our laws 
point specifically to the need for the healthcare authorities to promote the edu-
cation of the population on these matters, since it has been proven that the role 
of education in this field is crucial; hence the culture of donation must be 
stimulated if it is really considered that benefits worthy of being fostered arise 
from it.8 At the same time, the obligation of healthcare professionals to receive 
continuous training is emphasized in our legal system, a general obligation for 
these groups and which is even acknowledged ethically.
In conclusion, after 40 years of experience, a positive assessment can be 
made of the existing legal framework in Spain, as it has made it possible for the 
Spanish model to occupy a pioneering place in Europe and the world.
 6 Supreme Court. Criminal Law section. Section 1. Sentence no. 710/2017, of 27 October. RJ 2017/4697.
 7 See, on this point, the abovementioned book by Casado, M. “Gratuidad o precio.” In: Casado, M. 
(coord.) (2016). De la solidaridad al mercado. El cuerpo humano y el comercio biotecnológico. Mexico 
City: Fontamara, new edition by Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona, 2017.
 8 On this point, the Protocol to the Convention Relative to Human Rights and Biomedicine on the 
Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin states: “Considering that, taking into ac-
count the shortage of organs and tissues, suitable steps must be taken to increase donations of them, 
in particular by informing the public of the importance of organ and tissue transplants and through 
the promotion of cooperation in Europe in this field.” Moreover, article 6 of the Royal Decree of 
2012 establishes that: “2. Human organ donation will always be encouraged generally and its volun-
tary, altruistic and disinterested nature will be emphasized. 4. Publicity for organ donation for the 
benefit of specific people, healthcare centres, or institutions, foundations or particular companies is 
prohibited. Furthermore, deceptive publicity is expressly prohibited that is misleading about the 
obtainment and clinical use of human organs, according to available knowledge.” 
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3.  Bioethical aspects of removing organs  
and tissues from living persons
In Spain, the majority of the organs used for transplants come from cadavers. 
The success of our model has been based on the flexibility of the coordination 
of the detection and transplantation system and the proper management of 
waiting lists, taking into consideration obvious medical criteria. In this sense 
it may be said that the early inclusion in the law of brain death as a valid cri-
terion for certifying death was crucial for the development of transplants, from 
not just the medical point of view, but the legal one too.
Indeed, the drafting of Royal Decree 2070/1999, of 30 December, regulating 
the activities and the obtainment and clinical use of human organs, and territo-
rial coordination in matters of organ and tissue donation and transplantation, the 
precedent of the law currently in force, was due among other factors to the need 
to adapt the legal requirements to scientific progress. This meant, on one hand, 
accepting the new ways of determining death due to brain functions ceasing ir-
reversibly, according to reliable medical criteria; and on the other, considering the 
need to also consider death as being due to the irreversible stoppage of cardiores-
piratory functions, at the same time authorizing procedures to conserve organs so 
that they may be suitable later for transplants with guarantees of viability. 
The greater need for organs, however, together with the reduction in do-
nors arising from road accidents as a consequence of the many campaigns 
undertaken and safety measures adopted, has led to the boom in donation 
inter vivos, for which, moreover, better results are described. But must this 
possibility be encouraged? Might it be, to some extent, a form of emotional 
blackmail against the family? Organ donation for inter vivos transplants is 
authorized in Europe. The requirements are the following, taking into account 
both Spanish and European laws.
 a) This kind of transplant is only admissible if a suitable organ or tissue can-
not be obtained from a dead person and it is unfeasible to practise an alter-
native therapeutic method of comparable efficacy.
 b) The transplant must have a therapeutic end (it is not accepted for scien-
tific ends).
 c) The organ removed must be used to substantially improve the life expec-
tancy or conditions of the receiver.
 d) Organs from living donors for subsequent transplantation may only be 
obtained in hospitals and clinics that are expressly authorized by the com-
petent authority in the corresponding autonomous community.
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 e) Organs from a living donor may be removed in favour of a receiver with 
whom he or she has a close personal relationship. Nevertheless, the ab-
sence of such a close relationship is permitted, provided that the condi-
tions of this donation are predefined legally and an independent author-
ity approves it. 
 f ) The removal of the organ must be compatible with the life of the donor and 
must not cause a serious reduction of their functional capacity. This entails 
that removal will only be legal in the case of pairs of organs (kidneys for ex-
ample) and tissues that can be regenerated (for example, part of the liver).
 g) Independent information must be offered to the donor about the risks 
involved in the operation.
 h) Consent must be given freely, after previously receiving specific informa-
tion, without generic clauses or presumptions, but with an ad hoc act of 
volition that must be very personal. Article 13 of the Protocol establishes 
that consent must be provided in writing, or, failing that, before an official 
authority. However, in the case of Spain, the procedure that must be fol-
lowed is more strictly controlled, since article 8 of the Royal Decree of 2012 
establishes that consent must be given before the judge in voluntary juris-
diction proceedings, after a favourable ruling by the ethics committee of 
the hospital or clinic where the operation will be performed. Both require-
ments signify an important additional guarantee.
In this respect, the conclusion reached in the first National Congress 
on Bioethics and Transplants, in Pamplona in November 2003, is inter-
esting:
The fundamental objective of the committee, in this kind of report, is to be 
the donor’s guarantor and to endeavour to ensure, as far as is possible, that 
his or her decision is genuinely autonomous, that is, voluntary, free and suit-
ably informed and understood.9
A point of reference for assessing the level of suitability of this kind of 
transplant is medical ethics:
Organs must not be removed if this shortens the donor’s life expectancy, nor 
can the operation go ahead if the potential damage for the donor exceeds the 
 9 Martínez Urionabarrenetxea, K. “Consideraciones éticas del trasplante de donante vivo”. Tras-
plantament. Organització Catalana de Trasplantaments. Servei Català de la Salut. Societat Catalana 
de Trasplantament, pp. 10-13.
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benefits for the receiver, which rules out the use of single organs, or of an 
organ when what is left is insufficient or there is a risk of it being so.10
Lastly, we should point out the following rigorous and profound re-
flections on this issue:
Juan Luis Trueba, head of the Neurology department and former chairman 
of the Ethics Committee of Doce de Octubre Hospital, said he was con-
vinced that only the practical recognition of the coherent altruistic criterion 
of donors leads to the conviction that living-donor transplants must con-
tinue to be performed “despite the confirmation that the physical damage of 
both outweighs the physical benefit of the receiver”, he stated. “This prac-
tice, exceptional with respect to the principle of nonmaleficence, is extreme-
ly hard to manage and cannot be decided by the team of surgeons alone; but 
it must not be restricted”, Trueba claimed. “Because we must consider dam-
age not just as something physical or objective, but in relation to the values 
of the patient, gauging the moral or other type of satisfaction that the deci-
sion generates in the donor. In short, taking into account the patient’s scale 
of values and respecting the criteria of legality.”11 
 i) Article 13 of the Protocol to the European Convention on Bioethics estab-
lishes that the donor may withdraw their consent at any time before the 
operation. In the case of Spain, the legislation guarantees this possibility 
even more by requiring a period of at least 24 hours between the granting 
of consent and the transplant. In addition, it establishes that refusal to 
continue with the transplant does not under any circumstances make them 
obliged to pay compensation, a measure that for example is not specifi-
cally included in this protocol.
 j) Article 14 of the Protocol to the European Convention on Bioethics estab-
lishes specific requirements for the case of persons who lack the capacity to 
give consent. Thus, this type of donation must be exceptional and only for 
the removal of regenerable tissues (the donation of a kidney, for example, 
would be excluded). Further requirements are that the receiver must be a 
brother or sister; that the donation could save their life; that the donor 
 10 Quevedo Guanche, L. Consideraciones éticas en el trasplante hepático con donante vivo relacionado. 
Hospital Clínico Quirúrgico Hnos. Ameijeiras, at www.sld.cu/galerias/pdf/uvs/cirured/etica_trasplan 
te.pdf
 11 Muez, M. (2003). “Difícil balance entre riesgo y beneficio en los trasplantes de hígado de donante 
vivo”. El País, 2 December 2003.
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does not express their refusal to do it; and that consent be granted by a rep-
resentative of the donor or, failing that, the competent authority. These re-
quirements are only relaxed if the donation affects cells, in which case nei-
ther the receiver has to be a sibling, nor does it have to be a matter of life 
and death. The extraction of these cells must cause minimal risk and dis-
comfort.
Nevertheless, for the case of Spain article 8 of the Royal Decree of 2012 
restricts this kind of donation even more, since it establishes that the organ 
donor must not suffer from or present mental deficiencies, mental illness 
or any other condition due to which they are unable to give their consent 
in the way indicated. In addition, the obtainment of organs from minors 
is expressly excluded, even with the consent of their parents or guardians. 
In 2011 the University of Barcelona’s Bioethics and Law Observatory Opin-
ion Group published a document on living donor organ transplantation in 
which it recommended: a) considering this kind of transplant as subsidiary to 
cadaver transplantation, with the aim of avoiding illegal organ trafficking; 
b) avoiding gender bias, due to the fact that the percentage of living donors is 
greater in women than in men, and c) taking specific steps to guarantee in-
formed consent in this kind of donation, avoiding extreme situations that 
unduly pressurize donors.12
4.  Issues for debate: presumed consent 
and brain death
Science and the law are advancing at different rates because, among other fac-
tors, the pace of scientific discoveries and their practical application is cur-
rently accelerating, something especially obvious when it comes to creating 
rules for biotechnologies. Indeed, it is often pointed out that the very short 
time between discovery and application is one of the main reasons why the 
debate is so complicated, along with society’s lack of assimilation and reflec-
tion with respect to science and technology. This is the case with the determi-
nation of consent or with the criterion of death that it is decided to establish 
and the problems resulting from it.
 12 Document on Transplantation from Living Donors. Bioethics and Law Observatory, University of 
Barcelona. Coordinated by L. Busian, R. García Manrique, M. Mautone and M. Navarro (2011), at 
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/104602.
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4.1. Consent, presumed or express
With regard to the determination of a dead person’s consent in organ donation 
for transplantation, there are two systems in comparative law: a) the presump-
tion of this consent, unless expressly stated to the contrary, and b) the need to 
specifically formulate consent personally or through the family in the case of 
death, as its granting is not presupposed.
A paradigmatic example of the first option is Spanish legislation; and an 
example of the second system, which does not presume the deceased’s consent 
for the removal of organs and their subsequent donation, is the Chilean legal 
system. In other countries in the region, too, the issue has been fiercely de-
bated due to an underlying fear of being declared donors without the suffi-
cient guarantees that everything possible has been done to save the life of 
someone who it was believed was about to die. 
4.2. The criterion of brain death
The second issue that arouses profound reflection is the decision to adopt the 
criterion of brain death. This has in general been widespread in Europe and it 
has medical, ethical and legal agreement. It is interesting to mention the 
thoughts of the philosopher Peter Singer with regard to the way this criterion 
of death is regarded in our culture and the consequences of its medical and 
legal adoption.
In his book Rethinking Life and Death Singer draws attention to the 
changes implied in taking such a definition to its logical conclusion with re-
gard to the protection of goods and interests, pointing out that, precisely, 
ethics deals with making decisions about the right way to live life, which also 
includes death. Choosing brain death as a yardstick involves stressing its as-
sociation with the idea of consciousness, of personality, presenting many ad-
vantages for future transplant patients, without, on the other hand, harming 
anyone. 
The option taken in Spain by Royal Decree 2070/1999, of 30 December, 
and later by Royal Decree 1723/2012, leaves the decision of what evidence 
makes it possible to reliably determine a person’s death in the hands of the 
doctors, since this is a diagnosis that only specially qualified personnel can 
make. Article 9 of the Royal Decree of 2012 regulates this issue, together with 
the criterion of cardiorespiratory arrest, in the following way:
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2. Organs may only be obtained from deceased persons after diagnosis and certi-
fication of death performed in accordance with what is laid down in this royal 
decree and particularly in Appendix I, ethical requirements, scientific progress in 
the matter and generally accepted medical practice: […] The individual’s death 
may be certified after confirmation of the irreversible cessation of circulatory and 
respiratory functions, or irreversible cessation of brain functions. 3. Irreversible 
cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions will be acknowledged through 
an appropriate clinical examination after a suitable period of observation […] 
4. Irreversible cessation of brain functions, i.e., the confirmation of brain death 
for which the structural aetiology is known and irreversible in nature, will be 
acknowledged through a suitable clinical examination after an appropriate peri-
od of observation.
These are delicately balanced situations in which we must unavoidably 
make decisions. By choosing one position — even though it may be absten-
tion — one is also choosing an initiative, not just clinical but moral and legal. 
It is obvious that in Spain transplant legislation has followed correct patterns 
of legislative technique and, from its agreed drafting to its application by the 
judiciary, it is a model of consideration and of the public authorities’ involve-
ment in an undoubtedly social task. But legal regulation does not end the so-
cial debate and aspects still remain that deserve to be discussed and dealt with.
5. Xenotransplants
The scarcity of organs has forced researchers to ask themselves to what extent the 
organs, tissues and cells of animals may be compatible with human beings. Nev-
ertheless, this option raises many objections, both ethical and in reference to the 
safety of our species. We point out the following characteristics of this issue:
 a) Normalized use. Several products of animal origin are now frequently in 
use in medicine, such as insulin or conjunctive tissues; however, various 
difficulties arise depending on whether they are organs such as the heart 
— to which greater symbolic importance is attached — or living tissues, 
which may give rise to problems to which science has yet to find an answer.
 b) Rejection. An important problem that must be considered is the rejection 
of the transplanted organs. Although it may be said that in recent years 
progress has been made in the control of the phenomena of rejection and 
compatibility, there are still obscure areas, including from the psychologi-
cal point of view.
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 c) Transmission of viruses. It is also necessary to take into consideration the 
risks involved with xenotransplants, not just from the point of view of 
the subject who takes the decision to have one, but for the society in 
which they live, as this kind of transplant may cause viruses and retrovi-
ruses to break through the barriers between different species and mutate 
unpredictably. The assumption or not of this kind of scenario overrides any 
personal decision, hence individual risks and benefits, on one hand, and 
those assumed by the group, on the other, must be assessed. In our opin-
ion, the subject’s mere consent cannot be a good enough guarantee, as it 
must be weighed up by the community as a whole, and by the relevant 
public authorities.
 d) Choice of species. Even supposing that it is legitimate to agree to the use 
of animals to save human lives, problems also arise when choosing the 
animal species from which the organs must be taken. The use of primates 
was initially proposed, due to their greater proximity to humans, but these 
days it is considered preferable to use pigs, due to their habitual consump-
tion and the ease of breeding them. Primates, besides being protected spe-
cies, cause greater moral unease, precisely because of their proximity to our 
species.
 e) Financial aspect. Xenotransplants are an important potential market for 
the major biotechnological and pharmaceutical companies, whereby there 
is a risk of purely financial criteria prevailing where up to now the principle 
of gratuity has been consolidated. It is also true that, on the other hand, it 
could be argued that the spread of xenotransplants might make it possible 
to put an end to organ trafficking.
 f ) The initial stages of the use of xenotransplants in human beings are particu-
larly difficult, firstly when carrying out the first clinical trials and deciding 
who will be the most suitable patients for them, and then due to the need 
to establish epidemiological controls and rules to be followed by the health-
care authorities. Besides the need to establish rigorous criteria for inclu-
sions in the lists, it is also necessary to put in place clear procedures to 
ensure that the information patients receive is exhaustive and that the con-
sent they give is truly informed and free. Competent specialists are needed 
for this, bearing in mind that prolonged isolation measures may be neces-
sary and that false hopes must not be raised.
 g) Genome editing. Parallel to these debates, important progress is taking place 
in genome editing, paving the way for the widespread use of xenotrans-
plants. Techniques such as CRISPR, which make it possible to activate or 
silence genes, or to transfer genes from one species to another very easily 
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and cheaply, will in the not too distant future make it possible to prevent 
the organs from different animal species, pigs especially, from transferring 
viruses to humans, hence the hopes placed in this technique. 
 h) The law. In neither Spain nor the European Union are xenotransplants 
specifically prohibited. Another matter is the precaution with regard to 
this issue. In this respect, the Ruling of the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the proposed directive of the European Parliament and the 
Council relative to the establishment of quality and safety regulations for 
the donation, obtainment, verification, processing, storage and distribu-
tion of human cells and tissues (COM, 2002, 310, 2002/0128 COD) pro-
posed to exclude from the scope of this regulation the organs, tissues and 
cells used in xenotransplants, due to the fact that “a great deal of research 
still remains to be done”. Following this proposal, Directive 23/2004/EC, 
of the European Parliament and the Council, of 31 March 2004, relative to 
the establishment of quality and safety regulations for the donation, ob-
tainment, verification, processing, storage and distribution of human cells 
and tissues, excluded organs, tissues and cells of animal origin from the 
scope of application. And Royal Decree 1723/2012, of 28 December, which 
regulates the activities of obtainment, clinical use and territorial coordina-
tion of organs destined for transplantation and the establishment of qual-
ity and safety requisites, also excluded xenotransplants from its regulation. 
 i) Moratorium. In 1999, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Eu-
rope issued a resolution in which, protected by the principle of precaution, 
it called for a legally binding moratorium for xenotransplantation to be 
decreed, due to the risks it generates for humans.13 However, this proposal 
received a lukewarm response in the scientific community, the predomi-
nant opinion being that it was better to continue with research, maximiz-
ing precautions of course, but in any case without halting progress. The 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe limited itself to creating 
a working party that concluded its meetings with a document entitled 
“The situation in the field of xenotransplantation”,14 the step prior to the 
 13 Recommendation 1399/1999, on Xenotransplantation. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (29 January 1999).
 14 European Commission. Health & Consumer Protection Directorate General. Opinion on the state 
of the art concerning xenotransplantation. Adopted by Scientific Committee on Medicinal Products 
and Medical Devices (1 October 2001), at http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/committees/scmp/
documents/out38_en.pdf.
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publication of Recommendation 10/2003, on Xenotransplantation,15 in which, 
contravening the Parliamentary Assembly, it did not propose a moratori-
um, but specific precautionary measures for this kind of transplant.
In conclusion, everything that has so far been mentioned clearly shows 
that there is a need for specific national and international regulations to estab-
lish a harmonized framework of certainty and safety. The different legal sys-
tems must ensure that caution prevails in a field in which the potential dangers 
are not properly controlled and where there is the need for more in-depth 
preclinical research before taking the step of agreeing to clinical trials with hu-
man beings. This is a good place to turn to the oft-mentioned principle of 
precaution and to invoke the need to maximize responsibility when weighing 
up risks and benefits.
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8	 Bioethics and environmentalism
1. Introduction1
Multiple theories and ideas converge in environmentalism. They include reli-
gious premises, condensed in the dichotomy between monotheism and pan-
theism; alternatives to the present economic model, reflected in the dichotomy 
between capitalism and socialism; theories about the moral and ontological 
status of non-human living beings; reflections on our long-term survival; 
needs in biomedicine and biotechnology; psychological projections about 
“Mother Nature”; climate change; mythical narratives about an idealized past; 
inescapable realities of the present; future dystopias, and many other things.
In this chapter we shall analyse some factors related to environmentalism, 
for instance the degree of contemporary overlap between bioethics and envi-
ronmentalism; the existence of environmentalist statements in every meta-
narrative intended to serve as an existential guide to human beings; our his-
torical relationship with the planet, of which we are a part; the relationship 
between science and technology and the planet; our expectations about life, in 
both the short and the long term; our dependence, inescapable for now, on 
animals in biomedicine, and the degree of unnecessary cruelty that our species 
inflicts on animals. 
After reflecting briefly on these issues, we shall propose a model for analys-
ing the narratives about environmentalism using two variables, anthropocen-
trism and biocentrism. The resulting four models will enable us to fit in para-
digms as diverse as Judaeo-Christianity, Marxism, the animal rights movement 
and ecofeminism.
 1 This chapter is an adaptation of the paper on bioethics and environmentalism, written by Manuel 
Jesús López Baroni, and it forms part of the teaching materials for the University of Barcelona’s 
master’s degree in Bioethics and Law. www.bioeticayderecho.ub.edu/master. 
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2. Prior issues
When analysing environmentalism it is necessary to take into account several 
superimposed thematic lines, hence we shall try to separate them in order to 
get a broader perspective. We shall comment briefly on the following issues:
2.1. Environmentalism in the early days of bioethics
As we have already mentioned, in the early days of bioethics there was a bitter 
debate about what subject should predominate in our discipline: environmen-
talism (the case of Potter, with reminiscences of Jahr) or clinical ethics (the 
case of the Jesuits of Georgetown). This theoretical debate, which was initially 
won by the Jesuits, is now clearly out of date due to the rapid development of 
biotechnology.
The possibility of modifying ad hoc the genetic makeup of living beings 
confers upon us a power different to that which the human race has histori-
cally had. The mechanisms of selection and crossbreeding, which for millennia 
produced certain animals (for example, dogs and cows) and food (maize, 
wheat, rice) have given way to a new, more substantial, global, and occasion-
ally disheartening form of intervention in nature. 
For this reason, although ecological concerns predate the development of 
bioethics, we may maintain that for different reasons, among them the accel-
eration of technology, they have in the end converged. Developing human 
organs in pigs to be transplanted, modifying insects genetically so that they 
can propagate and replace the already existing ones, creating human brain 
organules in rats to study our mental illnesses, gestating new life forms through 
synthetic biology, and so on, are lines of research that show us a high degree of 
overlap between animals, plants, the ecosystem, biomedicine, ethics and envi-
ronmentalism. Not to mention the political, social and economic implications 
of these issues, against a backdrop of global warming. If it was once considered 
that environmentalism and bioethics were two separate disciplines, there can 
now be no doubt about how interrelated they are.
2.2. Environmentalism in the great metanarratives
Every worldview that aspires to make sense of or govern human beings con-
tains axioms about what our relationship with all other living beings and even 
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the ecosystem should be. From this postulate we see that instead of trying to 
define what environmentalism is, we should rather be examining the attitudes 
of different ideologies — religions included — towards the environment; that 
is, how these paradigms explain, justify and provide rationale for human be-
ings’ position of hierarchy or equality with regard to all other living beings, 
how legitimate their use is, what level of replacement and expansion we accept 
from the other species, and so on. 
These differences between some worldviews and others are why we can talk 
of environmentalist attitudes. And, at the same time, maintain that there is no 
such thing as pure, strictly ecological environmentalism, which is only con-
cerned about the ecosystem or non-human living beings, since the response to 
our relationship with our immediate surroundings is part of a larger series of 
statements that tell us which political model is better, what the relationship 
between human beings, peoples, cultures, should be like, what moral codes are 
acceptable, and an endless list of variables about communal living. 
Metanarratives are all-encompassing explanations or justifications (world-
views, Weltanschauung, systems, etc.). Every metanarrative that aspires to dom-
inate the human mind starts with an explanation of who we are and how we 
have reached this point. And our relationship with the world around us is part 
of this narrative.
This tells us, for example, that worldviews as different as Catholicism and 
Marxism have positioned themselves with regard to environmentalism. Their 
respective axioms (God exists, class division is the driver of society) make 
their environmentalist postulates coherent, which moreover discredit one an-
other (the other is not a true environmentalist). Given that we do not have a 
metaphysical referee to decide who is more environmentalist than who, the 
result is a confused mixture of ideas, postulates and proposals that become 
more complex as we include more factors of analysis.
2.3. Religions and economics
One of the many classifications that can be made of religions distinguishes 
between monotheistic systems (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) and pantheistic 
ones, whose variability, in turn, exceeds the space we are able to devote to 
them here. With regard to our subject, we can claim that, with the logical 
qualifications, monotheistic religions are based on the premise that everything 
we see and touch has been created by their respective god and is at the service 
of the human race.
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On the contrary, not only would pantheistic religions place humans on an 
equal footing with nature, they also sacralise it, attributing to it spiritual, mi-
raculous qualities. Obviously, in this second group human beings’ de facto 
power over nature would be more limited, so even more than in monotheism 
a large number of taboos, myths and prohibitions would restrict the acts that 
are legal when interfering in nature.
We can understand the way in which religion is able to condition, by plac-
ing ourselves at the extremes. The Calvinism that Weber described maintains 
that God has already decided who is going to Heaven and who to Hell.2 But 
as we do not know, we can only sense our future in the afterlife through signs. 
Thus, if life is good for us on Earth (success in business, in politics, with 
friends), it is a sign that we are on the side of the chosen ones. Neoliberal 
capitalism would be a collateral effect of these presuppositions, and with them, 
any idea of respect, not just for the environment or animals, but for all other 
human beings, is pointless.
Thus, a religious worldview that promotes harmonious coexistence with its 
surroundings will depend completely on gathering food (we are going to sup-
pose that not only would they not hunt, they would not use domestic animals 
either because it would be another way of objectifying nature). With a world-
view such as this, certain levels of welfare would never be surpassed (there are 
many urban legends about hunter-gatherers’ quality of life. If on top of that 
they are forbidden to hunt for moral reasons, the legend achieves the status of 
a children’s fable).
The archetypal rapacious predatory neoliberal will always be able to say that 
thanks to the technological advances inherent in unbridled capitalism, some 
day we will cease to use animals as a source of nutrition or to test drugs (he is 
working to make the future of the human race ecological). On the contrary, a 
mystic and contemplative pantheist will always maintain that we only need 
plants to feed ourselves and that the Earth would be better off without us. The 
former will have it thrown in his face that we may end up destroying the planet 
through his intensive exploitation; the latter, that without science and technol-
ogy we will be the ones that go extinct. Between both extremes there would be 
numerous narratives, with their contradictions, no matter how eclectic they are. 
Norway, for example, is the dream of anyone who aspires to live in a social 
state. Its level of wellbeing, quality of life and respect for nature is the envy of 
 2 Weber, M. (2003). La ética protestante y el espíritu del capitalismo. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica.
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all Europe. One thing is usually overlooked, however. The largest investment 
fund in the world (sovereign fund, in technical language; vulture fund in pop-
ular language) is the Norwegian, which is funded with the resources from the 
extraction of a gigantic oilfield inside its territory.
In other words, the model we all aspire to is financed by lending money to 
countries with financial problems, countries whose public debt has spun out 
of control and which as a side effect generates cuts in healthcare, education, 
and so on (we only have to think of Greece, Portugal or Spain). Thus, the larg-
est investment fund in the world finances one of the best systems of social 
protection in Europe, but it does so at the expense of extracting finite natural 
resources, such as oil, which is essential in highly industrialized (i.e. polluting) 
societies, and moreover it lends money at the highest possible rate of interest 
to countries in debt, according to a Calvinist logic that is universally reviled 
when others do it but not when we do.
In short, if we correlate the two groups of religions mentioned, monothe-
ism and pantheism, with a third subject, economics, we can understand some 
issues related to environmentalism. Thus, a narrative that promotes the sa-
cralisation of nature will be more spiritual, respectful and environmentalist 
than one that does not promote it, of course, but it will also have less techno-
logical and scientific development. And on the other hand, capitalism, the 
industrial and technological revolutions, scientific and economic develop-
ment, are the consequence of narratives (liberalism, Judaeo-Christianity, 
Marxism even, although from another economic perspective) that subordinate 
everything around us to our vital and intellectual needs, such as simple human 
curiosity, for instance.
When it comes to maintaining an environmentalist discourse, one must 
choose. It is essential to explain and justify how we should function on a plan-
etary scale, since upholding local environmentalism at the expense of bleed - 
ing other countries dry, economically speaking, is as contradictory as defending 
planetary environmentalism at the expense of local scientific and technological 
progress.
2.4. The use of animals
Non-human living beings are so different from one another that it is frankly 
difficult to find generic rules that unify, for example, insects, species in danger 
of extinction, species that interact damagingly with the environment and en-
danger other species, mammals, and so on. The Australians’ desperate efforts 
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to exterminate millions of rabbits whose uncontrolled reproduction in their 
country threatens the habitats of other species (they have even used bacterio-
logical weapons) are a good example of our contradictions.
The great apes represent our perplexity like no other group. Their genetic 
proximity to us has been the justification for attempting to grant them rights 
comparable to human rights (for example, the Great Ape Project). Critics say 
that rights can hardly be granted to those who have no responsibilities (and yet 
we give them to children), but, even so, a line of thinking has emerged that 
raises the status of the great apes with respect to all other living beings with the 
aim of banning experimentation with them or keeping them in non-natural 
habitats.
It was at this juncture where the expression “sentient beings” appeared, 
that is, non-human living beings that have feelings, on which the intention is 
to confer superior status. 
Sentient being status has to face the inescapable fact that at the present 
time using animals to test drugs before they are given to humans is essential. 
No computerized model can replace the empirical verification of the effects on 
animals. This does not mean that it is not legitimate to aspire to replace them, 
but nothing points to it being possible in the medium term. In fact one of the 
paradoxes of the most modern technology, for now at least, is that not only is 
it not reducing our dependence on animal models but it is increasing it. Thus, 
for example, it is unthinkable to apply genome editing techniques, such as 
CRISPR, to human beings without first having experimented with them on 
animals close to us. And if human organs were successfully created in pigs, 
with the aim of transplanting them later, or even in the great apes, it would be 
such a significant advance for our expectancy and quality of life that we could 
hardly renounce it.
This reality check leads us to maintain that the most we can do is restrict 
the use of animals (for example, only when it is essential) and to mitigate their 
suffering as far as possible. 
Of course, there are narratives that advocate eliminating ipso facto this use 
of animals, but there are important contradictions. Directly or indirectly, con-
sciously or unconsciously, the members of the human race benefit, and will 
continue to benefit, from the use of animals. “Don’t see, don’t ask, don’t want 
to know” is a legitimate option as long as it is consistent (for example, re-
nouncing any human service or product, medicine included, where animals 
have previously been used).
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2.5. The anthropological scale as an erroneous scale
When analysing our relationship with the ecosystem and all other living be-
ings it is interesting to use non-human, i.e. geological, timescales.
Thus, in the last 100 years we have discovered that: a) there have been five 
great extinctions of living beings in the world; b) there are cosmological events 
(falling meteorites, supernova explosions, gamma rays) that would devastate 
life on our planet without us being able to do anything about it, and c) it is 
reasonable to infer that sooner or later the human race will face an event of this 
kind (for example, although millions of years from now, the sun will defi-
nitely become a red giant and will swallow up the Earth. For anyone who 
wants to see what a falling meteorite would mean, look for information on 
internet about the one that crashed into Jupiter in July 2009, and imagine the 
effects if it happened on Earth). 
What place does science and technology have in this context, which is of-
ten overlooked because it belongs to another kind of worry? It seems obvious 
that contemplative mysticism would condemn us to the randomness of events. 
Only luck would prolong our existence.
At the other extreme are the so-called disruptive technologies (synthetic 
biology, biotechnology, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, and so on), on 
to which we project our hopes of salvation in the long run (for example, in the 
seemingly distant future we aspire to leave our planet, taking with us as many 
living beings as we can). With disruptive technologies we are also going to 
need luck, of a different kind of course, but luck all the same. The possibility 
of us losing control of these technologies would condemn us long before na-
ture itself does so.
This is the perspective from which we must view global warming. It is of-
ten forgotten that climate change has been a constant feature of the history of 
our planet (the Earth as a snowball is an extreme case of cooling, but there 
have been other periods with a higher average temperature than now) and its 
causes are not easy to understand, from volcanoes to the movement of the 
solar system around the galaxy (almost no one knows either that we complete 
a lap of the galaxy every 250 million years, and that our own galaxy spins 
around a black hole at a rotational speed of nearly one million kilometres an 
hour). We can only think about the stability of the climate, or even of the 
Earth, from ignorance.
The problem of climate change does not lie in change in itself, but in its 
causes: we — our species — are causing it, and in an extraordinarily short 
period of time. Although some scientists dispute the existence of the Anthro-
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pocene (our epoch is the Holocene, a period that began about 10,000 years 
ago and which is characterized by stable warm temperatures), no scientist dis-
putes the gradual warming of the planet due to our industrial activity (deniers 
are to climate change what creationists are to biology. In fact, Conservapedia3 
devotes an article to the climate change “conspiracy”, similar to the fossils con-
spiracy).
What conclusions can we draw from the reality in which we live? Basically, 
that if we do nothing we will become extinct; and if we go too quickly, as well. 
The truth is that Mother Nature lacks objectives, ends or an ultimate purpose, 
and this is why it is so dangerous to idealize it. Of the five species of hominids 
that existed when we appeared, we are the only ones left. If we cast our gaze 
back, or around us, we can only observe the constant disappearance of species, 
the victims of circumstances that they were unable to control.
We must place reflection on our relationship with all other living beings 
and how to preserve the planet for future generations between these two ex-
tremes, contemplating or accelerating. 
2.6. Human stupidity
We cannot think about environmentalism without all our collective “skills” 
coming to the surface. The dodo, a type of flightless bird (hence it was ini-
tially called Didus ineptus),4 represents the best possible example of this issue. 
Cut off with the fauna of Madagascar, it never encountered a human being 
until the sixteenth century, and so it did not run away from us. We know that 
it existed from the drawings left by colonists. According to legend the last one 
was beaten to death for fun. Even Schopenhauer had a theory about its lack of 
adaptation for survival.
Human stupidity is a variable that must be taken into account. On one 
hand, it is true that nature is sacralised, and protective, magical, shamanic and 
spiritual properties are attributed to it, sometimes putting environmentalism 
in the same bag as esoterica, but on the other hand human beings justify un-
necessary animal suffering using big words (culture, folklore, tradition, etc.). 
Many towns and villages in Spain preserve traditions (pulling at the body of a 
 3 It is an encyclopaedia created by American neoconservatives because they consider Wikipedia to be 
too liberal. It is illustrative to read its articles on creationism, global warming, etc. At https://es.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Conservapedia.
 4 Shapiro, B.; Sibthorpe, D.; Rambaut, A., et al. (2002). “Flight of the Dodo.” Science, 1 March, p. 1683.
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hen hanging by the neck, throwing animals off the church bell tower, setting 
fire to a bull’s horns) that can only be described as stupid. Only recently have 
we begun to reflect on our barbarity. 
Stupidity also functions on a planetary scale. We have thousands of nu-
clear bombs designed to eliminate all signs of life. The first time a nuclear ex-
plosion was tested it was thought that it might cause the whole of the Earth’s 
atmosphere to ignite, but that did not stop it being tested. Radioactive fallout, 
carbon emissions, the emergence of leaders at the limits of normality, competi-
tion between blocks of countries for finite natural resources, the fragility of 
life, cosmologically speaking, are all factors that ultimately interact with hu-
man stupidity, with unpredictable results. 
3. The narratives of environmentalism
Bearing in mind the many issues that must be taken into account when link-
ing bioethics to environmentalism, we are briefly going to analyse the narra-
tives that we can find in forms of environmentalism. For this, we shall use two 
variables, anthropocentrism and biocentrism, with two true values (represent-
ed by the numbers 1 or 0), and this produces a total of four possible combina-
tions. We shall analyse them very succinctly, as it will enable us to fit in other 
issues related to this one. 
3.1. “Anthropocentrism (1)” –  “biocentrism (0)”
In this first combination, human beings are at the top of the hierarchy, so that 
all the living beings around us would be at our service. The only limit would 
be not to mistreat other living beings unnecessarily, as we would be guilty of 
unjustified depredation. It would be the model typical of Judaeo-Christianity, 
of the European enlightened liberal tradition, and of Marxism too.
For Judaeo-Christianity the world and everything in it has been created by 
God, but there is an ontological gradation. The human being is on top, and all 
other living beings and inert matter are at our service (“And God said, let us 
make mankind in our image … to rule over the animals”, Genesis, 1:26; “so 
that with the subjection of all things to man the name of God may be admired 
in the world”, Vatican Council II). Jesús Mosterín reminds us that Saint Au-
gustine made the transition from a love of animals and plants, typical of veg-
etarian Manichaeism, to Christian anthropocentrism: “Christ himself showed 
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that refraining from killing animals and destroying plants is the height of su-
perstition” (Saint Augustine, in Mosterín,5 2014:55). This tradition was contin-
ued by Saint Thomas in the Middle Ages: “Hereby is refuted the error of those 
who claim it is sinful for a man to kill dumb animals […] He that kills an-
other’s ox, sins, not through killing the ox, but through injuring another man 
in his property.”6 And, in the Enlightenment, Kant says, “that he [in reference 
to human beings] constitutes in reality the natural end, and nothing of that 
which lives on the earth could compete with him in this sense”.7
This simple scheme permits the exploitation of all other living beings, eco-
systems and all the resources we can extract from the environment. And, ulti-
mately, capitalism.
However, Christian anthropocentrism has two limits: a) depredation is 
prohibited, that is, the unjustified destruction of all other living beings and 
ecosystems, and b) the sacralisation of nature is prohibited. In other words, 
nature has been created by God, but it is not in itself God. Hence, the Com-
pendium of the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church repudiates ecocentrism 
and biocentrism, without in doing so ceasing to consider itself environmental-
ist (“The Magisterium stresses the responsibility of humans to preserve a whole 
and healthy environment for all.”).8 The first encyclical by the present pope, 
Francis, talks precisely about environmentalism, but stays within the limits 
mentioned.9
The paradigm of European enlightened/liberal modernity, even when it 
demystifies the justification of our position in the pyramid, includes that same 
model in its relationship with all other living beings. Human beings are at the 
top. And all the other living entities remain at our service. The development of 
capitalism in the last 200 years, via the industrial and technological revolu-
tions, has only been possible through the use of a worldview that makes the 
intensive exploitation of natural resources possible (which has not prevented 
some enlightened souls from showing themselves to be more respectful of ani-
mals than their contemporaries).
Lastly, Marxism also corresponds to this Judaeo-Christian model mediated 
by Eurocentric liberal enlightenment. The unit of interest of Communism is 
 5 Mosterín, J. (2014). El triunfo de la compasión. Nuestra relación con los otros animales. Alianza Edito-
rial, pp. 55-56.
 6 Ibid.
 7 Ibid.
 8 Catholic Church, op. cit., Compendio de la doctrina social de la Iglesia católica, pp. 131-132.
 9 Francis (2015). On Care for our Common Home. Encyclical letter.
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the working class, as the convertible human being is in Christianity and the 
bourgeois in the enlightened liberal model. And our entire environment, eco-
systems and living beings included, is subordinated to the interests of the pro-
letariat. The Marxist pyramid of interest is the same as the Christian and lib-
eral ones, for all that its theoretical presuppositions (materialism) are different. 
Indeed, it is interesting to compare Soviet and western constitutionalism: be-
fore the Constitution of 1977 the obligation to preserve nature was not men-
tioned in the USSR, an obligation that would be remembered by Gorbachev 
in his speech to the Supreme Soviet in 1988, just before the final collapse of the 
Communist bloc,10 conditioned by the nuclear accident at Chernobyl two 
years earlier. Something similar occurs with Cuban constitutions.
The conclusion is obvious: concern in the Communist world for the rights 
of animals or the protection of ecosystems has been historically non-existent. 
And when they began to think about this issue, they copied the articles from 
Western liberal constitutions that established generic obligations related to the 
duty to preserve nature.
We can contrast the model that we are examining with one of the issues of 
biotechnology and environmentalism that has received most coverage in the 
media: genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The Compendium of the So-
cial Doctrine of the Catholic Church authorizes intervention in the genetic 
makeup of non-human living beings. The recent encyclical by Pope Francis 
even establishes analogies between what our ancestors did, through the selec-
tion and crossbreeding of species, and modern genetic engineering.
Similarly, there is no classic Marxist text from which the conclusion can be 
drawn that modifying the genetic makeup of living beings is, for example, a 
bourgeois heresy. On the contrary, and in the light of its constitutionalism, we 
may be certain that if the Soviet Union had had the right technology, it would 
also have competed with the United States of America in genetically modified 
organisms.
Pope Francis alerted people in the encyclical to the social and economic 
effects of GMOs: the concentration of land in the hands of a few people, the 
disappearance of small producers, the migration of farmers upon not being 
able to compete with companies producing GMOs, oligopoly and the denun-
ciation of (sterile) “terminator” seeds because they generate the farmer’s con-
tractual dependence, and so on. 
 10 Mikhail Gorbachev, report submitted in the twelfth extraordinary period of sessions of the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR of the eleventh legislature (29 November 1988).
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This same discourse would be possible from a Marxist perspective. That is, 
GMOs are not in themselves sinful (Christian perspective) nor do they consti-
tute in themselves an affront for the working class (Marxist perspective). The 
same social and economic consequences (monopoly, dependence, unemploy-
ment, etc.) are denounced in the papal encyclical and, from a Marxist perspec-
tive, could be assumed as demands typical of socialism. But under no circum-
stances does this condemnation mean replacing a hierarchical model with 
human beings at the top with another in which the moral and ontological 
status of people, plants and animals is the same.
Lastly, a legal example of the model that we are examining (pre-eminence 
of the human being with non-predatory obligations with respect to all other 
living beings) is constituted, in Spain, by the reform in 2010 of the Criminal 
Code:11
Anyone who by any means or procedure unjustifiably mistreats a domestic or 
tame animal, causing its death or injuries that seriously endanger its health, will 
be punished with three months to a year in jail and special disqualification of 
one to three years from the exercise of any profession, trade or business that is 
related to animals.
As can be seen, the crime consists in unjustifiably mistreating a domestic 
or tame animal, whereby it is inferred that it is possible to mistreat it justifiably 
(previously “cruelty” was necessary for it to be a crime). This article would 
make the exploitation of animals and even, indirectly, bullfighting non-pun-
ishable (it would have to be decided whether or not the fighting bull, a human 
creation through selection and crossbreeding, can be classed as a tame animal), 
since it could be argued that the justification (which does not mean that we 
agree) is economic, folkloric, etc.
This modification of the Criminal Code is in accordance with article 45 of 
the Spanish constitution, which obliges the public authorities to ensure the “ra-
tional use of all natural resources”, an expression that perfectly reflects the para-
digm that we have examined: the subordination of nature to human beings, 
but at the same time a tacit prohibition of its rapacious and predatory exploi-
tation (“irrational use”).
 11 Sole article 99 of Organic Law 5/2010, of 22 June, RCL\2010\1658.
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3.2.  “Anthropocentrism (1)” – “biocentrism (1)”
The second model, while still valuing the moral and ontological status of hu-
man beings, attempts to elevate the position of all other living beings and of 
ecosystems, to the extent of proposing measures that would be to the detri-
ment, not of human survival, but of their economic growth, which would also 
have repercussions for scientific and technological progress.
The narratives that we can place in this line, and the justifications and ul-
timate aims, are very different from one another, and we obviously lack the 
space here to examine them in sufficient detail. We shall make do with citing 
them briefly, showing to what extent they not only coincide but also differ 
from one another.
3.2.1. Ecoliberalism
Historical liberalism generally belongs to the previous paradigm, as we have 
said. But that has not prevented some thinkers in that liberal / enlightened / 
rational / scientific tradition from taking a step further in favour of the protec-
tion of the environment and of animals in particular. 
This is the case of the philosopher Jesús Mosterín. Although he is an out-
standing philosopher of science, we could place his political thinking in the 
liberal tradition (not neoliberal, far from it) to which very famous authors like 
Ortega y Gasset or Isaiah Berlin also belong. His thinking can be summarized 
in the following ideas:12
 a) He considers environmentalism and vegetarianism to be moral options. In 
line with legal positivism (Kelsen) he rejects the existence of natural rights, 
hence he maintains that animals or the environment lack intrinsic para-
Kantian value. He simply considers that the conservation of nature and 
the avoidance of animals’ suffering would be a higher moral stage, specifi-
cally, an ethics of compassion, the continuer of enlightened rational tradi-
tion. For this reason, he views his criticisms of bullfighting not just from 
the perspective of the animals’ suffering, but also from that of cultural 
backwardness, as yet another manifestation of the gratuitous barbarity and 
 12 The work of reference, in this case, is El triunfo de la compasión. Nuestra relación con los otros ani-
males. Alianza Editorial, 2014.
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ignorance bequeathed by King Ferdinand VII and continued by the ma-
jority of our contemporary leaders.
 b) This rejection of the existence of natural rights (which he calls a myth, al-
though a useful myth) is what leads him to maintain that there is nothing 
to stop animals being granted rights, although responsibilities should not 
be demanded of them. The responsibilities would be ours towards them. 
And this legal act is as possible and legitimate as any other that has taken 
place throughout history, without it being necessary to base it on meta-
physical axioms: “There are no arguments to postulate moral respect for all 
humans (including babies and different kinds of disabled and sick people) 
that are not also applied to large groups of non-human animals.”13 
He does not idealize vegetarianism, however. Besides reflecting on the 
effects on health and not advocating its imposition (“In favour of vegetar-
ianism it may be said that [practised with caution] it benefits health; that 
it makes better use of the Earth’s resources,”14 2014: 62), he does not hesi-
tate to call some vegan movements “fanatical”. Moreover, he shows us that 
environmentalism and the animal rights movement can hold contradic-
tory standpoints, for example, when it is necessary to eradicate a species 
that has invaded a habitat that is not its own and endangers the rest.
 c) Jesús Mosterín is in favour of research with GMOs:
The greatest enemy of biodiversity is agriculture. […] The more efficient 
agriculture is, the more food it will be able to produce per cultivated hectare 
and the greater amount of natural land it will be possible to conserve. As 
certain genetically modified crops increase agricultural yields, the better it 
will be for nature. The spread of these crops in the USA has coincided with 
a reduction of farmland and an increase in woodland. […] today’s world of-
fers us thousands of reasons for alarm, but genetically modified crops do not 
seem to be one of them.15
Environmentalism is often identified with the visceral rejection of 
GMOs, hence the opinions of Jesús Mosterín are so important. His com-
bination of the thoroughness typical of scientists and common sense lead 
 13 He uses the expression humanes, instead of humanos, as an expression inclusive of women. In the 
singular it would be humán.
 14 Mosterín, op. cit., p. 62.
 15 Mosterín, op. cit., p. 237.
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him to state that GMOs could contribute to the conservation of ecosys-
tems if they are able to maximize production and reduce the amount of 
land under cultivation. He considers that biotechnology could be the way 
to cease using animals for consumption and to reduce the land given over to 
agriculture with the combined action of stem cells and GMOs: “On that 
day we could rewild much of the surface of the planet now occupied by 
crop fields.”16 This explains why, for example, he sees no moral obstacles in 
cloning a lost child if the parents pay for it themselves.
In his book he also comments on how the death of monarch butterflies 
was put down to GMOs, specifically to Bt-corn (genetically modified 
maize), an accusation that lacked the slightest scientific rigour and which 
forced the author of the publication to retract.
 d) Experimentation with animals. Jesús Mosterín implicitly acknowledges that 
experiments with animals are still necessary for biomedicine, the reason 
why he talks of a “moral conflict” for which “no satisfactory solution has 
been reached (not even on a theoretical level)”.17 For this reason, he devotes 
many pages to advocating the replacement of animals, whenever possible, 
and reducing their suffering, with the European Union laws on experi-
mentation with animals.
The complexity of moral dilemmas is clearly shown more than once by 
Mosterín:
I would love it if there were there a general ethical theory that resolved all moral 
problems and dilemmas satisfactorily for us. But there isn’t one, or, at least, I am 
not aware of it. […] Although utilitarianism is the moral philosophy easiest to 
apply to our relationship with the other animals, it comes up against many other 
problems, beginning with its definition. […] Nor is there a simple universal 
formula in ethics. If only there were such a magic spell, a sort of conceptual ma-
chine for justifying moral decisions. We would avoid so many dilemmas and 
headaches. I wish everything were easier, but it is not.18 
In sum, using his own reasoning there are also contradictions: for example, 
GMOs are only safe, for both humans and ecosystems, if they are first tested 
on animals.
 16 Mosterín, op. cit., p. 166.
 17 Mosterín, op. cit., p. 244.
 18 Mosterín, op. cit., pp. 71-73.
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3.2.2. Ecosocialism
Just as with liberalism, some socialist thinkers have reread Marxism from an 
environmentalist point of view and they have placed class struggle, the preser-
vation of the environment and the protection of animals in the same bag.
This is the case of Jorge Riechmann, who, reusing a well-known phrase by 
Paul Valéry, “the age of the finite world has begun”, analyses the human race’s 
responsibility to future generations, non-human living beings and the bio-
sphere as a whole. We could restructure his proposals in three ideas:
 a) An environmentalist rereading of Marx. Riechmann begins by quoting Marx 
— “Even a whole society, a nation, even all simultaneously existing contem-
porary societies taken together are not the owners of the globe. They are 
only its possessors, its usufructuaries, and, like boni patres familias they 
must hand it down to succeeding generations in an improved condition” 
(Vol. 3 of Capital) — and the Marxist concept of social reproduction, to 
look in depth at the notion of sustainability:
A socioeconomic order is ecologically sustainable when social reproduction 
can potentially be prolonged ad infinitum, because it does not endanger the 
ecological conditions and the environmental functions on which it is based.19
Given the Marxist nature of its formulation (our age would be that of 
“financialized fossilist patriarchal capitalism”),20 sustainable development 
is impossible without modifying the economic and social structures of our 
societies.
 b) A duty to future generations. Basing himself on Giuliano Pontara’s principle 
of time irrelevance, Riechmann formulates the principle of diachronic 
egalitarianism towards future generations. It is basically the idea that our 
interests and preferences are not morally superior to those of future gen-
erations, so we must consider their interests (conserving the planet, basi-
cally) as if they were our own.
 19 Riechmann, J. “Desarrollo sostenible: la lucha por la interpretación”; Riechmann, J. et al. (1995). De 
la economía a la ecología. Madrid: Trotta.
 20 Riechmann, J., Carpintero, O., Matarán, A. et al. (2014). Los inciertos pasos desde aquí hasta allá: 
alternativas socioecológicas y transiciones poscapitalistas. Granada: Editorial Universidad de Granada.
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 c) Reinterpreting the principle of precaution through Jonas’s principle of responsibil-
ity. In his opinion, we have the moral duty to achieve sufficient predictive 
knowledge before continuing with large-scale scientific and technological 
progress. In fact, ignorance of the indirect or long-term consequences of our 
technological progress ought to lead us to postpone it or rule it out.
3.2.3. Peter Singer
The highly provocative ideas of Peter Singer are difficult to pigeonhole politi-
cally, and so, unlike what we have done with the two previous groups of theo-
ries, we shall refrain from categorizing them ideologically. We will briefly ana-
lyse his thinking in reference solely and exclusively to the issue of animals, 
summarizing his ideas in five points.
 a)  The expression “animal liberation” appeared for the first time in 1973, in a 
book review written precisely by Peter Singer.21 He also used this expres-
sion as the title of a book published two years later. As he himself explains, 
until 1970 in the West only 94 studies had been published on this subject; 
in the following 20 years the number rose to 240 publications. It would 
now be impossible to count them.22
 b) Based on a very well-known quote by the founder of utilitarianism, Jeremy 
Bentham — “The question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? 
But, Can they suffer?” — Peter Singer reaches the conclusion that the 
moral equivalence between animals and ourselves is due to their ability to 
suffer and feel pain. The existence of a nervous system and the empirical 
verification of their behaviour (“shaking, facial contortions, moans, 
screams or other sounds, attempts to avoid the source of pain, the appear-
ance of fear due to the prospect of its repetition, and so on, is present”)23 
support his thesis.
 21 Singer, P. (1973). The New York Review of Books, review of Animals, Men and Morals, by Godlovitch 
and John Harris.
 22 We will take his ideas from an article published in The New York Review of Books no. 8, of vol. 50, 15 
May 2003, translated by Margarita Martínez, and from his book Liberación animal. El clásico de-
finitivo del movimiento animalista. Madrid: Taurus, 2011.
 23 Singer, P. (2011). Liberación animal. El clásico definitivo del movimiento animalista. Madrid: Taurus, 
p. 27.
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 c) Richard D. Ryder was the first to use the neologism “speciesism”, and it 
was subsequently reused by Singer. This term became so important that in 
1989 it was included in The Oxford English Dictionary. Although the con-
cept did not satisfy him all that much, with this expression he alludes to 
the “prejudice or partial attitude favourable to the interests of the members 
of our own species and against those of others”. Thus, “In order not to be 
speciesists we must allow beings that are not similar in all relevant aspects 
to have a similar right to life, and the mere belonging to our biological 
species cannot be a relevant moral criterion for obtaining this right”.24
“Speciesism” is comparable to racism or sexism. Singer reminds us that 
the famous book by Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman (1792), was refuted by another one with a similar title, A Vindica-
tion of the Rights of Brutes, by Thomas Taylor, in which he asked if animals 
ought to have the right to vote as well.25 From his perspective the justifica-
tion for mistreating animals is comparable to the justifications that have 
been used historically for racism or the discrimination of women.
 d) Equality between animals and humans. Singer argues that the acknowl-
edgement of equality between human beings is not linked to effective 
equality in birth, talent, expectations, contexts, and so on. In fact, he con-
siders it an achievement that these differences, inherent in our species, do 
not result in differences in treatment between human beings. To under-
stand how he makes the jump to dialectical equivalence between animals 
and humans, we must read his thoughts on equality:
The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of sup-
posed real equality between them: it is rule relative to how we should treat 
human beings. […] It is possible that one day all significant  differences may 
be identified as environmental and not as genetic, and everyone opposed to 
racism and sexism will hope that it is so, as this would make the task of put-
ting an end to discrimination much easier; but anyhow, it would be danger-
ous for the struggle against racism and sexism to be based on the belief that 
all important differences have an environmental origin. […] The right to 
equality does not depend on intelligence, moral capability, physical strength 
or similar factors. Equality is a moral idea, not the statement of a fact. […] 
The principle of the equality of human beings is not the description of a sup-
posed real equality between them: it is a rule of behaviour.26
 24 Ibid. p. 35.
 25 Ibid. p. 17.
 26 Ibid. p. 22.
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From this perspective it is irrelevant that animals cannot be subjects, in 
liberal mythology, of a social contract, or that they cannot be the object of 
responsibilities, or that reciprocity cannot be demanded of them. Animal 
equality would simply be a moral ideal that mankind ought to achieve. He 
gives the example of Thomas Jefferson, who, although he “was incapable of 
freeing himself completely from his past as a slave owner”, advocated inter-
racial equality in the belief that blacks were inferior to whites in intellec-
tual capacities, a belief that did not hinder, from his perspective, the strug-
gle for equal rights.27
 e) Obscure areas in his thinking. The European Convention on Human Rights 
in Biomedicine and Biotechnology was not called, in his day, the European 
Convention on Bioethics, because this discipline was associated with utili-
tarian thinking, specifically, with Peter Singer.28 To avoid a biased interpreta-
tion, the best thing is to let him speak:
We thus conclude that rejecting speciesism does not imply that all lives have 
equal value. […] It is not arbitrary to think that the life of a self-aware being, 
with the power of abstract thought, to project his future, complex acts of 
communication, and so on, is more valuable. […] If we had to choose be-
tween saving the life of a normal human being or that of a mentally handi-
capped person, we would probably choose to save the normal one; […] But 
if the dilemma consisted in just one of them avoiding pain […] how we 
should act is not at all so clear. The same thing happens when we consider 
other species. […] This would mean that if we had to decide between the life 
of a human being and that of another animal, we would choose to save the 
life of the human; but there may be special cases in which the opposite could 
be maintained, due to the fact that the human being in question did not 
enjoy the capacity of a normal one. […] when we refer to the members of 
our species that lack the normal characteristics, we can no longer maintain 
 27 Ibid. p. 22.
 28 “Specifically to demonstrate the document’s legal, and not merely ethical, nature, the original title 
was changed, which included the term ‘bioethics’, and it was replaced by ‘biomedicine’. This change 
can also be explained due to an ideological reason: the word ‘bioethics’, which has been carefully 
omitted throughout the entire document, had caused serious resistance, in Germany especially, be-
cause it is usually identified with a utilitarian approach to bioethical dilemmas and in particular with 
the ideas of the controversial Australian philosopher Peter Singer. With the title eventually used it is 
clear that the Convention is ‘law’ in the strictest sense, and not purely ‘ethical’, even when there are 
huge points in common between both disciplines in this subject.” Andorno, R. (2001). “Hacia un 
derecho internacional de la bioética: el ejemplo de la Convención Europea de Derechos Humanos y 
Biomedicina”. Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales.
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that their lives must necessarily be preferred to that of other animals. […] As 
long as we remember that we should give the same respect to the lives of 
animals as we give to the lives of those human beings at a similar mental 
level, we shall not go far wrong.29
I do not believe it is too mistaken to interpret that, according to his argu-
ments, if there was nothing else for it but to carry out experiments in bio-
medicine (a life or death case, for example), we would have to prefer to do it 
with “not normal” humans, rather than with “normal” animals.30 A similar 
idea has been put forward by the philosopher Ray Frey.31
One of the most surprising things about these movements of equating ani-
mals and humans is the ease with which some acknowledge the possibility of 
carrying out experiments with disabled human beings, as long as “normal” apes 
or pigs are protected. Surprise turns into dismay when we see that Singer, for ex-
ample, comes from a family of Jews murdered in the Nazi extermination camps.32
3.2.4. Other forms of environmentalism
Ecofeminism, the members of Liberation Theology, peasant, pro-indigenous 
and anti-globalization movements, and so on, could, although for different 
reasons, be grouped together in this paradigm. For reasons of space, we are 
unable to look at their postulates in detail.33
 29 Singer, op. cit., 2011, pp. 37-38.
 30 The nuances are important: “This does not mean that in order to avoid speciesism we have to main-
tain that it is as reprehensible to kill a dog as it is to kill a human being in full possession of their facul-
ties” (Singer, op. cit., 2011, p. 35, our italics).
 31 “Some moral philosophers who have dealt with the subject, such as Ray Frey, accept a limited use of 
mentally subnormal humans and non-human animals as subjects for experimentation, acknowledg-
ing that there are no arguments for giving greater moral consideration to mentally subnormal hu-
mans than to other animals. Humans in full possession of their mental faculties, and chimpanzees 
and other superior animals, should be excluded from experimentation. Moreover, in certain experi-
ments that are crucial for medical and pharmacological research, the best experimental animals (the 
best models of human reaction) are without doubt ourselves, humans, and then, the most sensitive 
animals and even chimpanzees, which actually exacerbates the moral dilemma posed.” (Mosterín, 
op. cit., 2014, p. 240). The quote by Mosterín is in the book by Ray Frey, Interests and Rights: The 
Case Against Animals. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.
 32 He talks about his life history at the end of the book we have analysed.
 33 Their theses converge in the justification of the principle of food sovereignty. On this point, see 
López Baroni, M. J. (2011). “Los principios no originarios de la Bioética”, Revista Argumentos de 
Razón Técnica, no. 13, pp. 113-149.
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3.3.  “Anthropocentrism (1)” –  “biocentrism (1)”
The third model argues that the important thing is life on Earth, and that our 
species is a danger to it, hence we must reduce it to numbers compatible with 
the sustainability of the planet.
The most representative paradigm of this model is Norwegian philosopher 
Arne Naess’s “Ecosophy T”. The T symbolizes an isolated cabin in which he 
lived for much of his life.
The Norwegian upheld axioms based on an extreme egalitarianism of any 
form of life,34 which would place human beings, with regard to ontological and 
moral status, on the same level as insects, for example. This way of equalizing 
nature ought to place his proposal in the previous model, as one of its varia-
tions; however, his discourse did not stop there, but he advocated reducing the 
human race to a number compatible with life on Earth, about 100 million.35
This form of intellectual pyromania is what causes us to place his dis-
course in this third model. Arne Naess did not take the trouble to explain 
how he intended to reduce the world’s population, a detail apparently insig-
nificant for his “deep” ecology. Therefore, some of his disciples tried to com-
plete his proposal: causing famines in overpopulated areas to exterminate the 
surplus population.36 These ideas were formulated shortly after the end of 
the Second World War, with the public by then fully aware of the Holocaust 
caused by the Nazis, something that was apparently no obstacle for Naess’s 
neophytes.
Although the Norwegian expressly rejected this kind of idea,37 his discourse 
undoubtedly lit the fuse. If human beings are placed on the same moral level 
as ants, there is nothing to stop it being taken a step further and humans being 
treated as ants.
The Earth would surely be better off without us, although life on the plan-
et will more likely depend precisely on our technology in the long term. In any 
case, these debates can only be considered abstractly. The reality is that one 
thing is trying to reduce population growth by encouraging contraceptive 
practices, and another thing altogether is considering its forced reduction 
 34 Keller, D. R. (2008). Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy –  2nd, pp. 206-210.
 35 Naess, A. (1973). “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A Summary.” In-
quiry, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 95-100; (1986). “The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical As-
pects.” Philosophical Inquiry 8, nos. 1-2.
 36 Augustin Berque, M. (1995). De milieux en paysages. Montpellier: Reclus, pp. 63ff, in Ballester-
os, J. (1995). Ecologismo personalista. Cuidar la naturaleza, cuidar al hombre. Editorial Tecnos.
 37 Schwarz, W. (2009). The Guardian, 15 January 2009.
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down to levels in line with the numbers proposed by someone who lived alone 
in a remote cabin in rich industrialized Norway, with its hospitals at the ready in 
case the pensive hermit should happen to fall in the snow.
3.4.  “Anthropocentrism (0)” – “biocentrism (0)”
In this model we could classify the discourses that, under the guise of environ-
mentalism, conceal another kind of programme that is not only damaging for 
all other living beings, but for the human race especially. Environmentalism 
would be a mask behind which to hide other types of objectives, like for exam-
ple, racial supremacy.
Indeed, Luc Ferry recalled in a publication how in the 1930s the most ad-
vanced European animal protection legislation came from Nazism.38 One of 
Hitler’s aphorisms (“In the new Reich there should be no room for cruelty to 
animals”) was the preamble for the Animal Protection Act, of 24 November 
1933, the Hunting Law, limiting hunting, of 3 July 1934, and the Nature Con-
servation Act, of 1 July 1935.
It is essential to read some paragraphs of the Animal Protection Act, to get 
an idea of the dangerous mixture of ideas that lie behind an apparently envi-
ronmentalist programme:
The German people have always possessed a great love for animals and they have 
always been aware of the high ethical obligations that we have towards them. 
Even so, thanks only to the National Socialist Leadership, shared by very large 
circles, of an improvement of the legal provisions with respect to animal protec-
tion, the wish to enact a specific law that recognizes the right that animals possess 
as such to be protected by themselves (um ihrer selbst Willem) has been put into 
practice. […] Cruelty is no longer punished based on the idea that people’s sen-
sibility ought to be protected from the spectacle of cruelty against animals, men’s 
interest is no longer in this case the background to the matter, but it is acknowl-
edged that animals must be protected as such (wegen seiner selbst). […] from the 
point of view of criminal law, no distinction will be made between domestic 
animals and other kinds, nor between inferior and superior animals, nor between 
useful animals and those dangerous to man.39 
 38 Ferry, L. El Nuevo orden ecológico. El árbol, el animal y el hombre (translated by Thomas Kauf ). 
Tusquets, 1st edition April 1994.
 39 Ibid. pp. 155 and 156.
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Luc Ferry associates environmentalism with German Romanticism.40 Re-
gardless of the fact that there would be a lot to discuss about these issues, what 
we have read ought to serve to alert us to the risks of lowering the status of 
human beings, or elevating that of all other living beings (as Gustavo Bueno 
said ironically, the risk does not lie in equating the chimpanzee with the hu-
man being, but the other way round).
4. Assessment of the narratives
Environmentalism, our relationship with all other living beings and, in gen-
eral, with the ecosystem, is part of the hard core of bioethics.
About the first model, “anthropocentrism (1)” – “biocentrism (0)”, we 
could note on the plus side that it is the one that has made contemporary sci-
entific and technological progress possible. Experimentation with animals is 
essential, these days, to be able to test new drugs or therapies before applying 
them to human beings. And the survival of our species has always depended 
on the consumption of animal protein, meat especially.
On the debit side, we must stress that it is the model that has led us to 
global warming and the objectification of all other living beings.
In the second model, “anthropocentrism (1)” – “biocentrism (1)”, we could 
mention on the plus side that it is the one that has allowed us to become aware 
of the suffering caused to non-human living beings and the overexploitation of 
the planet. European legislation on experimenting with animals, without elimi-
nating these experiments, is due in large measure to its denunciations. 
On the debit side, we could demand of them a bit more coherence, for 
example, that they refuse any medical treatment that might have been tested 
first on animals. 
About the third and fourth models we have nothing to say, as they speak 
for themselves. They remind us of the caution with which we must deal with 
these issues and labels.
 40 “As the biologist Walter Schoenichen, one of the principal theoreticians of the protection of the en-
vironment, has insisted time and again, the laws of 1933-1935 constitute the culmination of the Ro-
mantic movement, ‘the perfect illustration of the popular idea of Romanticism’.” Ferry, Luc, ibid. 
pp. 148 and 149.
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 Bioethics is a field of knowledge that requires plural approaches 
and solid scientific foundations to analyse with sufficient rigour 
the ethical, legal and social consequences of biotechnology and 
biomedicine. For this reason, this Handbook of Secular Bioethics, 
the result of many years of teaching and research, is designed 
to provide the necessary information to those interested in the 
subject.
The ultimate aim is to provide arguments and proposals to 
encourage autonomy and responsibility, so that bioethical deci-
sions enable the construction of a more transparent and demo-
cratic society. This perspective explains why the authors advocate 
the secular paradigm, based on the idea that the human rights 
acknowledged in international texts must form the universal mini-
mum ethical threshold as a suitable legal and political model to en-
sure that these debates are productive and plural, and not merely 
based on beliefs, religious or of any other kind.
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BIoetHICS CoLLeCtIon
La Colección de Bioética del Observatorio 
de Bioética y Derecho de la Universidad de 
Barcelona, dirigida por la Dra. María Casa-
do, promueve una concepción de la bioética 
flexible, pluridisciplinar y laica, en el marco 
del respeto a los derechos humanos recono-
cidos, y fomenta el debate informado sobre 
«las cuestiones éticas relacionadas con la 
medicina, las ciencias de la vida y las tecno-
logías conexas aplicadas a los seres humanos, 
teniendo en cuenta sus dimensiones socia-
les, jurídicas y ambientales» (art. 1.1, Decla-
ración Universal sobre Bioética y Derechos 
Humanos).
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